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Abstract
The 2008 financial crisis has been attributed by policymakers to “excessive complexity”
of the financial network, especially due to financial derivatives. In a financial network,
financial institutions (“banks” for short) are connected by financial contracts. As banks
depend on payments from contracts with other banks to cover their own obligations, such
a situation creates systemic risk, i.e., the risk of a financial crisis. Some of the contracts
are financial derivatives, where an obligation to pay depends on another variable.
In this thesis, I study in what sense derivatives make a financial network fundamentally
“more complex” compared to one without derivatives. I capture the notion of “complexity”
formally using tools from finance and theoretical computer science. I reveal new kinds
of systemic risk that arise in financial networks specifically because of derivatives and I
discuss the impact of recent regulatory policy.
I first focus on a type of derivative called a credit default swap (CDS), in which
the writer insures the holder of the contract against the default (i.e., bankruptcy) of a
third party, the reference entity. I show that, when the reference entity is another bank,
then such CDSs introduce a new kind of systemic risk arising from what I call default
ambiguity. Default ambiguity is a situation where it is impossible to decide which banks
are in default following a shock (i.e., a loss in banks’ assets). At a technical level, I show
that the clearing problem may have no solution or multiple incompatible solutions. In
contrast, without CDSs, a unique canonical solution always exists.
I then demonstrate that increased “complexity” due to CDSs also manifests as
computational complexity. More in detail, I show that the clearing problem leads to
NP-complete decision and PPAD-complete approximation problems if CDSs are allowed.
This implies a fundamental barrier to the computational analysis of these networks,
specifically to macroprudential stress testing. Without CDSs, the problems are either
trivial or in P. I study the impact of different regulatory policies. My main result is that
the aforementioned phenomena can be attributed to naked CDS positions.
In a final step, I focus on one specific regulatory policy: mandatory portfolio com-
pression, which is a post-trade mechanism by which cycles in the financial network are
eliminated. While this always reduces individual exposures, I show that, surprisingly, it
can worsen the impact of certain shocks. Banks’ incentives to compress may further be
misaligned with social welfare. I provide sufficient conditions on the network structure
under which these issues are eliminated. Overall, my results in this thesis contribute to a
better understanding of systemic risk and the effects of regulatory policy.
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Zusammenfassung
Die Finanzkrise des Jahres 2008 wurde von politischen Entscheidungstra¨gern als Folge
von “unverha¨ltnisma¨ßiger Komplexita¨t” des Finanznetzwerkes, besonders aufgrund von
Finanzderivaten, bezeichnet. In einem Finanznetzwerk sind Finanzinstitutionen (kurz
“Banken”) durch Finanzvertra¨ge verbunden. Da die Banken von Zahlungen aus ihren
Vertra¨gen mit anderen Banken abha¨ngen, um ihren eigenen Verpflichtungen nachzukom-
men, erzeugt eine solche Situation systemisches Risiko, d.h., das Risiko einer Finanzkrise.
Einige der Vertra¨ge sind Derivate, bei denen eine Zahlungsverpflichtung von einer anderen
Variable abha¨ngt.
In der vorliegenden Arbeit untersuche ich, in welchem Sinne Derivate ein Finanznetz-
werk fundamental “komplexer” machen, verglichen mit einem Netzwerk ohne Derivate. Ich
verwende Werkzeuge aus den Finanzwissenschaften und der theoretischen Informatik, um
den Begriff der “Komplexita¨t” formal zu erfassen. Ich decke neue Arten von systemischem
Risiko auf, die in Finanznetzwerken spezifisch aufgrund von Derivaten auftreten, und ich
untersuche die Auswirkungen der ju¨ngsten regulatorischen Maßnahmen.
Ich konzentriere mich zuna¨chst auf eine Klasse von Derivaten namens Credit Default
Swaps (CDSs), in denen der Verka¨ufer des Vertrages den Ka¨ufer gegen den Kreditausfall
einer dritten Partei absichert, des Referenzschuldners. Ich zeige, dass solche CDSs, in
denen der Referenzschuldner eine andere Bank ist, eine neue Art systemischen Risikos
einfu¨hren, das ich default ambiguity (Ambiguita¨t des Kreditausfalls) nenne. Default
ambiguity bezeichnet eine Situation, in der es nach einem Schock (d.h. einem Verlust
in den Anlagen der Banken) unmo¨glich ist, zu bestimmen, welche Banken infolgedessen
ausfallen. Auf einer technischen Ebene zeige ich, dass es mo¨glich ist, dass das Clearing-
Problem keine Lo¨sung oder mehrere inkompatible Lo¨sungen hat. Im Gegensatz dazu
existiert ohne CDSs immer eine eindeutige kanonische Lo¨sung.
Ich lege dann dar, dass die erho¨hte “Komplexita¨t” durch CDSs sich auch als Rechen-
komplexita¨t offenbart. Im Detail zeige ich, dass das Clearing-Problem zu NP-vollsta¨ndigen
Entscheidungsproblemen sowie PPAD-vollsta¨ndigen Approximationsproblemen fu¨hrt,
wenn CDSs erlaubt sind. Dies impliziert eine fundamentale Hu¨rde zur computergestu¨tzten
Analyse dieser Netzwerke, insbesondere im Kontext makroprudenzieller Stress Tests. Ohne
CDSs sind die Probleme entweder trivial oder in P. Ich untersuche die Auswirkungen ver-
schiedener regulatorischer Maßnahmen. Mein Hauptresultat ist, dass die obengenannten
Pha¨nomene auf ungedeckte CDS-Positionen zuru¨ckgefu¨hrt werden ko¨nnen.
Zuletzt konzentriere ich mich auf eine bestimmte regulatorische Maßnahme, na¨mlich
obligatorische Portfoliokomprimierung. Portfoliokomprimierung ist ein Mechanismus,
durch den Kreise im Finanznetzwerk entfernt werden. Wa¨hrend dieser Vorgang immer
die individuellen Risikopositionen reduziert, zeige ich, dass er die Auswirkungen von
bestimmten Schocks unerwarteterweise verschlimmern kann. Die Anreize der Banken,
eine Komprimierung durchzufu¨hren, ko¨nnen außerdem dem sozialen Wohl entgegenstehen.
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Ich gebe hinreichende Bedingungen an, unter denen diese Probleme ausgeschlossen sind.
Meine Resultate in dieser Arbeit tragen zu einem besseren Versta¨ndnis systemischer
Risiken und der Auswirkungen regulatorischer Maßnahmen bei.
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1 Motivation and Overview of Results1
If we go down,
we all go down together.
If we go down, down, down,
We all go down together.
Krewella, We go down
1.1 Financial Derivatives, Networks, and Systemic Risk
Aristotle tells the story how philosopher Thales of Miletus made a fortune off the first
known financial derivative around 600 BC. During one winter, Thales had used his
understanding of the weather to predict a good olive harvest for the coming summer.
Thales had then paid a small amount of money to reserve all the olive presses in his
area for use in summer. When Thales eventually found himself correct and demand for
olive presses spiked, he was able to rent them out at a high price.2 However, not all
stories of this kind have the same ending. In 1868, the time Thomas Mann sets his epos
Buddenbrooks, derivatives are slowly gaining acceptance at the commodities exchanges.
Thomas Buddenbrook, son of the family, enters into a risky contract in which he buys
a farmer’s whole harvest while it is still growing. Like Thales, Thomas had speculated
on a good harvest; in this case, to his ruin: when a hailstorm destroys the whole crop,
Thomas is left with nothing.3
When we witness the protagonists of Michael Lewis’ true story The Big Short profit
from the 2008 financial crisis,4 derivatives have already become an integral part of our
financial system. A financial derivative is a financial contract between two parties in
which the payment depends on the future value of another variable. In case of Thales
and Thomas, this was the harvest later in the year. In the case of The Big Short, the
derivative is called a credit default swap (CDS) and the variable was the default (i.e.,
bankruptcy) of another firm, the reference entity. When this entity is a mortgage fund
or even a bank, the holder of a CDS profits off a financial crisis — provided the seller of
the CDS does not default as well.
1I liberally borrow from my own prior work (Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston, 2019b,a, Schulden-
zucker and Seuken, 2019a,b) for parts of Chapter 1.
2Aristotle, Politics, section 1259a. See also Crawford and Sen (1996, p. 7).
3Thomas Mann, Buddenbrooks, part 8
4Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine. W. W. Norton & Company, 2010
1
What would have been banned as illegal betting in earlier times is today an indispens-
able tool by which financial institutions trade and reallocate risk. To see how this can
be useful to society, consider a European company seeking a loan. US investors may be
willing to supply the loan, but there may be disagreement about the currency the loan
should be denominated in: if it is denominated in US dollars, the company is exposed to
the risk that dollars become more expensive. If it is denominated in euros, investors are
exposed to the risk that the euro devalues. An investment bank may be able to help here:
it can bundle a euro-denominated loan with a derivative that will pay the dollar–euro
exchange rate in the future.5 US investors could then buy the bundle without having to
worry about exchange rates: any loss due to a devaluation of the euro would be offset by
an equivalent gain in the derivative. Another trader, like a hedge fund, would take on
the other side of the derivative and thus the exchange rate risk. The investment bank
has thus just enabled an investment that otherwise would not have taken place, reducing
funding costs for the company and contributing to economic growth.6
Of course, in our example, both the investment bank and the investor depend on
the hedge fund to meet its obligation to pay. If the investor or the hedge fund enter
into further derivatives with other parties, the process can continue over any number of
stages, with each party buying, rebundling, and reselling risk. A network of obligations
arises: a graph where the nodes are financial institutions (“banks” for short) and the
edges are financial contracts. I call this the financial network.7
The financial network can serve a stabilizing function because losses at one institution
can be spread across many different institutions and are thus more easily absorbed.
However, the 2008 financial crisis has told us a different story: the financial network
can also be a source of systemic risk, which endangers the financial system as a whole.
Andrew Haldane (2009), then Executive Director of Financial Stability at the Bank
of England, described the crisis as a manifestation of “the behaviour under stress of
a complex, adaptive network,” in which “financial innovation [had] increased further
network dimensionality, complexity, and uncertainty.” The financial network functioned
as an “incendiary device” (Haldane, 2009), through which financial distress would travel
to new institutions and markets. Financial contagion turned significant but local losses
in the US housing market into the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression.
Financial over-the-counter (OTC)8 derivatives have played a major role during the
5This would most likely come in the form of a cross-currency swap, one of the most actively traded
derivatives.
6See Mehrling (2010) and Mehrling et al. (2013) for more examples of how the shadow banking sector
generates value through the use of derivatives.
7One important property of the financial network is that cycles, i.e., closed chains of obligations,
are overwhelmingly common. See D’Errico et al. (2018), for example, for an empirical study of the
network structure of credit default swap markets, which will be discussed below. One may assume
that cycles are redundant structures that should be eliminated. Indeed, a post-trade mechanism called
portfolio compression specifically aims to eliminate cycles. I will discuss portfolio compression in detail in
Section 1.2 and in Chapter 5.
8OTC derivatives are derivatives that are traded directly with other financial institutions rather than
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crisis.9 For example, Fender, Frankel and Gyntelberg (2008) described how the default
of Lehman Brothers, which was both a major counterparty and reference entity in
the CDS market, had significant repercussions in money markets (i.e., short-term loan
markets). Further distress could only be averted by the government rescue of AIG,
another major CDS trader. Both firms were among the most important institutions in
the CDS market, both as counterparties and as reference entities (Fitch Ratings, 2007).
It is hence almost certain that they were counterparties in a significant amount of CDSs
where the respective other bank was the reference entity. Such a situation makes the
consequences of a government intervention hard to foresee in a way I will make precise
below.
After the crisis, financial regulators found themselves under great urgency to act
against the “excessive systemic risk arising from the complexity and interconnectedness
that characterize our financial system” (then Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve Janet
Yellen, 2013). These reforms can be grouped into two directions: the first was tighter
regulation of financial institutions through reforms such as Basel III, EMIR (in Europe),
and the Dodd-Frank act (in the US). The second was improved monitoring and stress
testing. In a stress test, a regulator such as the European Banking Association evaluates
the stability of the financial system under an array of adverse economic scenarios. At the
same time, researchers found a renewed interest in systemic risk in financial networks
to evaluate and support these regulatory measures. The present thesis is part of this
research effort.
The above accounts by policymakers attribute the financial crisis to excessive “com-
plexity” of the financial network. The question remains, though, how exactly we should
understand the informal term “complexity” here. In particular, it seems intuitive that
derivatives lead to a “more complex” financial network, which should therefore be exposed
to more systemic risk compared to a network without derivatives. The goal of this thesis is
to capture this notion formally using tools from finance and computer science. Therefore,
the present thesis is guided by the following overarching research question:
In what sense are financial networks with derivatives “more complex” than
those without and what are the implications for systemic risk?
In the next section, I present some background and I operationalize my overarching
research question into three specific research questions.
1.2 Background, Problem Statement, and Research Questions
Researchers have studied network-induced systemic risk since around 2000, where they
have mostly focused on financial contagion. Researchers have studied two questions
through an exchange. In this thesis, I only consider OTC derivatives.
9Regarding the role of OTC derivatives, specifically CDSs, in the 2008 crisis, see also: Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011)
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in particular: first, what is the impact of network topology on contagion compared
to other factors such as correlation between banks’ asset portfolios (Allen and Gale,
2000, Elsinger, Lehar and Summer, 2006, Gai, Haldane and Kapadia, 2011, Acemoglu
et al., 2012, Glasserman and Young, 2015)? And second, how can an individual bank’s
contribution to network-induced systemic risk be measured (Battiston et al., 2012, Hu
et al., 2012, Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015, Demange, 2016)?
The overwhelming majority of these pieces of work makes the implicit assumption
that the contracts in a financial network are all of the same kind: debt contracts, which
encode a fixed obligation to pay a certain amount from one bank to another bank.10 This
model has many advantages: debt networks can be represented as weighted graphs and
this way we gain access to many standard tools from graph theory. The model is also
simple to evaluate in a way that will be made precise below. Going back to my original
discussion from Section 1.1, however, one should bear in mind that many of the contracts
in the real financial network are actually derivatives, where the obligation to pay is not
fixed, but depends on another variable. This raises the question if the debt model is
appropriate in this case. In other words, are financial networks that contain derivatives
merely “a bit more complicated” in the sense that they by and large exhibit the same
phenomena as debt networks? Or are they truly more complex in the sense that they
exhibit entirely new phenomena, and potentially new systemic risks, that are not visible
if one assumes that all contracts are debt?
Attempts to capture the “complexity” of the financial network have previously
been made using various measures from graph theory, such as path length, degree, or
concentration measures (Shin, 2010, Gai, Haldane and Kapadia, 2011, Arinaminpathy,
Kapadia and May, 2012, Battiston et al., 2016). As these measures require ordinary
graphs as their inputs, where edges cannot contain more information than weights, they
only apply to debt networks (unless some kind of transformation is applied first; such a
transformation would always lose information).
One way to operationalize complexity of financial networks is by means of the clearing
problem: we are given a financial network where some of the banks have been exposed
to a shock, i.e., a loss on their assets. Each bank now makes payments to its creditors
based on its own external assets and its interbank assets, i.e., the payments it receives
from other banks. This implies a constraint reminiscent of a flow identity: banks with
sufficient (total) assets to pay their liabilities in full must do so; the other banks are
in default and must pay out all their assets to creditors in proportion to the respective
liability. Banks may further incur default costs and lose a percentage of their assets upon
10Elliott, Golub and Jackson (2014) studied cross-holdership, encoded as the percentage of one
institution owned by another institution. Kusnetsov and Veraart (2019) studied a model of debt contracts
with multiple maturities. These variations of the standard debt contract all behave in a very similar way
for my purposes in this thesis. I use “debt contract” as an umbrella term for any model of financial
contracts where the liability from one bank to the other is a fixed number.
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defaulting.11
The clearing problem serves as a model for how a financial crisis will turn out following
the initial shock. Note that it is based entirely on simple rules of accounting rather than,
e.g., the order of defaults and payments. This makes the clearing problem robust to
errors in the details of the contracts, such as maturities. Due to its simple structure, the
clearing problem is analytically tractable, making it a useful tool for theoretical research.12
Central banks’ stress tests, currently in the process of moving to a macroprudential (i.e.,
system-wide) regime, will likely include a variant of the clearing problem in the future as
well.13
One interpretation of the clearing problem is that in a financial crisis, a clearing
authority (e.g., a central bank) observes the whole network of contracts, seeks to solve
the clearing problem, and prescribes to each bank how much it has to pay to every other
bank. Such a scenario is not a mere theoretical device. Indeed, then world bank chief
economist Joseph Stiglitz described his attempt at a resolution of the 1997 East Asia
financial crisis as “an extraordinarily complex general equilibrium problem that had not
been solved” akin to the clearing problem. Not being able to solve the clearing problem
resulted in a “paralysis” and a costly delay in restructuring (Stiglitz, 2016, at 0:51).
It would take another four years after the East Asia crisis until Eisenberg and Noe
(2001) provided the first formalization of the clearing problem in debt networks and
proved that it always has a solution. While there may be several solutions, there is always
one that maximizes the equity (i.e., the money left for shareholders after clearing) of
each individual bank. The equity-maximal solution is the obvious choice for the clearing
authority to implement because it is preferred by each bank to every other solution. It
can further be computed in polynomial time. Rogers and Veraart (2013) extended this
result to a situation where there may be default costs. Importantly, these results only
apply to debt networks.
When we think about the suitability of debt networks as a model for derivatives
networks, we should distinguish two types of derivatives: if the obligation to pay only
depends on variables that are external to the financial system, then these variables can
be assumed to be fixed for the purpose of clearing, which essentially gives rise to a debt
11While the exact rules of clearing vary across the literature (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001, Cifuentes,
Ferrucci and Shin, 2005, Rogers and Veraart, 2013, Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015), they all
share as a common feature that payments (or, in some cases, contract valuations) happen simultaneously
and an input-output identity needs to hold at each bank. The essential properties of these models are
very similar. In most parts of this thesis, I consider the very influential clearing model by Eisenberg and
Noe (2001) and its extension to default costs by Rogers and Veraart (2013).
12Most of the theoretical pieces of work cited at the beginning of this sub-section are based on some
variant of the clearing problem.
13The European Central Bank’s recent STAMPe framework, which was developed based on “top-down
models used to support EU-wide stress-testing exercises” (Constaˆncio, 2017), includes network effects as
one of its central elements. Specifically, a variant of the clearing problem very close to Eisenberg and
Noe (2001) is solved 20,000 times in the context of a Monte Carlo simulation to obtain a probability
distribution of contagion losses (Dees, Henry and Martin, 2017, Chapter 12).
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network. If, however, the obligation to pay depends on a variable that is fundamentally
endogenous to the financial system, then such a derivative cannot be modeled as a debt
contract. It is here where we should look first to find new effects due to derivatives.
I therefore study financial networks that contain credit default swaps (CDSs) written
on other banks in addition to debt. Recall from Section 1.1 that a CDS is a financial
derivative where the obligation to pay depends on the default of a third party, the
reference entity. Market participants use CDSs to insure themselves against a default of
the reference entity or to place a speculative bet on this event. The situation between
Lehman Brothers and AIG mentioned in Section 1.1 was one where a large amount of
CDSs was written on other banks.14
The little prior work that has studied financial networks with CDSs on other banks
has not employed the clearing problem, but has rather resorted to models where either
some of the effects of CDSs are ignored or CDSs are evaluated in some order (Heise
and Ku¨hn, 2012, Leduc, Poledna and Thurner, 2017, Banerjee and Feinstein, 2019).
While such models always produce a solution, they also rely on their assumptions or the
respective evaluation order for their result and therefore do not provide a definition of
“the unique and well-defined outcome” of a crisis. The question now arises if this was a
coincidence.
Research Question 1 Under which conditions can financial networks with debt and
credit default swaps be cleared?
Recall from above that this is always the case in debt networks. Thus, if the answer
to this question is not “always,” then I have captured a way in which CDSs make a
financial network more “complex.” The possibility of a situation where the financial
network cannot be cleared should also be considered a new systemic risk, as we have
learned from Stiglitz’ account of the East Asia crisis.
Recall that in debt networks, not only does an (equity-maximizing) solution to the
clearing problem always exist, but it can also be computed in polynomial time. This is
important: if regulators only knew that a solution exists, but could not find it quickly
enough, then this would be almost equivalent to a situation where no solution exists
in the first place. Clearing algorithms for debt networks do not extend to CDSs on
other banks,15 and therefore the question regarding computational complexity of clearing
14The market for CDSs on financial firms alone currently has a size of about USD 900 billion. In the
years following the 2008 crisis, this number was as high as USD 5 trillion. See Bank for International
Settlements (2018, Section Single-name instruments, Subsection Financial firms) and the graph linked
there.
15I provide a discussion on this in Chapter 3. Note that brute-force approaches are impractical due to
the size of the financial systems considered. For example, the 2014 European stress test considered 123
banks (European Banking Authority, 2014). In the ECB’s stress testing methodology in Dees, Henry and
Martin (2017, Chapter 12), the authors consider 144 banks, only few of which are trivial, i.e., sources or
sinks in the network (see Chart 12.1 in that paper). If one were to include all actors in the CDS market
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in this setting has remained open. Besides the practical relevance of efficient clearing
algorithms, I argue that computational complexity provides a useful measure for the
“complexity” of financial networks. Researchers have previously used this approach in the
context of derivatives. Arora et al. (2011) and Zuckerman (2011) studied the hardness of
detecting rigged collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Braverman and Pasricha (2014)
showed that pricing a class of complex financial derivatives called compound options is
PSPACE-hard. These pieces of work considered individual financial products that are
“complex” by themselves. In contrast, a single CDS is a rather simple derivative and only
develops “complexity” in a network context.
Hemenway and Khanna (2016) studied computational complexity in debt networks
and showed that it is computationally hard16 to, given a cross-holdership network and
a “budget” for negative shocks, determine the distribution of this budget to the banks
that does the worst damage in terms of defaults. In contrast, the clearing problem is
concerned with determining the impact of a particular known distribution of shocks to
banks, which is likely an easier problem for any type of network. My second research
question concerns the computational complexity of the clearing problem in financial
networks with CDSs on banks. Depending on the answer to research question 1, this
question needs to be asked in two parts.
Research Question 2 What is the computational complexity of clearing financial
networks with credit default swaps? Specifically, (1) what is the computational complexity
of deciding whether a solution to the clearing problem exists, and (2) when a solution is
guaranteed to exist, what is the computational complexity of computing an (approximate)
solution?
I study both research questions 1 and 2 in general networks and under restrictions
imposed by the regulatory changes after the financial crisis. This provides an opportunity
to evaluate these policies, to understand if they help reduce “complexity” of the financial
network in the context of derivatives. The following are policies that were put into place
specifically for the regulation of OTC derivatives and that seem particularly relevant
from a network perspective:
Naked CDSs on European sovereign states were banned by the European Union in 2012.
This means that a CDS on a European sovereign can only be bought if a sufficiently
high (debt) exposure towards that sovereign is present as well. In this case, the
CDS functions as insurance, offsetting any losses in the debt contract. In a naked
in a stress test, one would end up with almost 1000 institutions (Peltonen, Scheicher and Vuillemey,
2014). Note further that in (Dees, Henry and Martin, 2017, Chapter 12), the clearing problem is solved
in the inner loop of a Monte Carlo simulation, making running time concerns even more important.
16Their result is relative to the Balanced Complete Bipartite Subgraph problem, which is the subject
of various hardness conjectures.
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CDS, in contrast, the holder only holds a CDS and thus benefits if (other things
equal) the reference entity is in financial distress. A ban on all naked CDSs has
been part of the public debate following the 2008 crisis (Soros, 2009, Reuters, 2009),
but was never implemented.
Central counterparty clearing is mandated for a significant part of the OTC derivative
market. In its most extreme form, this means that all contracts have to be made
via a central node, the central clearing counterparty (CCP). A bank A would not
write a contract to a bank B directly, but rather bank A would write a contract to
the CCP and the CCP would write a contract to bank B. One of the desired effects
is that the CCP would absorb a shock on the banks, prevent it from spreading
through the network, and thus prevent financial contagion.17
Portfolio Compression is multilateral netting, i.e., the elimination of cycles in the net-
work. Netting is performed for cycles of the same type of derivative, e.g. CDSs
with the same reference entity. Compression is used in markets for OTC deriva-
tives where insufficient standardization prohibits the use of a CCP. This includes
single-name credit default swaps, i.e., the financial derivatives with which research
questions 1 and 2 are concerned.18
Out of the three, portfolio compression stands out as particularly “complex.” For
example, a non-trivial choice needs to be made regarding which cycles should be com-
pressed. If cycles overlap, it may be the case that not all cycles can be compressed and
trade-offs need to be made. The involved banks further need to agree for compression
to be performed, giving rise to a potential incentive problem. Financial networks with
derivatives may therefore be more “complex” than debt networks by virtue of a complex
process being applied exclusively to them.
While the impact of central counterparty clearing on systemic risk has been studied
intensely (e.g., Duffie and Zhu, 2011, Loon and Zhong, 2014, Duffie, Scheicher and Vuille-
mey, 2015), very little is known about the analogous question for portfolio compression
(the only prior piece of work dealing specifically with this question being Veraart (2019)).
Given this little prior knowledge, it appears sensible to study portfolio compression in
the simpler debt-only model first. To further simplify the analysis, one should consider
shocks that are arbitrary but fixed, rather than a random distribution of shocks.
17Both the regulatory framework EMIR (in Europe) and Dodd-Frank (in the US) mandate the use of
a CCP for certain types of derivatives (interest rate swaps and index CDSs), but not yet for the kind of
CDSs I study in research questions 1 and 2 (single-name CDSs).
18EMIR regulations include an “obligation to have procedures to analyse the possibility to conduct
the exercise” of portfolio compression when counterparties have more than 500 contracts with each other
that are not centrally cleared (European Securities and Markets Authority, 2017). Portfolio compression
can also be applied in the context of a CCP; however, I do not explicitly study this use case in this thesis.
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Research Question 3 In debt-only financial networks, what are the banks’ incentives
to engage in portfolio compression and what are the effects of portfolio compression on
systemic risk?
1.3 Publications Contained in This Thesis
This thesis consists of four papers, which together address the three research questions:
paper 1 addresses research question 1, paper 2 and 3 address research question 2, and
paper 4 addresses research question 3. I restate the research questions and provide a list
of papers that address the respective research question. For working papers, the dates
listed here refer to the most recent publicly available version. The chapters of this thesis
include small changes to the exposition relative to these publicly available versions.
Research Question 1 Under which conditions can financial networks with debt and
credit default swaps be cleared?
Publications
• “Default Ambiguity: Credit Default Swaps Create New Systemic Risks in Fi-
nancial Networks.” Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken, and Stefano Battiston.
Management Science . Published in Articles in Advance, June 2019.
See also: “Clearing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps.”
Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken, and Stefano Battiston. Extended abstract in
Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC),
Maastricht, The Netherlands, July 2016.
Research Question 2 What is the computational complexity of clearing financial
networks with credit default swaps? Specifically, (1) what is the computational complexity
of deciding whether a solution to the clearing problem exists, and (2) when a solution is
guaranteed to exist, what is the computational complexity of computing an (approximate)
solution?
Publications
• “The Computational Complexity of Clearing Financial Networks with Credit Default
Swaps.” Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken, and Stefano Battiston. Working
Paper, May 2019.
See also: “Finding Clearing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit Default
Swaps is PPAD-complete.” Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken, and Stefano
Battiston. In Proceedings of the 8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science
(ITCS) Conference, Berkeley, USA, January 2017.
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See also: “Clearing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps.”
Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken, and Stefano Battiston. Extended abstract in
Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC),
Maastricht, The Netherlands, July 2016.
• “Monotonic and Non-Monotonic Solution Concepts for Generalized Circuits.” Stef-
fen Schuldenzucker and Sven Seuken. Working Paper, July 2019.
Research Question 3 In debt-only financial networks, what are the banks’ incentives
to engage in portfolio compression and what are the effects of portfolio compression on
systemic risk?
Publications
• “Portfolio Compression in Financial Networks: Incentives and Systemic Risk.”
Steffen Schuldenzucker and Sven Seuken. Working Paper, November 2019.
1.4 Summary of Contributions
In the following, I provide a brief summary of all four papers and explain how they
answer the three research questions.
1.4.1 Default Ambiguity: Credit Default Swaps Create New Systemic Risks
in Financial Networks
In the first paper of my thesis (Chapter 2), I answer my first research question in the
negative for general networks: in financial networks with CDSs, it may indeed be the case
that it is not well-defined which banks are in default in terms of the clearing problem, a
situation I call default ambiguity. This can happen in two different ways. Non-existence
refers to a situation where the clearing problem has no solution. Non-maximality means
that there is a solution, but no solution maximizes the equity of each bank simultaneously:
banks disagree on which solution they prefer. Recall that both situations are impossible
in debt networks.
If the clearing authority was facing a situation of non-existence in a crisis, a “paralysis”
like in the East Asia crisis may ensue because it would not be clear how to proceed. In
a situation of non-maximality, the clearing authority would have to choose among the
different solutions, which would imply favoring the equity (and thus shareholders’ profits)
of one bank over that of another one. This in turn might lead to major lobbying activities,
as banks would have an incentive to influence the clearing authority to select a solution
that is favorable to them. If default ambiguity came up during a stress test, it would
lead to an inconclusive outcome. Default Ambiguity thus constitutes a fundamental
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barrier to effective stress testing in financial networks with CDSs. These reasons are why
I consider default ambiguity a new systemic risk that is specific to financial networks
with derivatives like CDSs.
The intuition for my non-existence result is that with CDSs, a bank A can hold
a short position on another bank B, i.e., A is better off if B is worse off. In a dense
network of debt and CDS contracts, a bank may easily find itself indirectly holding a
short position on itself, i.e., bank A is better off if bank A is worse off, which intuitively
leads to a contradiction. The non-maximality case is similar. In contrast, in a debt-only
network, banks only hold long positions on each other (if one bank is worse off, then the
other is also worse off), so that this phenomenon does not exist.
To understand which kinds of networks are exposed to default ambiguity, I develop a
new analysis framework. More in detail, I define the colored dependency graph, where
the nodes are banks and colored edges indicate long and short positions. By restricting
the cycles in the colored dependency graph, I receive sufficient conditions under which
existence and/or maximality are restored. Specifically, I show that default ambiguity
hinges on the presence of naked CDSs. Recall that naked CDSs are CDSs that are held
without also holding a corresponding debt contract (or holding an insufficient amount of
debt) so that the holder of a naked CDS benefits from financial distress at the reference
entity. My results imply that a ban on all naked CDSs would eliminate default ambiguity.
In contrast, I find that the policy of using a central clearing counterparty (CCP) does
not eliminate default ambiguity. This may be surprising since it may look like a CCP
transforms the financial network into a trivial star network. However, a CCP in fact
only protects against counterparty risk (i.e., the dependence of a bank on its debtors)
while fundamental risk (i.e., the dependence of CDS holders and writers on the respective
reference entity) still passes directly between the banks, essentially “around” the CCP.
This is enough to lead to non-existence of a solution.
The results in this paper provide a first answer regarding the “complexity” of financial
networks with derivatives: yes, in the case of CDSs on other banks, derivatives make a
financial network more complex. Default ambiguity is a new systemic risk that does not
exist in debt networks. Specifically, naked CDSs are to blame.
1.4.2 The Computational Complexity of Financial Networks with CDSs
In the next paper (Chapter 3), I study the “complexity” of financial networks with CDSs
through the lens of computational complexity. Recall that in debt networks, the clearing
problem can always be solved in polynomial time. At the same time, we know from
the previous paper that with CDSs, the clearing problem may not even have a solution.
Recall from research question 2 that this immediately raises two questions regarding the
computational aspects of the clearing problem with CDSs:
1. Given a financial network, can we efficiently determine whether a solution to the
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clearing problem exists?
2. Given a financial network in which a solution is known to exist, can we efficiently
compute it?
In this paper, I answer both questions in the negative. Towards the first question, I show
that deciding if a solution exists is NP-hard. An appropriate relaxation to ε-approximate
solutions is NP-complete, for a sufficiently small constant ε.19 Towards the second
question, I restrict my attention to the special case where banks do not incur default costs
and where it is known that a solution always exists.20 Here, the clearing problem gives
rise to the total search problem of, given a financial network, finding an ε-approximate
solution. I show that this problem is PPAD-complete for a sufficiently small constant ε.
Thus, no polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) exists unless P=PPAD.
I then attempt to isolate an “origin” of this hardness. In a first step, I show that
already obtaining the most basic information about the solutions of the clearing problem,
namely which banks default, is hard. More in detail, it is already NP-hard to decide if
some given bank will default in some ε-solution (an appropriate relaxation being NP-
complete) and in the case without default costs, it is already PPAD-complete to find a
set of banks that will default in some ε-solution. These results suggest that the newfound
“complexity” of the clearing problem is not an artifact of the problem formulation, but is
fundamental to financial networks with CDSs.
In a second step towards the “origin” of the hardness, I study restrictions on the
contract space. My results echo the findings from the previous paper. Computational
complexity arises from fundamental risk, not counterparty risk, so CCPs do not help.
Banning naked CDSs on the other hand does help: in this case, we receive a fully
polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS).
Computational complexity was likely not the regulators’ first concern during and after
the 2008 crisis. However, I have demonstrated in this paper that it is useful measure of the
fundamental “complexity” of financial networks and that it constitutes a new systemic
risk in financial networks with CDSs. My results on the “origin” of the complexity
provide a tool to guide regulatory policy.
1.4.3 Monotonic and Non-Monotonic Solution Concepts for Generalized
Circuits
The third paper of this thesis (Chapter 4) provides the technical foundation for some of
the proofs in the previous paper. The most important insight for the PPAD-hardness
19The (exact) solutions to the clearing problem with CDSs can be all irrational, so that finding an
exact solution is not a well-defined computational problem and the exact decision problem is likely not
in NP. This is another difference to debt-only networks, where solutions are always rational and of
polynomial length.
20I prove this in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
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results in Chapter 3 is that financial networks with CDSs can perform calculations. There
are financial networks where the recovery rate of one bank (i.e., the percentage of its
liabilities it can pay) is the sum, difference, etc., of the recovery rates of two other banks.
More in detail, my PPAD-hardness proofs in Chapter 3 are reductions from generalized
circuits to financial networks with CDSs. Originally introduced for the study of the
Nash equilibrium approximation problem (Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou, 2009,
Chen, Deng and Teng, 2009, Rubinstein, 2018), generalized circuits have been used to
show PPAD-hardness of many other equilibrium approximation problems since.21
When I study the “origin” of the computational complexity in Chapter 3 and I show
that it is already hard to compute a set of banks that default in some ε-solution, I perform
reduction from a new discrete “support finding” variant of the generalized circuit problem.
This proof requires a particularly close correspondence between the generalized circuit
and the financial network I reduce it to. Such a correspondence was, however, hindered
by a conceptual flaw in the generalized circuit concept itself, namely that the solution
concept is not monotonic. By this I mean that if ε < ε′, then an ε-approximate solution
for a certain generalized circuit is not necessarily also an ε′-approximate solution. This
very unintuitive property, which had not been discussed before, creates subtle technical
issues, including in prior work, that require intricate additional arguments to circumvent.
To overcome this problem of non-monotonicity, in my third paper (Chapter 4), I
introduce two new computationally equivalent variants of the generalized circuit problem
that are monotonic, serve as a drop-in replacement in prior work, eliminate the afore-
mentioned issues in a natural way, and enable my above hardness proof. I hope that my
results will enable new studies of sub-classes of generalized circuits as well as simpler and
more natural reductions from generalized circuits to other equilibrium search problems
in the future.
1.4.4 Portfolio Compression in Financial Networks: Incentives and Systemic
Risk
The market for CDSs and other OTC derivatives is subject to several regulatory policies,
some of which I have discussed in the previous papers. In the final paper in this thesis
(Chapter 5), I focus on one specific policy: mandatory portfolio compression, i.e., the
practice of removing cycles in the financial network. Note that portfolio compression is
only applied in OTC derivatives networks (see Section 1.2).
Compression originated in the private sector and was only later endorsed by regulators.
It proceeds in three steps: first, participating institutions submit the trades they would
like to compress to a financial service provider. Second, the service provider combines
the information submitted by all participants to construct the network and it calculates
21See, for instance: Babichenko, Papadimitriou and Rubinstein (2016), Chen, Paparas and Yannakakis
(2017), Othman, Papadimitriou and Rubinstein (2016)
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an unwind proposal, i.e., a collection of contracts to be removed. Third and crucially,
all involved banks need to agree to the unwind proposal before the compression is
implemented.22
One might assume that compression universally reduces systemic risk because it
reduces interconnectedness. However, in a pre-study for this paper I have shown that
this is not the case: there are networks where compression increases losses following a
particular shock (Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston, 2018). This immediately raises
two questions:
1. Under which conditions is a particular compression socially beneficial or even
beneficial for each individual bank?
2. Under which conditions do involved banks have an incentive to agree to compression?
Is there a misalignment with the previous question?
With this paper, I am among the first to conduct a principled theoretical study of these
questions and of the impact of portfolio compression on systemic risk in general.23 As
explained in research question 3, I study a particularly simple model: only debt contracts
and an arbitrary but fixed shock.
I find that compression can be socially and individually detrimental, and it can even
hurt the banks that participate in it. Furthermore, incentives to agree to compression
may be misaligned with social welfare. I show that this effect depends on the parameters
of the financial system and on the compression in a complex and non-monotonic way.
This reveals another degree of “complexity” in OTC derivatives networks that arises
from the business practices and regulatory policies imposed in these markets.
Based on my findings in the previous paragraph, it is a complex strategic decision
for banks whether or not to agree to compression. In practice, however, banks generally
seem to agree to unwind proposals without further deliberation. An explanation for this
might be local information. I show that the incentives for banks to agree to compression
depend on the presence of feedback paths, i.e., paths of liabilities that are not compressed
and that lead from an involved bank to another involved bank. If banks do not take the
possibility of feedback paths into account (and make an additional normality assumption),
they would always consider it in their best interest to agree to compression.
I then present sufficient conditions under which compression is beneficial for all
banks in a Pareto sense. This is the case if the recovery rates of involved banks are
relatively high or when their balance sheets are sufficiently homogeneous. These effects
depend on the default costs: if interbank payments are subject to lower default costs,
22I present a simplified description of the process at one of the largest compression providers, TriOptima
(see TriOptima, “triReduce Overview”, https://www.trioptima.com/resources/). I also copy their
terminology. The basic process is the same for all compression providers.
23To the best of my knowledge, the only piece of prior work dealing explicitly with this question is
Veraart (2019). All of the results from that paper can be viewed as special cases of the results I obtain in
Chapter 5 of the present thesis.
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more homogeneity seems to be required, for example. This finding may be taken as an
argument for compression in the pre-crisis financial system, where inefficient resolution
processes kept default costs high while a convergence of investment and risk management
strategies led to homogeneous risk profiles across the financial system (Plosser, 2009,
Haldane, 2009); of course, further research is needed before any definite conclusions can
be drawn.
The results from this paper reveal that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the effects
of portfolio compressions are by no means straightforward. This gives rise to “complexity”
in financial networks with derivatives. Both the context of the compression and incentives
matter. The analytical tools developed in this paper enable a better understanding of
these effects.
1.5 Conclusion and Future Work
Financial derivatives are fundamental to the functioning of today’s financial system.
However, the 2008 financial crisis has shown to us that banks’ use of derivatives also
generates systemic risk, which endangers the financial system as a whole, through the
creation of the financial network. Policymakers have attributed the crisis to “excessive
complexity” of the financial network, while the term “complexity” has remained informal.
In this thesis, I have shown that financial networks with derivatives are fundamentally
“more complex” compared to those without. I have captured this complexity formally using
tools from finance and theoretical computer science. I have shown that this “complexity”
implies new systemic risks that are specific to financial networks with derivatives. More
in detail, credit default swaps (CDSs), if they occur in a network, create the new systemic
risk of default ambiguity, where it may no longer be well-defined which banks default
following a shock. CDSs also increase the computational complexity of network clearing,
which is a direct barrier to stress-testing while taking all network effects into account. I
have shown that this complexity can be attributed to the presence of naked CDSs. The
regulatory policies for OTC derivatives may also be a source of complexity, as exemplified
by portfolio compression: rather than universally reducing systemic risk, the systemic
effects of portfolio compression depend on various properties of the financial system, such
as default costs and homogeneity.
Future Work
I see two promising, but also challenging, research threads for future work. The first is to
study financial networks with derivatives from a perspective ex-ante to a random shock.
While in this thesis, I have always considered arbitrary, but fixed shocks, regulators
and market participants are often interested in a valuation of contracts under a random
distribution of future shocks to banks. Under such an extension of the model, we may
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expect a wealth of new phenomena. Randomness might “smooth out” default ambiguity
such that ex-ante valuations are always well-defined. Incentives for portfolio compression
may change as well if banks act from an ex-ante perspective. Some prior work has
approached the problem of consistent ex-ante valuations in networks (Barucca et al., 2016,
Veraart, 2018, Bertschinger and Stobbe, 2018), but the problem is still open, especially
for derivatives.
The second thread is to consider the process of strategic formation of financial
networks with derivatives. Ultimately, we as a society want to incentivize banks to use
derivatives in such a way as to reduce network-induced systemic risk. While prior work has
studied financial network formation with debt (Leitner, 2005, Farboodi, 2014, Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2014) and even restricted cases of CDSs (Zawadowski, 2013,
Babus and Hu, 2017, Leduc, Poledna and Thurner, 2017), a general, analytically tractable
model has remained elusive. A study of strategic network formation with derivatives
would first have to answer questions regarding banks’ incentives to enter into them. Note
that a derivative is only incentivized for both parties if there are differences in beliefs or
differences in risk preferences and if there is some uncertainty. Thus, this thread will
likely also include some aspect of the first research thread I have discussed above.
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1. Introduction
During the 1996 East Asia crisis, “[i]n Indonesia, . . . 75
percent of all businesses were put into distress, while
in Thailand close to 50 percent of bank loans became
nonperforming” (Stiglitz 2002, p. 112). All of these
ﬁrms were interconnected, and as a result of the com-
plexity of this network, regulators were facing a phe-
nomenon we call default ambiguity. As then World
Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz describes it,
Every ﬁrm owed money to every other ﬁrm. But . . . you
couldn’t tell whether theywere bankrupt or not, because
that depended onwhether they got paidmoney that was
owed to them by other ﬁrms who might or might not be
in default, depending on whether the ﬁrms that owed
them money went bankrupt. (Stiglitz 2016, at 0:51h)
In otherwords, default ambiguity is a situation where
one cannot tell which banks are in default. Stiglitz
(2016) points out that this led to a paralysis (“it took
years to resolve it”), resulting in large welfare losses
because banks’ resolution could not be carried out
quickly.
It may be intuitive to expect that default ambiguity
can arise when the ﬁnancial authority only has im-
perfect information about banks’ contractual obli-
gations. For instance, Haldane (2009) described a
related effect on asset prices in the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
In this paper, we show that, remarkably, default ambi-
guity canalsoarise inaperfect information setting, where
the whole ﬁnancial network is known to the ﬁnancial
authority.
In the perfect information setting, default ambi-
guity can be studied in terms of the clearing problem:
given a network of banks (or other ﬁnancial in-
stitutions) interconnected by ﬁnancial contracts, de-
termine which banks are in default and for the
defaulting banks what percentage of their liabili-
ties they can still pay to their creditors (i.e., we are
looking for the recovery rate of each bank). As in
Eisenberg and Noe (2001), we assume that all pay-
ments are made simultaneously and in accordance
with standard bankruptcy regulations. The banks’
assets may lose part of their value when banks default
(i.e., the banks incur default costs).1
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An interpretation of the clearing problem is that in
a ﬁnancial crisis, a clearing authority (e.g., a central
bank) observes the whole network of contracts, seeks
to solve the clearing problem, and prescribes to each
bank howmuch it has to pay to every other bank. The
clearing problem is challenging because banks typi-
cally rely on payments they receive from other banks
to meet their obligations, and banks can form an in-
tricate web of contractual relations with each other.
Default ambiguity arises when the clearing problem
has no solution or when there are multiple conﬂicting
solutions (i.e., none of which is simultaneously best
for all banks).
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and Rogers and Veraart
(2013) showed that ﬁnancial networks where banks
can only enter into simple debt contracts (i.e., loans
from one bank to another) have two very desirable
properties from a clearing perspective: First, the
clearing problem always has a solution (we call this
property existence). Second, there is always a solution
that maximizes the equity of each bank simultaneously
(we call this property maximality).2 Thus, although
theremay bemultiple solutions, themaximal solution
is the obvious choice for the clearing authority to
implement (because it is simultaneously best for all
banks).3
In this work, we study ﬁnancial networks that contain
debt contracts as well as credit default swaps (CDSs).
A CDS is a ﬁnancial derivative in which the writer
insures the holder of the contract against the default
of a third party, the reference entity. The holder may or
may not have an exposure to the reference entity.
Prior work has shown that the network structure of
CDSs has a signiﬁcant effect on systemic risk (Dufﬁe
and Zhu 2011, Loon and Zhong 2014). A large part of
the CDS market is made up of CDSs where the ref-
erence entity is itself a ﬁnancial institution.4 An
analysis of CDS transaction data by D’Errico et al.
(2018) has shown that the ﬁnancial institutions (in-
cluding reference entities) in the CDS market are
tightly connected, implying the presence of circular
relationships involving holders, writers, and refer-
ence entities.
Weask, underwhich conditions canﬁnancial systems
still be clearedwhen they contain suchCDSs in addition
to debt? We take existence and maximality as desid-
erata for the design of aﬁnancial system.We thenderive
constraints on the network structure under which the
ﬁnancial system is guaranteed to satisfy these two de-
siderata, independent of banks’ external assets (i.e.,
assets that do not depend on other banks).5 Similar to
prior work on the clearing problem, our approach is
agnostic to how networks have formed. Thus, our
results apply to any network, including those that
could arise in equilibrium from a decentralized pro-
cess of network formation.
In this work, we are the ﬁrst to present an analyt-
ically tractable model for the clearing problem with
CDSs on ﬁnancial institutions (Section 2).6 Our ﬁrst
majorﬁnding is that, in networkswith debt andCDSs,
default ambiguity can occur (Section 3).We ﬁrst show
that if there are default costs, then existence is not
always satisﬁed.7 The intuition for this is that with
CDSs, a bank A can hold a position on another bank B
wherebyA is better off if B is worse off, referred to as a
short position hereafter. In a dense network of debt and
CDS contracts, a bank may easily ﬁnd itself indirectly
holding a short position on itself (i.e., bank A is better
off if bank A is worse off), which intuitively leads to a
contradiction.8 By contrast, in a debt-only network,
banks only hold long positions on each other (if one
bank is worse off, then the other is also worse off) so
that this phenomenon does not exist. If the clearing
authority was facing a situation where no solution
exists in a crisis, a “paralysis” such as in the East Asia
crisis may ensue because it would not be clear how to
proceed. One might wonder which changes to our
model might restore existence in the general case. We
provide a discussion on this at the end of Section 3.1.
Second, we show that even in situations where
existence is satisﬁed, maximalitymay not be satisﬁed.
This resolves an open question by Demange (2016),
who conjectured that if one extended the Eisenberg/
Noe model to CDSs, “multiple and noncomparable
ratios might then clear the market” (p. 967). The in-
tuition for our result is that CDSs can give rise to a
situation in which two banks happen to hold a short
position on each other. In this case, exactly one of the
two banks can be well off while the other one is doing
poorly, but it is not possible tomaximize both equities
at the same time. Again, because networks of debt
obligations contain only long positions, this effect can
only be observed in networks with CDSs, with or
without default costs. In a situation where no maxi-
mal solution exists, the clearing authority would have
to choose among the different solutions, whichwould
imply favoring the equity (and thus shareholders’
proﬁts) of one bank over that of another one. This, in
turn, might lead to major lobbying activities, as banks
would have an incentive to inﬂuence the clearing
authority to select a solution that is favorable to them.
Note that solving the clearing problem is not only
relevant in a ﬁnancial crisis. Regulators such as the
European Central Bank regularly conduct stress tests
to evaluate how likely certain banks are to default given
adverse economic scenarios. As regulators progres-
sively take on a macroprudential (i.e., systemwide)
perspective, stress tests increasingly take network ef-
fects into account.9 In the future, it seems prudent to
also includeCDSs in network-based stress tests, given
the important role they played in the 2008 ﬁnancial
crisis.10 Our work shows that the inclusion of CDSs
Schuldenzucker, Seuken, and Battiston: Default Ambiguity in CDS Networks
2 Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–18, © 2019 The Author(s)
may lead to an inconclusive outcome of a stress test
due to default ambiguity. Another real-world ap-
plication that illustrates the importance of our ﬁnd-
ings is the recent provision to resolve a failing bank
within one weekend (Single Resolution Board 2016).
If default ambiguity arose in this application, this
would hinder the quick resolution of the bank.
To eliminate these issues regarding default ambi-
guity, we next study what constraints on the network
structure are sufﬁcient to guarantee existence and
maximality. To this end, we ﬁrst introduce the colored
dependency graph, a new analysis framework to cap-
ture the dependencies among banks, in particular
among the three parties (holder, writer, and reference
entity) involved in aCDS (Section 4). By restricting the
cycles in this dependency graph, we then derive
sufﬁcient conditions under which existence and/or
maximality are satisﬁed (Section 5). Furthermore, we
provide an algorithm to compute a solution in this
case. The conditions we derive provide ex ante guar-
antees; that is, they are robust to any possible future
shock on the banks’ external assets. Ex ante guaran-
tees are important for practical applications because
the mere possibility that the market could not be
cleared in the future could undermine trust of market
participants and bring about a liquidity crisis today.
Furthermore, if a bank anticipated a future incentive
to inﬂuence the clearing authority’s choice of a so-
lution, then the bank would have a motivation to
already start lobbying today.
We last discuss potential policy implications. We
show within our model that the policy of routing all
contracts through a central counterparty does not
guarantee existence. By contrast, when “naked”CDSs
(i.e., CDSs that are held without also holding a cor-
respondingdebt contract) are not allowed, thenexistence
and maximality are always fulﬁlled. Our results thus
contribute to the debate on a possible regulation of the
CDS market (Section 6).
Prior work on ﬁnancial networks has primarily
focused on ﬁnancial contagion (i.e., how local shocks to
market participants’ portfolios spread through the
network and cause systemic crises). Researchers have
considered two questions in particular: First, what is
the impact of network topology on contagion com-
pared with other factors such as correlation between
banks’ asset portfolios (Allen and Gale 2000, Elsinger
et al. 2006, Acemoglu et al. 2012, Glasserman and
Young 2015)? And second, how can the likelihood of
an individual bank to trigger contagion be measured
(Hu et al. 2012, Acemoglu et al. 2015, Battiston et al.
2016, Demange 2016)? Bardoscia et al. (2017) have
shown how speciﬁc closed chains in networks of
credit contracts are a sufﬁcient condition for insta-
bility. This prior work has shown that ﬁnancial
contagion can amplify the effect of a small shock
leading to a large loss. By contrast, default ambiguity
describes a situation in which the effect of a shock on a
ﬁnancial network is not even mathematically well
deﬁned. This means that neither the interbank pay-
ments nor the systemwide losses can be determined.
In this sense, the risk of a ﬁnancial system to experi-
ence default ambiguity is more fundamental than the
risk of ﬁnancial contagion. Our dependency analysis
framework constitutes a new tool to study this risk and
inform regulatory policy.
2. Formal Model and Visual Representation
Our model is based on the model by Eisenberg
and Noe (2001) and its extension to default costs by
Rogers and Veraart (2013). Both of these prior models
were restricted to debt contracts. We deﬁne an ex-
tension to credit default swaps. Following said prior
work, we assume a static model where a ﬁnancial sys-
tem is given exogenously and all contracts are evalu-
ated simultaneously. We adjust the notation where
necessary.
2.1. The Model
Banks and External Assets. LetN denote a ﬁnite set of
banks. Each bank i ∈ N holds a certain amount of ex-
ternal assets, denoted by ei ≥ 0. Let e  (ei)i∈N denote
the vector of all external assets.
Contracts. There are two types of contracts: debt con-
tracts and CDSs. Every contract gives rise to a con-
ditional or unconditional obligation to pay a certain
amount, called a liability, from its writer to its holder.
Banks that cannot fulﬁll this obligation are said to be
in default. The recovery rate ri of a bank i is the share of
its liabilities it is able to pay. Thus, ri  1 if i is not
in default and ri < 1 if i is in default. Let r  (ri)i∈N
denote the vector of all recovery rates.
A debt contract obliges the writer i to uncondi-
tionally pay a certain amount to the holder j. The
amount is called the notional of the contract and is
denoted by c∅i,j. A credit default swap obliges the writer
i to make a conditional payment to the holder j.
The amount of this payment depends on the recovery
rate of a third bank k, called the reference entity.
Speciﬁcally, the payment amount of the CDS from i to
j with reference entity k and notional cki,j is c
k
i,j · (1 − rk).
The contractual relationships between all banks
are represented by a three-dimensional matrix c 
(cki,j)i∈N, j∈N, k∈N∪{∅}. Zero entries indicate the absence of
the respective contract.
Note that when banks enter contracts, there typi-
cally is an initial payment. For example, debt con-
tracts arise because the holder lends an amount of
money to the writer, and the holder of a CDS pays a
premium to obtain the CDS. In our model, we assume
that any such initial payments have been made at an
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earlier time and are implicitly reﬂected in the external
assets.
We make two sanity assumptions to rule out path-
ological cases. First, we require that no bank enters
into a contract with itself or on itself (i.e., c∅i,i  c
j
i,i 
c
j
i,j  c
i
i,j  0 for all i, j ∈ N). Second, as CDSs are de-
ﬁned as insurance on debt, we require that any bank
that is a reference entity in a CDS must also be the
writer of a debt contract (i.e., if
∑
k,l∈N c
i
k,l > 0, then∑
j∈N c
∅
i,j > 0 for all i ∈ N).
For any bank i, the creditors of i are those banks that
are holders of contracts for which i is the writer (i.e.,
the banks to which i owes money). Conversely, the
debtors of i are the writers of contracts of which i is the
holder (i.e., the banks that owe money to i). Note that
the two sets can overlap: for example, a bank could
hold a CDS on one reference entity while writing a
CDS on another reference entity, both with the same
counterparty.
Default Costs. We model default costs following
Rogers and Veraart (2013): there are two default cost
parameters α, β ∈ [0, 1]. Defaulting banks are only able
to pay to their creditors a share of α of their external
assets and a share of β of their incoming payments.
Thus, α  β  1 means that there are no default costs,
and α  β  0 means that assets held by defaulting
banks are worthless. The values 1 − α and 1 − β are the
default costs.11
Financial System. A ﬁnancial system is a tuple (N, e, c,
α, β)where N is a set of banks, e is a vector of external
assets, c is a three-dimensional matrix of contracts,
and α and β are default cost parameters.
Liabilities, Payments, and Assets. For two banks i, j
and a vector of recovery rates r, the liability of i to j at r is
the amount of money that i has to pay to j if recovery
rates in the ﬁnancial system are given by r, denoted by
li,j(r). It arises from the aggregate of any debt contract
and all CDSs from i to j:
li,j(r) : c
∅
i,j +
∑
k∈N
(1 − rk) · c
k
i,j.
The total liabilities of i at r are the aggregate liabilities
that i has toward other banks given the recovery rates
r, denoted by li(r):
li(r) :
∑
j∈N
li,j(r).
The actual payment pi,j(r) from i to j at r can be lower
than li,j(r) if i is in default. By the principle of pro-
portionality (discussed below), a bank that is in default
makes payments for its contracts in proportion to the
respective liability:
pi,j(r) : ri · li,j(r).
The total assets ai(r) of a bank i at r consist of its external
assets ei and the incoming payments:
ai(r) : ei +
∑
j∈N
pj,i(r).
In case bank i is in default, its assets after default costs
a′i (r) are the assets reduced according to the factors α
and β. This is the amount that will be paid out to
creditors:
a′i (r) :αei + β
∑
j∈N
pj,i(r).
Clearing Recovery Rate Vector. Following Eisenberg
and Noe (2001), we call a recovery rate vector r clearing
if it is in accordance with the following three prin-
ciples of bankruptcy law:
1. Absolute priority: Bankswith sufﬁcient assets pay
their liabilities in full. Thus, these banks have re-
covery rate 1.
2. Limited liability: Banks with insufﬁcient assets to
pay their liabilities are in default and pay all of their
assets to creditors after default costs have been sub-
tracted. Thus, these banks have recovery rate a′i (r)/
li(r)< 1.
3. Proportionality: In case of default, payments to
creditors are made in proportion to the respective
liability.
The principle of proportionality is automatically
fulﬁlled in our model by the deﬁnition of the pay-
ments pi,j(r). The other two principles lead to the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 (Clearing Recovery Rate Vector). Let X 
(N, e, c, α, β) be a ﬁnancial system. A recovery rate vector
is a vector of values ri ∈ [0, 1] for each i ∈ N. We denote
by [0, 1]N the space of all possible recovery rate vectors.
Deﬁne the update function
F : [0, 1]N → [0, 1]N ,
Fi(r) :
1 if ai(r) ≥ li(r)
a′i (r)
li(r)
, if ai(r)< li(r).
{
(1)
A recovery rate vector r is called clearing for X if it is a
ﬁxed point of the update function (i.e., if Fi(r)  ri for
all i). We also call a clearing recovery rate vector a
solution to the clearing problem.
Equity. For any bank i, its equity Ei(r) is the positive
difference between assets and liabilities. This is the
proﬁt that the owners of bank i get to keep after
clearing:
Ei(r) : max (0, ai(r) − li(r)).
2.2. Example and Visual Representation
Figure 1 shows a visual representation of an example
ﬁnancial system. There are three banks N  {A, B, C},
Schuldenzucker, Seuken, and Battiston: Default Ambiguity in CDS Networks
4 Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–18, © 2019 The Author(s)
drawn as circles, with external assets of eA  0, eB  2,
and eC  1, drawn as rectangles on top of the banks.
Debt contracts are drawn as blue arrows from the
writer to the holder, and they are annotated with the
notionals c∅B,A  2 and c
∅
B,C  1. CDSs are drawn as
orange arrows with a dashed line connecting to the
reference entity, and they are also annotated with the
notionals: cBA,C  1. Default cost parameters α  β 
0.5 are given in addition to the picture. A solution for
this example is rA  1, rB  1/3, and rC  1. The lia-
bilities at this recovery rate vector are lB,A(r)  2,
lB,C(r)  1, and lA,C(r)  2/3. Payments are pB,A(r) 
2/3, pB,C(r)  1/3, and pA,C(r)  2/3, and equities are
EA(r)  0, EB(r)  0, and EC(r)  1. This is the only
solution.
2.3. Discussion of Our Formal Model
Note that our addition of CDSs to the Rogers and
Veraart (2013) model substantially changes its mathe-
matical properties. The liabilities li,j(r) now depend on
the recovery rate vector r, and the assets ai(r) contain
terms of the form ckj,i · rj · (1 − rk). Thus, the update
function Fi(r) depends on r in a way that is both
nonlinear and nonmonotonic: an increase in some re-
covery rate rl could lead to a higher or lower value of
Fi(r) for another bank i. Because Fi(r) is nonmonotonic,
we cannot in general ﬁnd a solution to the clearing
problem by simply iterating the function F. The it-
eration sequence may cycle among different recovery
rate vectors without even getting near a solution (see
Appendix A for an example). For the same reason,
Eisenberg and Noe’s (2001) algorithm for computing
clearing payments in debt-only systems cannot be
applied to systems with CDSs.
Prior work has modeled ﬁnancial networks al-
most exclusively as weighted binary graphs where
edges reﬂect binary long relationships such as debt
(Eisenberg andNoe 2001, Cifuentes et al. 2005, Rogers
and Veraart 2013) and cross-ownership (Vitali et al.
2011, Elliott et al. 2014). Barucca et al. (2016) presented
a uniﬁed framework for suchmodels. However, CDSs
give rise to ternary relationships because the holder is
affected by the ﬁnancial health of both the writer and
the reference entity, and they imply both long and
short positions. Weighted-graph models cannot ac-
curately represent these features, whereas our model
captures them well.12
3. Existence and Maximality in General
Financial Systems
In this section, we explore the possible shapes of the set
of solutions for a ﬁnancial system with debt and CDSs.
We construct ﬁnancial systems that have no solution
or multiple conﬂicting solutions. Consequently, neither
existence nor maximality is guaranteed in general.
At the heart of our constructions lies the following
lemma,whichmay be of independent interest to some
readers. The lemma demonstrates a gap in the space
of possible solutions: the recovery rate of any bank is
either 1 or below α or β.
Lemma 1. Let X  (N, e, c, α, β) be a ﬁnancial system, r
clearing for X, and let i ∈ N be a bank. If ri < 1, then the
following hold:
(1) If i has only external assets (i.e.,
∑
j pj,i(r)  0), then
ri ≤ α. If, in addition, α> 0, then ri <α.
(2) If i has only interbank assets (i.e., ei  0), then ri ≤ β.
If, in addition, β> 0, then ri < β.
(3) In any case, ri ≤ max(α, β). If α> 0 or β> 0, then
ri < max(α, β).
Proof. We prove part (3). From the deﬁnition, it fol-
lows that a′i (r) ≤ max(α, β) · ai(r). Because ri < 1, we
must have ai(r)< li(r) (in particular, li(r)> 0) and ri 
Fi(r)  a
′
i (r)/li(r) ≤ max(α, β) · ai(r)/li(r) ≤ max(α, β). If
α> 0 or β> 0, then the last inequality is strict.
The proofs of parts (1) and (2) are analogous. □
3.1. Existence of a Solution
What is perhaps most surprising about ﬁnancial
networks with CDSs is that as soon as there are any
default costs, the existence of a solution can no longer
be guaranteed.
Theorem 1 (No Solution with Default Costs). For any pair
(α, β) with α< 1 or β< 1 there exists a ﬁnancial system
(N, e, c, α, β) that has no clearing recovery rate vector.
Proof. If β< 1, consider the system in Figure 2. Let
δ  3 · 1/(1 − β). Assume, toward a contradiction, that
there is a clearing recovery rate vector r.
• If rA  1, then pC,B(r)  lC,B(r)  δ(1 − rA)  0;
hence aB(r)  0 and pB,A(r)  0. This implies aA(r) 
0< 1  lA(r), and thus rA  0— a contradiction.
• If rA < 1, then rA ≤ β by Lemma 1. Thus, pC,B(r) 
lC,B(r)  δ(1 − rA) ≥ δ(1 − β)  3. Now, aB(r)  3 ≥ 2 
lB(r), so pB,A(r)  lB,A(r)  2. Hence aA(r) ≥ lA(r), and so
rA  1—a contradiction.
The proof for the case α< β  1 is provided in
Appendix B. It uses a similar construction but where
A has positive external assets. □
Figure 1. (Color online) Example Financial System with
α  β  0.5
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The system in Figure 2 is paradoxical because A is
implicitly holding a CDS (and is thus short) on itself: if
A is in default, it receives a payment because of the
CDSwritten on it, so it is not in default, and vice versa.
Although A actually holding a CDS on itself would be
absurd, having B in betweenmakes the paradoxmuch
less obvious. Supervisory authorities could only notice
that the two scenarios are, in fact, equivalent once they
are aware of network effects and have detailed knowl-
edge about the contract structure, including the ternary
relationships introduced by CDSs.
In addition, although it is hard to imaginewhy a bank
would ever buy a CDS on itself, Figure 2 could have
formed in an entirely sensibleway. For example, B could
have borrowed money from A and later placed a spec-
ulative bet onA’s default before both bankswere hit by
a shock that wiped out their external assets.With only
knowledge of their own assets and liabilities, none of
the banks would have noticed any problem.
Figure 2 is a particularly simple example to show
nonexistence because of its small size and zero external
assets for all relevant banks. Note that these features are
not essential for nonexistence. We present a larger ex-
amplewherenonexistence arises inamuchmore indirect
way in the electronic companion of this paper.
Remark 1. We know from Rogers and Veraart (2013)
that no example such as in Theorem 1 can be con-
structed using only debt contracts. Note that it can also
not be constructed using only CDSs because in a ﬁ-
nancial system consisting of onlyCDSs, the recovery rate
vector (1, . . . , 1) (nobody defaults) is always clearing:
under this recovery rate vector, no liabilities arise, and
thus, indeed, no bank defaults. Therefore, nonexistence
can only arise in systems with debt and CDSs.
It turns out that the nonexistence of a solution
hinges on the presence of default costs.
Theorem 2 (Existence of a SolutionWithout Default Costs).
Any ﬁnancial system (N, e, c, α  1, β  1) has a clearing
recovery rate vector.
Proof. Because α  β  1, we can simplify the update
function F from Deﬁnition 1 to Fi(r)  min(1, ai(r)/li(r))
on the set Li : {r | li(r)> 0}. Note that Li is an open set
because li is continuous, and note that Fi is continuous
on Li. We use this fact and apply a ﬁxed-point theorem.
Care must be taken because Fi is not, in general, con-
tinuous on [0, 1]N \ Li. Consider the set-valued function
ρ deﬁned by
ρ : [0, 1]N →P ([0, 1]N), where P (S) denotes the
power set of S;
ρ(r) :×
i∈N
ρi(r), where ρi(r) :
Fi(r) if r∈Li,
[0, 1] if r /∈ Li.
{
If there is an r such that r ∈ ρ(r), then r can be made
clearing by setting the recovery rates of banks with
zero liabilities to 1. This is because for all i, if r ∈ Li,
then Fi(r)  ri by choice of r, and if r /∈ Li, then Fi(r)  1,
and no other bank depends on i because of our sanity
assumptions.
It remains to show that an r with r ∈ ρ(r) exists. By
the Kakutani (1941) ﬁxed-point theorem, this is the case
if (1) the domain of ρ is compact and convex, (2) the set
ρ(r) is convex for each r, and (3) the graph of ρ, Gρ :
{(r, s) | s ∈ ρ(r)}, is a closed set. Properties (1) and (2) are
obvious.
To prove (3), it sufﬁces to show that for each i, the
graph of ρi, Gρi : {(r, si) | si ∈ ρi(r)}, is closed. To this
end, let (rk, ski )k∈N be a sequence in [0, 1]
N
×[0, 1] con-
verging to some point (r, si) such that s
k
i ∈ ρi(r
k) for each
k. We need to show that si ∈ ρi(r). If r /∈ Li, then trivially,
si ∈ ρi(r)  [0, 1]. If r ∈ Li, then si ∈ ρi(r)  {Fi(r)} be-
cause Fi is continuous on the open set Li. □
In ﬁnancial systemswithout default costs, money is
never lost, just redistributed. Theorem 2 shows that
these systems always have a solution. It does not ap-
ply once default costs are present because the update
function F then has a discontinuity where the assets of
a bank are equal to its liabilities (i.e., when a bank is
just on the verge of defaulting). This discontinuity
creates a gap in the space of possible recovery rates
(see Lemma 1) and can give rise to nonexistence.
One might wonder what changes to our model
might restore existence in the general case. Ourmodel
differs from Eisenberg and Noe (2001) only in that we
allow for default costs and CDSs. Thus, if one seeks to
represent these two features and aims to guarantee
existence, the only option would be to use a clearing
model different from simultaneous clearing. Perhaps
the ﬁrst alternative that comes to mind is sequential
clearing, where the contracts are not evaluated at the
same time but in some order. The result of this pro-
cedure, however, heavily depends on the order of
evaluation, as the following example shows.
Example 1 (Sequential Clearing). We deﬁne a natural
sequential clearing procedure: The debt contracts are
evaluated in a predetermined order, and banks pay
their liabilities based on their external assets and
Figure 2. (Color online) Financial System with No Solution
for β< 1
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payments received so far (i.e., their “cash” holdings). If
a bank cannot pay a liability, then it enters bankruptcy.
Default costs are subtracted from the bank’s cash
holdings, and the recovery rate is computed based on
the remaining cash. Then all CDSs written on the bank
are triggered and are evaluated next. The process ends
when all debt contracts have been evaluated.
Nowassume that this procedure is applied to Figure 2
for β  0.5, so that δ  6.
• If the debt contract from A to D is evaluated ﬁrst,
then A defaults with rA  0, B receives six in the CDS,
and A receives two from B. The resulting equities are
EA(r)  2 and EB(r)  4.
• If the debt contract from B to A is evaluated ﬁrst,
then B defaults with rB  0, A receives nothing and
defaults with rA  0, and B receives six in the CDS.We
have EA(r)  0 and EB(r)  6.
The order of evaluation in sequential clearing could
be chosen at random or based on some objective crite-
rion, such as the maturity of the contracts. In any case, it
would introduce an element of arbitrariness and an
opportunity for strategic manipulation. Although other
sequential clearingprocedures could bedeﬁned, it seems
unlikely that this problem could be fully avoided.
Alternative clearing models that go beyond se-
quential clearing have been proposed in the literature;
each has its own limitations. Cso´ka and Herings (2018)
studied a decentral clearing procedure where pay-
ments are made incrementally in an arbitrary order.
In a setting with CDSs, the result of this procedure de-
pends on the order inwhich payments aremade, similar
to sequential clearing.13 Banerjee and Feinstein (2018)
deﬁned a dynamic clearing procedure where multiple
rounds of simultaneouspayments are performedwhile a
CDS is triggered with a delay of one round after its
reference entity has defaulted. A solution always exists
and can be chosen in a natural way. However, CDSs in
this model cannot represent a complete insurance on a
debt exposure. This is because, if the writer of a debt
contract fails, the holder still incurs a loss in that round,
irrespective of any CDS they might hold. This loss may
be enough to send the holder into permanent bank-
ruptcy. Acemoglu et al. (2015) studied a simultaneous
clearing model where default costs arise exclusively
from the partial liquidation of illiquid projects. This
assumption would ensure existence even with CDSs
via continuity in a similar way to Theorem 2, but it
also precludes modeling any kind of discontinuous
default costs such as time delays or operational losses.
3.2. Multiplicity of Solutions
We now show that even when the clearing prob-
lem has a solution, there can be multiple ones, and
the structure of the set of solutions may not be eco-
nomically desirable. We discuss this structure in terms
of the banks’ aggregate preferences. Recall that we
denote the equity of a bank i by Ei(r). We assume that,
when there are multiple solutions, banks prefer those
that maximize their equity.
Deﬁnition 2 (Preferred and Maximal Solution). Fix a ﬁ-
nancial system X. A bank i is said to weakly prefer a
solution r over another solution r′ if Ei(r) ≥ Ei(r
′). A
solution r is calledmaximal if it is weakly preferred to all
other solutions by all banks.14
Our second desideratum, maximality, requires that
amaximal solution exists. Otherwise, any solution the
clearing authority could select would be opposed by
at least one bank because this bank could achieve
strictly higher equity in a different solution.15 Such a
situation is illustrated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (No Maximal Solution). For any α and β, there
exists a ﬁnancial system (N, e, c, α, β) that has a clearing
recovery rate vector but no maximal one.
Proof. We use the ﬁnancial system in Figure 3 with δ 
1/(1 − β) if β< 1 and δ> 1 arbitrary if β  1. It is easy to
verify that r0 : (0, 1, 1, 1) and r1 : (1, 0, 1, 1) (where
entries are in alphabetical order) are clearing. In any
potential other solution, we must have rC  rD  1 and
0< rA, rB < 1.
For β< 1, no other solution exists: if r was an-
other one, then because rA < 1, by Lemma 1, we have
rA ≤ β, so aB(r)  δ(1 − rA) ≥ δ(1 − β)  1. Thus, rB  1—
a contradiction.
For β  1, there is exactly one other solution r2 
(ζ, ζ, 1, 1), where ζ  (δ2 − δ)/(δ2 − 1). This is because r
is a solution with rA, rB < 1 iff rA  δ(1 − rB) and rB 
δ(1 − rA). It is easy to verify that rB  rA  ζ is the
unique solution of this linear equation system.
For any value of β, bank A has a positive equity of
δ − 1 in r1 and equity 0 (because it is in default) in the
other solution(s). Thus, A strictly prefers r1. Analo-
gously, B strictly prefers r0. This implies that none of
the solutions of this system is maximal.16 □
To see why the solution structure in the previous
theorem is economically undesirable, consider the
β< 1 case in the above proof and imagine a clearing
authority faced with the problem of actually clearing
Figure 3. (Color online) Financial System with NoMaximal
Solution
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the market: there are two solutions, one where A
defaults and one where B defaults. Choosing among
the solutions means giving preference to one of the
banks. It is not clear how this decision should be
made, and the clearing authority may even be legally
prohibited from making such a trade-off. If a choice
among nonmaximal solutions were legally allowed,
then a bankmay have a large incentive to lobby for the
implementation of a solution that it prefers most. Note
that, in contrast to nonexistence, nonmaximality can
even occur in systems without default costs.17
If clearing were done sequentially in the scenario
fromTheorem3, oneof the twosolutions, r0 or r1,would
be chosen based on which of the two debt contracts is
evaluated ﬁrst. In practice, such a scenario could lead
to severe incentive problems. In today’s ﬁnancial
practice, whether a CDS is triggered is decided by so-
called determinations committees, which consist of the
most active dealers in addition to nondealer members
(International Swaps and Derivatives Association
2012). In Figure 3, A, B, and C would be members
of the determinations committee. Taking the per-
spective of A, it would be rational to try to convince
the other members that B’s ﬁnancial situation qual-
iﬁes as a default. This triggers the CDS, A receives the
payment and does not default, and B receives noth-
ing. Thus, in hindsight, it appears as though Amade a
correct objective assessment about B. Of course,
B would argue exactly the opposite of A. By contrast,
when a maximal solution exists, it can be implemented
without having to make any choices that could be
manipulated.
Remark 2. Note that Rogers and Veraart (2013) have
previously observed multiple solutions in debt-only
networks stemming from default costs. However, the
form of multiplicity they observed is much less prob-
lematic because in debt-only systems, there always
exists a maximal solution.
4. Dependency Analysis Framework: The
Colored Dependency Graph
In Section 3, we have shown that introducing CDSs
into the well-established clearing model by Eisenberg
and Noe (2001) has the effect that existence and max-
imality are no longer guaranteed. In this section, we
develop an analysis framework, which we call the
“colored dependency graph,” to better understand
how and when this effect arises. In Section 5, we then
show how to use the colored dependency graph to de-
rive sufﬁcient conditions under which the two de-
siderata are satisﬁed.
4.1. Covered and Naked CDS Positions
At the level of an individual bank, we need to dis-
tinguish between two fundamentally different uses of
CDSs. For the purposes of illustration, consider a ﬁ-
nancial system with a single CDS where the CDS
writer cannot default. If the holder of the CDS also
holds at least an equal amount of debt written by the
reference entity, then the CDS holder is long on the
reference entity: a worse situation of the reference
entity would, at most, be offset by the CDS payment,
but it could never be beneﬁcial for the holder. This use
of a CDS is called covered. By contrast, if the holder
holds no or not enough debt written by the reference
entity, then it is short on the reference entity: a worse
ﬁnancial situation of the reference entity would beneﬁt
the holder. This use of a CDS is called naked. See the top
row of Figure 4 for a depiction of a prototypical (a)
debt contract, (b) naked CDS, and (c) covered CDS.
For the formal deﬁnition in general ﬁnancial systems,
we must consider the notional of all CDSs that a bank
holds on a reference entity to classify a CDS position
as covered or naked.
Deﬁnition 3 (Covered and Naked CDS Position). Let X 
(N, e, c, α, β) be a ﬁnancial system. A bank j has a covered
CDS position toward another bank k if∑
i∈N
cki,j ≤ c
∅
k,j.
Otherwise, j has a naked CDS position toward k.
4.2. The Colored Dependency Graph
We can now deﬁne the colored dependency graph
(or just the “dependency graph”), in which long and
short positions among banks are represented by green
edges (with ﬁlled arrow tips) and red edges (with
hollow arrow tips), respectively.
Deﬁnition 4 (Colored Dependency Graph). Let X  (N, e,
c, α, β) be a ﬁnancial system. The colored dependency
Figure 4. (Color online) Prototypical Financial Systems
(Top) and Their Colored Dependency Graphs (Bottom)
Note. Green edges with ﬁlled arrow tips indicate long positions, and
red edges with hollow arrow tips indicate short positions.
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graph CD(X) is the graph with nodes N and edges of
colors red and green constructed as follows:
(1) For each i, j ∈ N, if c∅i,j > 0 or c
k
i,j > 0 for any k ∈ N,
then add a green edge i → j.
(2) For each i, k ∈ N, if cki,j > 0 for any j ∈ N, then add
a green edge k → i.
(3) For each j, k ∈ N, if j has a naked CDS position
toward k, then add a red edge k → j.
The deﬁnition of the colored dependency graph can
be understood in terms of the three primitive contract
patterns illustrated in Figure 4: debt contracts, naked
CDSs, and covered CDSs. In each case, the holder of
any contract is long on the writer because, in case the
writer defaults, the lower the recovery rate of the
writer, the lower the payment that the holder receives.
This is expressed by rule (1) in Deﬁnition 4. In case of a
debt contract, this is the only dependency that is in-
duced, whereas a CDS gives rise to two additional
dependencies. The writer of a CDS is always long on
the reference entity because, the lower the recovery
rate of the reference entity, the higher the liability for
the writer. This is expressed by rule (2) in Deﬁnition 4.
The position of the holder of a CDS toward the reference
entitydependsonwhether it is anakedora coveredCDS:
only the holder of a naked CDS is short on the reference
entity, expressed by rule (3) in Deﬁnition 4. A covered
CDS, on the other hand, only gives rise to a long
position together with the debt contract.
The following proposition shows the usefulness of
the framework in capturing the directional behavior
of the update function F. We will repeatedly use it in
Section 5 when deriving sufﬁcient conditions. The
proof is straightforward and thus omitted.
Proposition 1 (The Colored Dependency Graph and the
Update Function). For any two banks i and j, we let r−ij
denote a vector of recovery rates of all banks excluding i and j.
Then the following holds:
(1) If there exists an r−ij such that, holding r−ij ﬁxed,
the function Fj is increasing
18 in ri, then there is a green
edge from i to j in CD(X).
(2) If there exists an r−ij such that, holding r−ij ﬁxed, the
function Fj is decreasing in ri, then there is a red edge from i
to j in CD(X).
(3) If there is no edge from i to j of any color, then Fj is
independent of ri. The converse is not necessarily the case.
Remark 3 (Parallel Edges). Both a red and a green edge
can be present in the dependency graph in the same
direction between the same two banks. In this case,
whether a long or a short effect is present depends on
the recovery rates of the other banks. The two edges do
not cancel out.
If a ﬁnancial system contains only debt contracts,
then the colored dependency graph only has green
edges; speciﬁcally, it has a green edge i → jwhenever
c∅i,j > 0. Notice that this graph coincides with the “ﬁ-
nancial structure graph” introduced by Eisenberg
and Noe (2001). For systems with debt and CDSs,
our colored dependency graph provides an elegant
conversion from the ternary relations introduced by
CDSs to binary relations, making them amenable to
graph-theoretic analysis.19
Figure 5 depicts the colored dependency graphs of
two ﬁnancial systems that exhibit very different be-
havior: Figure 5, panel (a) corresponds to the example
ﬁnancial system from Figure 1, which has a unique
solution. Figure 5, panel (b) corresponds to the ﬁ-
nancial system from Figure 2, which has no solution.
We immediately see some similarities and differ-
ences: both graphs have a red edge; panel (a) has no
directed cycle, whereas (b) has two of them,A–B–Aand
A–C–B–A; and the former cycle contains a red edge.
All of these features will be of importance in the
analysis in Section 5. Note that, although the cycles in
Figure 5, panel (b) happen to be very short, this is not a
necessary condition for the nonexistence of a solution.
The electronic companion provides a more involved
example with longer cycles.
5. Analysis of Restricted
Network Structures
With our analysis framework in place, we now use it
to describe sufﬁcient conditions under which our
desiderata are fulﬁlled. We show that one can guar-
antee our desiderata by restricting the ways in which
the edges in the dependency graph may form cycles.
We present three domain restrictions where we suc-
cessively allow more cycles and receive successively
fewer guarantees.
5.1. Acyclic Financial Systems
If there are no cycles in the colored dependency graph,
then the clearing problem has a unique solution. As this
solution is trivially maximal, both desiderata are
fulﬁlled.
Theorem 4 (Existence andUniqueness in Acyclic Financial
Systems). Let X be a ﬁnancial system such that CD(X) has
no cycles. Then X has a unique clearing recovery rate vector.
Figure 5. (Color online) The Colored Dependency Graphs
of the Financial Systems from (a) Figure 1 and (b) Figure 2
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Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that N 
{1 . . . n} and banks are sorted in topological order; that
is, whenever there is an edge i → j in CD(X), we have
i ≤ j. This is possible because CD(X) has no cycles by
assumption. To ﬁnd a solution r, iterate over banks i
in order. In each step, set ri :Fi(r1, . . . ri−1), where
r1, . . . , ri−1 have already been computed. This is well
deﬁned by Proposition 1. In the end, r is clearing by
construction.
Toward uniqueness, if r and r′ are both clearing, it
follows by induction on i that ri  Fi(r1, . . . , ri−1) 
Fi(r
′
1, . . . , r
′
i−1)  r
′
i for all i, where the middle equality is
by induction hypothesis. Note that F1 is a constant
function. □
Theorem 4 shows formally that default ambiguity
in ﬁnancial systems with CDSs is due to cycles in the
dependency graph. Note that we must consider all
dependency edges here, including those originating
at reference entities of CDSs. It is not sufﬁcient to
consider the graph of liabilities, where an edge exists
from the writer of each contract to the holder, cor-
responding to only rule (1) in Deﬁnition 4. This graph
would be acyclic for all our counterexamples in
Section 3, although they clearly did not fulﬁll our de-
siderata. Thus, the more sophisticated colored depen-
dency graph is necessary to capture the behavior of a
ﬁnancial system with CDSs.
5.2. Green Core Systems
The previous theorem required a very strong assump-
tion; in reality, ﬁnancial systems do contain cycles in the
dependency graph, but not all of them pose a prob-
lem. In fact, we know from Rogers and Veraart (2013)
that debt-only ﬁnancial systems, even if they con-
tain cycles, always satisfy existence and maximality.
At the same time, debt-only systems always have a
completely green dependency graph; that is, banks
are only long on each other. In this section, we show
that all ﬁnancial systems with a completely green
dependency graph satisfy existence and maximality,
thus generalizing Rogers and Veraart’s result. We
consider a slightly more general class of ﬁnancial
systems that we call green core systems.
Deﬁnition 5 (Green Core System). A ﬁnancial system X
is called a green core system if in CD(X), banks with
an incoming red edge (i.e., the holders of naked
CDS positions) have no outgoing edges. We call the
set of these banks the leaf set and the other banks the
core.
An example of a green core system is shown in
Figure 6. Banks in the leaf set have no liabilities (oth-
erwise, they would have an outgoing green edge) and
hence always have recovery rate 1. This does not render
the leaf set obsolete: allowing a leaf set keeps the def-
inition of green core systems general enough so that
banks in the core can be writers of naked CDSs. This
feature will also be essential in Section 5.3, where we
consider even more general network structures that
are composed of multiple green core systems that can
be connected by red edges.
Green core systems always have a solution that is
best for all banks in the core. We call such a solution
core maximal. Our proof is constructive.
Theorem 5 (Existence and Core Maximality in Green Core
Systems). In any green core system, the following holds:
(1) There exists a recovery rate vector that maximizes both
the recovery rate and the equity of all banks in the core.
(2) The iteration sequence (rn) deﬁned by r0  (1, . . . , 1)
and rn+1  F(rn) converges to this recovery rate vector.
Proof. The main technical challenge lies in proving the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. Consider a green core system with core C and
leaf set L.
(1) The update function F is monotonic and continuous
from above, where the order relation is a pointwise com-
parison of recovery rate vectors.
(2) If i ∈ C, then the equity Ei is monotonic, also with
respect to a pointwise comparison.
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix C. The
lemma formalizes the fact that because all relevant
dependency edges are green, a decrease in any bank’s
recovery rate can only affect the other banks in the
core in a negative way. In addition, this happens in a
continuous fashion.
Frompart (1) of the lemma, it follows via a standard
technique from lattice theory (see Lemma 3 in Ap-
pendix C) that the sequence (rn) converges to a so-
lution that maximizes the recovery rate of each bank.
By part (2) of the lemma, this solution also maximizes
all equities in the core. □
Theorem 5 shows that green core systems always
satisfy existence and core maximality. Furthermore,
the proof of the theorem tells us that green core systems
are structurally very similar to debt-only systems. They
share the following properties, which have previously
been observed for debt-only systems by Rogers and
Veraart (2013). First, the update function is mono-
tonic and continuous from above. Second, the set of
Figure 6. (Color online) Colored Dependency Graph of a
Green Core System with Core C and Leaf Set L
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solutions even forms a complete lattice (which follows
from monotonicity of F via the Knaster–Tarski ﬁxed-
point theorem; see, e.g., Granas and Dugundji 2003).
Third, a core-maximal solution can be found via the
iteration sequence provided in part (2) of Theorem 5.
A subtle difference to the debt-only case is that a core-
maximal solution of a green core system can contain
irrational numbers, whereas the maximal solution of
a debt-only system is always rational.20
A special case of Theorem 5 is a situation in which
naked CDSs are not present.
Corollary 1 (Existence and Maximality Without Naked
CDSs). If no bank in a ﬁnancial system has a naked CDS
position toward another bank, then there exists a maximal
clearing recovery rate vector.
Proof. In this case, the colored dependency graph
contains only green edges. The ﬁnancial system is hence
trivially a green core system where the core consists of
all banks. □
Corollary 1 has important implications for regu-
latory policy regarding naked CDSs, which we dis-
cuss in detail in Section 6.
5.3. Systems Without Red-Containing Cycles
Weknow fromTheorem5 andCorollary 1 that default
ambiguity can be attributed to the presence of red
edges in the dependency graph. Green core systems
restrict these edges in an extreme way, only allowing
them to leaf banks. But we know from Theorem 4
(acyclic systems) that red edges to nonleaf banks do
not always pose a problem. In this section, we study in
which situations they do. Our main result is that,
regarding existence, only red edges that are part of a
cycle of dependencies can pose a problem.
Theorem 6 (Existence Without Red-Containing Cycles).
Assume that in the colored dependency graph of a ﬁnancial
system, there is no cycle that contains a red edge. Then a
clearing recovery rate vector exists.
Our proof of the theorem is constructive by using an
algorithm. Unfortunately, simply iterating the func-
tion F such as in the green core case does not work
anymore in the more general no-red-containing-cycle
case (we provide an example inAppendixD). Instead,
our algorithm exploits the structure of the depen-
dency graph. Recall from above that the solutions of a
ﬁnancial system with debt and CDSs may be irrational.
Given this, it is impossible to design an algorithm that
can compute an exact solution in ﬁnite time. Instead, we
devise an approximation algorithm that computes an
arbitrarily accurate approximate solution.We nowﬁrst
describe our approximate solution concept and our
algorithm. We then prove correctness of the algo-
rithm and Theorem 6.
Deﬁnition 6 (Approximately Clearing Recovery Rate
Vector). Let X be a ﬁnancial system, and let ε ≥ 0.
A recovery rate vector r is called ε-approximately clearing
or an ε-solution for X if ||F(r) − r|| ≤ ε, where ||r|| :
maxi |ri| is the maximum norm.
We now describe our core iteration algorithm to
compute an ε-solution in a ﬁnancial system X when
no cycle in CD(X) contains a red edge. Given are ε and
X. We begin by partitioning the dependency graph
into strongly connected components; or cores. Each of
these corresponds to the core of a green core system.
A core is a minimal set of banks such that all banks
with which these banks are in cycles are also part of
the core. By partitioning the graph in this way, the
connections between different cores form an acyclic
graph, so we can sort them in topological order (i.e.,
edges only go from earlier to later cores in the order,
but never in the other direction).21 Figure 7 provides
an example for such a dependency graph. We now it-
erate over cores. By assumption, all edges within a core
are green, so we can use the iteration sequence from
Section 5.2 to compute an ε-solution for each of them.
More in detail, let C1, . . . ,Cm be the cores in topo-
logical order. We store recovery rates in a vector r.
Initially, r is the empty vector. In step k ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
we deﬁne a function
Fk : [0, 1]Ck → [0, 1]Ck ,
Fki (s) :Fi(rh s),
where the symbol “h” denotes a concatenation of
vectors. This corresponds to the update function F
restricted to Ck with previously computed recovery
rates of the previous cores C1, . . . ,Ck−1 given by r.
Function Fk is well deﬁned because, by the topological
ordering, each bank i ∈ Ck depends only on the banks
in C1, . . . ,Ck. We iterate the function F
k starting at s 
(1, . . . , 1) until ||Fk(s) − s|| ≤ ε. We then add the re-
covery rates computed in s to r and continue with the
next core. The algorithm stops when all cores have
been visited.
Figure 7. (Color online) Dependency Graph Where No
Cycle Contains a Red Edge
Notes. Cores are marked by black rectangles. The topological ordering
of cores is from left to right; the two cores second from the left can be
visited in any order.
Schuldenzucker, Seuken, and Battiston: Default Ambiguity in CDS Networks
Management Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–18, © 2019 The Author(s) 11
Proposition 2 (Correctness of the Core Iteration Algorithm).
Assume that in the colored dependency graph of a ﬁnancial
system, no cycle contains a red edge. Then for any ε> 0,
the core iteration algorithm computes an ε-approximately
clearing recovery rate vector.
Proof. To see that r is an ε-solution when the algorithm
terminates, let i be a bank, let k be such that i ∈ Ck, and
let s be r restricted to the indices in Ck. By the topo-
logical ordering, Fi(r) depends only on the rj with j ∈⋃
l≤k Cl. Hence, Fi(r)  F
k
i (s), and therefore |Fi(r) − ri| 
|Fki (s) − si| ≤ ||F
k(s) − s|| ≤ ε as required, where the last
inequality holds by the algorithm’s stopping criterion.
It remains to show that the algorithm terminates—that
is, that the iteration sequence for Fk reaches the
stopping criterion ||Fk(s) − s|| ≤ ε after ﬁnitely many
steps for each k. First note that Fk is monotonic and
continuous from above. This follows just like in
Lemma 2, where we also need to account for the effects
of earlier cores on the ﬁnancial subsystem Ck: CDSs
written by banks in Ck on banks in earlier cores give
rise to additional ﬁxed liabilities, and incoming pay-
ments from earlier cores to Ck give rise to additional
assets. These manifest as constants that do not affect
the argument in the proof. Now the iteration sequence
converges to a maximal ﬁxed point of Fk like in
Theorem 5. In particular, we reach the stopping cri-
terion after ﬁnitely many steps.22 □
Given the core iteration algorithm, it is now straight-
forward to prove existence in systems without red-
containing cycles.
Proof of Theorem6. We “run” the algorithmwith ε  0
to receive a constructive proof of existence. The stop-
ping criterion ||Fk(s) − s||  0 is not attained after ﬁnitely
may steps but in the limit of the iteration sequence. All
other steps of the proof of Proposition 2 remain the
same. □
Theorem 6 generalizes and uniﬁes the existence
statements of Theorems 4 and 5: individually, neither
cycles nor red edges going to nonleaf nodes are a prob-
lem; only red-containing cycles can cause nonexistence.
Thus, the no-red-containing-cycle condition is themost
general (weakest) condition we have derived for ex-
istence (as it also covers acyclic and green core sys-
tems). Regarding maximality, the weakest condition
we have derived is “acyclic or no naked CDSs”
(Theorem 4 and Corollary 1). The absence of red-
containing cycles does not guarantee maximality
because cores with an incoming red edge may be
made worse off when the recovery rates of earlier
cores are maximized. It is an open question whether a
condition exists that is weaker than acyclic or no
naked CDSs and guarantees maximality. However,
because our analysis has shown that cycles and
red edges in the dependency graph are essential
factors for nonmaximality, it seems unlikely that a
simple condition that fulﬁlls this requirement can
be found.
In this section, we have shown that our dependency
analysis framework can be used to derive sufﬁcient
conditions for existence and maximality. However,
they are not necessary conditions. Although it may be
possible to derive stronger guarantees by taking even
more information about the contract structure into
account, we should not expect to obtain equivalence
conditions: Our computational complexity results in
Schuldenzucker et al. (2019) imply that any condition
that is equivalent to existence or maximality would be
NP-hard to check (informally, this would take ex-
ponential runtime) and would therefore be of limited
use. By contrast, our framework has yielded sufﬁcient
conditions that are simple and easy to check. Thus, we
argue that our colored dependency graph hits a
“sweet spot” by capturing the most important inter-
actions among contracts, enabling us to distinguish
between long and short positions as well as between
covered and naked CDSs.
6. Discussion: Policy Relevance
We evaluate two recent policies regarding their ef-
fectiveness for protecting against default ambiguity
under the assumptions of our model: central coun-
terparty clearing and banning naked CDSs.
The regulatory frameworks EMIR (in Europe) and
Dodd–Frank (in the United States) mandate the use of
a central clearing counterparty (CCP) for a large part of
the over-the-counter derivatives market.23 In its most
extreme form, this means that all contracts are routed
via a central node: a bankAwould notwrite a contract
to a bank B directly, but rather bank A would write a
contract to a highly capitalized central entity S, and S
would write a contract to bank B. One of the desired
effects is that the CCP would absorb a shock on the
banks, prevent it from spreading through the net-
work, and thus preventﬁnancial contagion. Although
using a CCP simpliﬁes the network of liabilities,
surprisingly, it is not effective for protecting against
default ambiguity in our model. Figure 8 provides an
example: there are three banks that hold CDSs and
write debt together with a CCP S.24 Note that S has
very high external assets such that it cannot default.
This system does not have a solution (the proof is
given in Appendix E). Indeed, when we look at the
colored dependency graph (Figure 8, bottom panel),
we see that there is still a red-containing cycle A–
B–C–A. At a higher level, we see that although a CCP
can help reduce counterparty risk (i.e., the risk to a
bank that a debtor cannot pay its liability), the ﬂow of
fundamental risk (i.e., the risk that the reference entity
in a CDS has a higher or lower recovery rate than
expected; see D’Errico et al. 2018) still takes place
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directly between the banks, essentially “around”
the CCP. This is enough to lead to nonexistence of a
solution. Overall, our example shows that requiring
banks to trade all CDSs via a CCP, even if the CCP is
very well capitalized, does not guarantee existence of
a solution to the clearing problem. This result is for-
mally proven in Appendix E.
Another policy that has seen adoption in Europe since
the European sovereign debt crisis in 2011 is banning
naked CDSs. A CDS on a European sovereign state can
only be bought if a corresponding (debt) exposure is
present as well (European Commission 2011; also see
European Securities and Markets Authority 2017b).
Corollary 1 shows that if all naked CDSs are banned,
not only those on sovereigns, then the clearing problem
is guaranteed to have a maximal solution. Thus, under
the assumptions of our model, this policy is effective
against default ambiguity. Note that in this paper, we re-
frain from recommending the adoption of any par-
ticular policy. Instead, our ﬁndings illustrate how our
framework can be used to help inform regulatory policy.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that ﬁnancial networks
that contain debt contracts and CDSs are prone to a
phenomenon we call default ambiguity—that is, a
situationwhere it is impossible to decidewhich banks
are in default. Formany years, the total notional of CDSs
written on ﬁnancial institutions has exceeded USD1
trillion worldwide. Although the European Commission
has previously acknowledged that CDSs can give rise to
new kinds of systemic risk, they have not yet considered
the risk of default ambiguity. Our new dependency
analysis framework reveals that default ambiguity
hinges on the presence of cycles in the colored depen-
dency graph. Table 1 summarizes our ﬁndings. As we
have shown, the more we relax the restrictions on the
type of these cycles, the weaker the guarantees we
obtain for our desiderata. To ﬁnd a solution for the re-
stricted network structures we have studied, one can
use the core iteration algorithm we have provided.
Our results illustrate that, to understand the be-
havior of ﬁnancial systemswith CDSs, it is essential to
consider the ternary relations they introduce, in-
cluding the reference entities. If we had instead only
considered the writer–holder relationships, all of our
counterexamples in Section 3 would have looked
like simple acyclic graphs, and we would only have
captured one of the three dependencies arising from a
CDS. Our insights may help bring about a paradigm
Table 1. Summary of Our Results
Contracts Network structure Existence Maximality Reference
Debt only Any network structure 3 3 Eisenberg and Noe (2001),
Rogers and Veraart (2013)
Debt + CDSs External reference entities only 3 3 See “Debt only” abovea
Acyclic dependency graph 3 (unique) 3 This paper (Section 5.1)
No naked CDSs 3 3 This paper (Section 5.2)
Green core systems 3 (3) (in the core) This paper (Section 5.2)
No red-containing cycles 3 7 This paper (Section 5.3)
Red-containing cycles 3 (no default costs)b/7 (with default costs) 7 This paper (Section 3)
aWhen reference entities are external to the ﬁnancial system, then CDS liabilities can be considered constant for the purpose of clearing, and the
results for ﬁnancial systems without CDSs carry over to this case.
bRemember that our proof of this result is nonconstructive. Indeed, we have shown in a separate piece of work (Schuldenzucker et al. 2019)
that, in general ﬁnancial systems without default costs, ﬁnding a solution is PPAD-hard (informally, any algorithm would need exponential
runtime in the worst case). This implies that any practical algorithm would have to use heuristics.
Figure 8. (Color online) Financial System with a CCP and
No Solution and Its Colored Dependency Graph
Notes. Top Panel: Financial system with a CCP S where β< 1 is
arbitrary and δ : 1/(1 − β + β2 − β3). There is no clearing recovery
rate vector. Bottom Panel: The corresponding colored dependency
graph (note that we omit offsetting positions that the CCP S has with
other banks as they do not affect our results).
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shift in the literature on systemic risk in CDS markets
where, so far, either the reference entities were ag-
gregated or the interactions across different reference
entities were not taken into account.
From a conceptual perspective, the reason why
CDSs can give rise to default ambiguity is that the
holder of a naked CDS may proﬁt from ﬁnancial
distress of another market participant. Note that this
phenomenon is not exclusive to CDSs. For example,
the holder of a bond put option and the writer of a
bond call option both beneﬁt if the issuer of the un-
derlying bond is in ﬁnancial distress, and therefore
the price of the bond declines. Stock options exhibit
similar behavior. Thus, we expect that these markets
would also be susceptible to default ambiguity. Our
framework can be extended to these other derivative
markets in a straightforward way (in particular, to
options).
Our dependency analysis framework enables ex ante
guarantees that hold irrespective of a shock to banks’
external assets. If the external assets are known or can
be bounded, future work may be able to derive stronger
sufﬁcient conditions for existence and maximality. To
do this, one could extend the colored dependency
graphwithweights that represent the “strength” of the
dependency. This will be a challenging task, however,
because in contrast to standardweighted-graphmodels,
this “weighted dependency graph” would have to
represent highly nonlinear effects.
An important problem that is closely related to
clearing is network valuation of contracts. Studying this
problem requires a model with uncertainty about the
future value of banks’ external assets. Barucca et al.
(2016) designed such a model for debt-only networks
by extending the Eisenberg and Noe (2001) model.
Researchers interested in network valuation with CDSs
could similarly extend our newmodel. Thiswould raise
new questions regarding whether a consistent vector of
CDS valuations exists and what is needed for market
prices to reﬂect these true values.
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Appendix A. Example That Iterating the Update
Function DoesNot Generally Converge
to a Solution
Consider Figure A.1.25 The unique solution of this system is
rA  6/7, rB  3/7, and rC  rD  1. However, the iteration
sequence deﬁned by r0  (1, 1, 1, 1) and rn+1  F(rn) does not
converge to this solution but rather exhibits cycling be-
havior: we have r1  (1, 0, 1, 1), r2  (0, 0, 1, 1), r3  (0, 1, 1, 1),
r4  (1, 1, 1, 1)  r0, etc. One may think that the cycling be-
havior is due to an unfortunate choice of the starting point
r0, but this is not the case: the iteration sequence does not
converge for any starting point other than the solution itself.
To see this, let ∆ 
 0 and rB  3/7 + ∆. It is easy to see from
the deﬁnition of F that
FB(F(r))  min(1, max(0, 3(1 − 2rB)))
 min
(
1, max
(
0,
3
7
− 6∆
))
.
Thus, after two iterations, the distance to the solution has
increased sixfold until the sequence again enters the inﬁnite
loop above.
Appendix B. Omitted Proofs from Section 3
We describe a ﬁnancial system that does not have a so-
lution and where α< β  1, thus completing the proof of
Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1 (α< β  1). Consider Figure B.1, a
variant of Figure 2, with values for eA, γ, and δ chosen as
follows: let eA ∈ (0, 1) arbitrary, set γ  1 − (1 + α)/2 · eA, and
let δ ≥ γ/(1− αeA − γ). It is easy to see that (1) eA < 1, (2)
eA + γ> 1, and (3) αeA + γ< 1.We have γ> 0 by deﬁnition and
δ> 0 by (3), so this is a well-deﬁned ﬁnancial system.
We perform a case distinction such as in the proof for β< 1.
Assume toward a contradiction that r is clearing.
Figure A.1. (Color online) Financial System Where
Iterating F Does Not Converge to a Solution; Let α  β  1
(No Default Costs)
Figure B.1. (Color online) Financial System with No
Solution for α< β  1
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• If rA  1, then pC,B(r)  0, so aB(r)  0 and pB,A(r)  0.
Thus, aA(r)  eA < 1, which implies that rA < 1—a contradiction.
• If rA < 1, then A is in default, so rA  (αeA + pB,A(r))/1 ≤
αeA + γ. Thus, pC,B(r)  δ(1 − rA) ≥ δ(1 − αeA − γ) ≥ γ, so
B is not in default and pB,A(r)  γ. Now aA(r)  eA +
γ> 1 by (2), so A is not in default, and rA  1—a
contradiction. □
Appendix C. Omitted Proofs from Section 5
We show that in a green core system, the update function is
monotonic and continuous from above and the equities of
core banks are monotonic, which is the main ingredient to
the proof of Theorem 5.
Proof of Lemma 2. As the main step of the proof, we show
that for all i ∈ C, the assets ai(r) and the assets after default
costs a′i (r) are monotonically increasing in r.
• The assets ai and a
′
i are monotonic: It sufﬁces to show that
the total incoming payments of bank i,
∑
j pj,i(r), are mono-
tonically increasing in r. To this end, let
qk,i(r) : rkc
∅
k,i + (1 − rk)
∑
j
rjc
k
j,i.
Observe that
∑
j pj,i(r) 
∑
k qk,i(r). Each individual sum-
mand qk,i(r) is monotonically increasing in r by the green
core property, which can be seen as follows. Let r ≤ r′
pointwise. Then
qk,i(r
′) − qk,i(r)  r
′
kc
∅
k,i − rkc
∅
k,i + (1 − r
′
k)
∑
j
r′j c
k
j,i
− (1 − rk)
∑
j
rjc
k
j,i
≥ r′kc
∅
k,i − rkc
∅
k,i + (1 − r
′
k)
∑
j
rjc
k
j,i
− (1 − rk)
∑
j
rjc
k
j,i
 (r′k − rk) ·
(
c∅k,i −
∑
j
rjc
k
j,i
)
≥ (r′k − rk) ·
(
c∅k,i −
∑
j
ckj,i
)
≥ 0,
where the last inequality holds because r′k − rk ≥ 0 by
assumption and c∅k,i −
∑
j c
k
j,i ≥ 0 because we are in a green
core system, so i must have a covered CDS position toward k.
• The equity Ei is monotonic for i ∈ C: First note that the
liabilities li(r) are monotonically decreasing in r in any ﬁ-
nancial system, as can be seen directly from the deﬁnition. As
ai(r) is monotonically increasing by the above argument,
Ei(r)  max(0, ai(r)) − li(r) is monotonically increasing.
• The function F is monotonic and continuous from above:
Because Fi is constant 1 for i ∈ L, it sufﬁces to show the
statement for each Fi with i ∈ C. To this end, note that Fi is
of form
Fi(r) 
f (r) if h(r) ≥ 0,
g(r) if h(r)< 0,
{
where f (r) : 1, g(r) : a′i (r)/li(r), and h(r) : ai(r) − li(r) are all
monotonic and continuous. It is easy to see that this implies
that Fi is monotonic and continuous from above. □
The following lemma has become a standard proof tech-
nique in ﬁnancial network theory, for example in Rogers and
Veraart (2013). It can be viewed as a special case of the Kleene
or Tarski–Kantorovitch ﬁxed-point theorems (see Granas and
Dugundji 2003). We restate and prove it here because there is
no standard reference for it.
Lemma 3. Let N be any ﬁnite set, and let F : [0, 1]N → [0, 1]N be
any function that is monotonic and continuous from above, where
the order relation is given by pointwise ordering. Then F has
a pointwise maximal ﬁxed point, and the iteration sequence (rn)
deﬁned by r0  (1, . . . , 1) and rn+1  F(rn) converges to this
maximal ﬁxed point.
Proof. We proceed in three steps.
(i) The sequence (rn) is descending and convergent: We show
by induction that (rn) is a descending sequence; that is, rn ≥
rn+1 pointwise. For n  0, this is trivial because r0 is the
maximal element of [0, 1]N . For n> 0, and assuming rn−1 ≥ rn,
we have rn  F(rn−1) ≥ F(rn)  rn+1 by monotonicity of F.
Because (rn) is also bounded from below by (0, . . . , 0), it must
be convergent. Call the limit of the sequence r.
(ii) The point r is greater or equal to any ﬁxed point of F: It
sufﬁces to show that any rn is greater or equal to any ﬁxed
point r∗ of F. We proceed by induction: for n  0, the state-
ment is obvious; for n> 0, and assuming rn−1 ≥ r∗, we receive
by monotonicity of F that rn  F(rn−1) ≥ F(r∗)  r∗.
(iii) The point r is a ﬁxed point of F: Because F is continuous
from above and (rn) is descending, we have F(r)  F(limn r
n) 
limnF(r
n)  limn r
n+1  limn r
n  r. □
Appendix D. Example That Iterating the Update
Function Is Not Effective in the No-Red-
Containing-Cycle Case
Consider Figure D.1 and let α  β  0.5. The cores of the
dependency graph in topological order are {A,B}, {C},
{D}, and {E}. The unique solution of this system is given by
rA  rB  0 and rC  rD  rE  1. This is because C and E
cannot default, and A and Bmust defaultwith recovery rate 0
as they togetherhavenoassetsbutanoutgoing liability; fromthis
it follows thatD has assets exactly equal to its liabilities.
Figure D.1. (Color online) Financial SystemWhere Iterating
the Update Function Does Not Converge
Notes. Top Panel: Financial system with no red-containing cycle
where iterating F does not converge to a solution (let α  β  0.5).
Bottom Panel: Its colored dependency graph.
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Simply iterating the update function F does not con-
verge in this system. To see this, let r0  1, . . . , 1 and rn+1 
F(rn) for each n. We ﬁrst consider the recovery rates of bank
A and B as the iteration sequence proceeds. Note that B
defaults in step 1, and then, following the default of B, A
defaults in step 2. We thus have from the deﬁnition of F for
rnA and r
n
B (recall that default costs are 0.5):
rnA 
1
2
rn−1B for n ≥ 2 and r
0
A  r
1
A  1,
rnB 
1
4
rn−1A for n ≥ 1 and r
0
B  1.
Solving these recursive equations yields rnA  2
−3⌊n/2⌋ for all
n and rnB  2
−3⌈n/2⌉+1for n ≥ 1and r0B  1.We observe that for
n ≥ 2, rnA < r
n
B if n is even and r
n
A > r
n
B if n is odd. This is because
log(rnA) − log(r
n
B)  −3⌊n/2⌋ + 3⌈n/2⌉ − 1  3⌈n/2⌉ − ⌊n/2⌋ − 1
and ⌈n/2⌉ − ⌊n/2⌋ is 0 if n is even and 1 if n is odd.
Now consider bank D. The assets of D consist of a CDS
on A and debt from B, so aD(r)  1 − rA + rB, and lD(r)  1.
Thus, D is in default iff rA > rB. Over the course of the it-
eration, whenever n is even, we have rnA < r
n
B, so D is not in
default and rn+1D  FD(r
n)  1. Whenever n is odd, we have
rnA > r
n
B, soD is in default and r
n+1
D  FD(r
n)< max(α, β)  0.5.
Hence, rnD changes by at least 0.5 from each iteration to the
next. In particular, the sequence does not converge.
Our example may appear artiﬁcial because bank D is
just on the verge of defaulting in the solution. We, indeed,
expect that the iteration sequence converges if this is
not the case for any bank. However, it is not clear how one
would detect this property if the exact solution is not yet
known.
Appendix E. Nonexistence with a CCP
We formalize and prove the fact that the presence of a
highly capitalized central clearing counterparty (CCP) does
not guarantee existence of a clearing recovery rate vector
(see Section 6).
Proposition 3. There exists a ﬁnancial system (N, e, c, α, β) with
a distinguished bank S ∈ N (the CCP) such that the following holds:
(1) The CCP is a counterparty to each contract: For any k ∈
N ∪ {∅} and i, j ∈ N, if cki,j > 0, then S ∈ {i, j}.
(2) The CCP is running a balanced book: For any k ∈ N ∪ {∅},∑
i c
k
i,S 
∑
i c
k
S,i.
(3) The CCP is so highly capitalized that it cannot default:
eS ≥
∑
i c
∅
S,i +
∑
i,k c
k
S,i.
(4) The ﬁnancial system has no clearing recovery rate vector.
Proof. Let β< 1. Consider a ﬁnancial system with banks
A, B, C, and S and contracts such as in Figure 8 together with
an additional bank D (for offsetting positions). Choose eD
arbitrarily, and for any k ∈ N ∪ {∅}, let ckD,S 
∑
i∈N\{D} c
k
S,i and
ckS,D 
∑
i∈N\{D} c
k
i,S. The system is well deﬁned because 1−
β + β2 − β3  (1 − β) + β2(1 − β)> 0, so δ> 0. It is easy to see
that it fulﬁlls conditions (1)–(3). To see that it also fulﬁlls
condition (4), assume toward a contradiction that r ∈ [0, 1]N is
clearing. As S is highly capitalized, rS  1.
If rA  1, then rB  0; thus rC  1, and thus rA  0, as is
easily seen from the contracts—a contradiction.
If rA < 1, then rA ≤ β by Lemma 1. Then aB(r) ≥ 1 − β, so
rB ≥ β(1 − β). Then aC(r) ≤ 1 − β(1 − β), so rC ≤ β(1 − β(1 − β)).
Thus, aA(r) ≥ δ(1−β(1−β(1−β)))  δ(1−β+β
2−β3)  1 lA(r) :
a contradiction. □
Endnotes
1As payments aremade simultaneously and there is no timing, default
and technical insolvency are equivalent conditions in our model. We
use the term “default” throughout this paper.
2Note that the models in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and Rogers and
Veraart (2013) are based on the payments between banks instead of
recovery rates. It is easy to see that the two points of view are
equivalent. In debt-only ﬁnancial systems, maximizing payments,
recovery rates, and equities are equivalent objectives.
3One could also include the interests of “society” (i.e., the real
economy) in our analysis by introducing it as an additional node in
the network. In Section 5.2 (Corollary 1), we derive sufﬁcient con-
ditions for maximality that guarantee that a solution is simulta-
neously best for all banks and society, assuming that banks’ defaults
can only have a negative effect on society.
4The total notional of these CDSs was USD1 trillion in the second half
of 2017. See Bank for International Settlements (2018, section “Single-
name instruments,” subsection “Financial ﬁrms”).
5An orthogonal question is whether we can efﬁciently compute a
solution to the clearing problem or determine algorithmically
whether a solution exists. We have found in a separate stream of
work (Schuldenzucker et al. 2019) where, in contrast to debt-only
networks, both problems are computationally infeasible in general
ﬁnancial networks with CDSs. It is an open question to which extent
algorithms exist that are guaranteed to be efﬁcient in restricted
cases.
6 See our discussion at the end of Section 2.3 for a comparison with
prior approaches toward modeling these networks.
7Following Rogers and Veraart (2013), we model default costs as
multiplicative discounts α ∈ [0, 1] on the external assets and β ∈ [0, 1]
on the interbank assets that apply only in case of default. If α  β  1,
no default costs are present, andwe showusing a ﬁxed-point theorem
that a solution always exists by continuity. By contrast, we show that
if either α< 1 or β< 1 (or both), default costs introduce a discontinuity,
and existence is not guaranteed anymore.
8A similar kind of contradiction was observed by Sundaresan and
Wang (2015), who considered a setting with a single bank that issues
contingent capital—that is, debt that is converted into equity as soon as
the bank’s stock price falls below a threshold. For certain contract
parameters, this led to nonexistence or multiplicity of an equilibrium
stock price. Their situation bears some resemblance to a bank that has
gone “short on itself” by buying a pathological CDS where it itself is
the reference entity or “long on itself” by selling such a CDS. Sun-
daresan and Wang’s scenario thus concerns the balance sheet of an
individual bank. By contrast, the ambiguity we illustrate is due to the
interactions among different contracts in a network, although each
individual bank may look innocuous.
9The ECB’s recent STAMP\euro framework, which was developed
based on “top-down models used to support EU-wide stress-testing
exercises” (Constaˆncio 2017), includes network effects as one of its
central elements. Speciﬁcally, a variant of the clearing problem very
close to Eisenberg andNoe (2001) is solved 20,000 times in the context
of a Monte Carlo simulation to obtain a probability distribution of
contagion losses (Dees et al. 2017, chapter 12).
10For example, Fender et al. (2008) described how the default of
Lehman Brothers, which was both a major counterparty and refer-
ence entity in CDSs, had signiﬁcant repercussions in money markets.
Further distress in these markets could only be averted by the
government rescue of AIG, another major CDS trader.
11Default costs could result from legal and administrative costs, from
a delay in payments, or from ﬁre sales when defaulting banks need to
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sell off their assets quickly. Details can be found in Rogers and
Veraart (2013).
12 Some prior work has employed graph-based models for CDS
networks when simplifying assumptions reduce a CDS to a binary
relationship. It was implicitly assumed that either the default of a
reference entity is an event exogenous to the network (Dufﬁe and Zhu
2011, Markose et al. 2012, Brunnermeier et al. 2013) or that CDSs do
not carry counterparty risk (Puliga et al. 2014, Leduc et al. 2017).
Heise and Kühn (2012) studied a model of CDS networks with ternary
relationships and short positions. However, they only considered
recovery rates 0 and 1 and a ﬁxed number of update steps. We are the
ﬁrst to study simultaneous clearing in networks where CDSs are
modeled as ternary relationships.
13This is the case, for example, in any variant of Figure 2 where B has
positive external assets. Here, B might ﬁrst receive the full amount in
the CDS and then pay A, or B might pay A ﬁrst, which reduces the
payment in the CDS.
14Note that a maximal solution is not necessarily unique, but all
maximal solutions lead to the same equities Ei(r).
15One could deﬁne a notion of utility for banks equal to their equity.
Then a solution to the clearing problemwould bemaximal if and only
if it Pareto dominates any other solution, and the situation in
Theorem 3 would be one of multiple Pareto optima. Note, however,
that the multiplicity we reveal here is different from a multiplicity of
equilibria that is often observed in strategic games. Recovery rates are
not actions chosen by banks. Rather, they are mathematically implied
by the network of obligations and the rules of bankruptcy. Thus,
instead of banks “choosing an equilibrium,” the clearing authority
chooses a solution to be implemented, which implies a requirement to
treat all market participants fairly (in particular, not to advantage one
bank over another one). This is only possible if maximality is fulﬁlled.
16The solution r2 that exists only in the β  1 case is strictly disfavored
by A and B over all other solutions (but strictly preferred by C andD).
17 If there exists a solution, there also exists one that maximizes total
equity (except in pathological cases). One might be tempted to simply
select such a solution. However, without maximality, there would still
be banks that prefer another solution. For complete markets, we know
from the second welfare theorem that one can impose lump sum
transfers to move from one (less desirable) Pareto-optimal outcome to
any other (more desirable) one. By contrast, without maximality, all
solutions of the clearing problem that are Pareto optimal pose the issue
that the clearing authority would have to favor one bank over another.
18 It follows from the structure of F that in this situation, holding r−ij
ﬁxed, Fj is increasing at some point ri if and only if it is increasing at
all points ri.
19Leduc et al. (2017) presented a mapping from a ﬁnancial system
with CDSs to a weighted graph where they distinguished between
naked and covered CDSs in a similar way as we do. However, they
made simplifying assumptions regarding the regulatory environ-
ment such that only a subset of the possible dependencies need to be
considered. For example, their model does not represent default by
CDS writers or short dependencies so that naked CDSs cannot be
captured. This makes their model unsuitable to study general ﬁ-
nancial systems with naked and covered CDSs.
20 See Schuldenzucker et al. (2019, appendix B) for a ﬁnancial system
with CDSs and a unique and irrational solution. Inspection shows
that it is a green core system. The maximal solution of a debt-only
system is rational because it can be computed exactly in ﬁnite time
using Eisenberg and Noe’s (2001) ﬁctitious default algorithm.
21Both computing strongly connected components and sorting in
topological order can be done easily using well-known algorithms
(see, e.g., Korte and Vygen 2012). Note that the topological order may
not be unique.
22 It is possible to show that the number of steps of the algorithm
is bounded by a function that is polynomial with respect to the size
of the ﬁnancial system and 1/ε. This makes the core iteration al-
gorithm a computationally efﬁcient approximation scheme. See
Schuldenzucker et al. (2019) for details.
23Both frameworks mandate use of a CCP for certain types of de-
rivatives (interest rate swaps and index CDSs) but not for the kind of
CDSs we discuss in this paper (single-name CDSs). See European
Securities and Markets Authority (2017a, c) for EMIR and the doc-
uments linked at U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(2017) for Dodd–Frank.
24For simplicity, we assume that all CDSs and debt contracts are
cleared via the same CCP. This is not necessary for our result. We
further assume that S has offsetting positions with other banks (i.e., it
is running a balanced book). These positions do not affect our result
and are therefore omitted from the ﬁgure.
25Figure A.1 corresponds to Figure 2 for β  0.5; however, in
Figure A.1, we set α  β  1. That is why, in contrast to Figure 2, this
system has a solution.
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3 The Computational Complexity of
Financial Networks with Credit Default
Swaps
Oh, simple thing, where have you gone?
I’m getting old and I need something to rely on.
So tell me when you’re gonna let me in.
I’m getting tired and I need somewhere to begin.
Keen, Somewhere Only We Know
The content of this chapter has previously appeared in:
“The Computational Complexity of Clearing Financial Networks with Credit
Default Swaps.” Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken, and Stefano Battiston.
Working Paper, May 2019.
See also: “Finding Clearing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit
Default Swaps is PPAD-complete.” Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken,
and Stefano Battiston. In Proceedings of the 8th Innovations in Theoretical
Computer Science (ITCS) Conference, Berkeley, USA, January 2017.
See also: “Clearing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit Default
Swaps.” Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken, and Stefano Battiston. Ex-
tended abstract in Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Economics
and Computation (EC), Maastricht, The Netherlands, July 2016.
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Abstract
The 2008 ﬁnancial crisis has been attributed to “excessive complexity” of
the ﬁnancial system due to ﬁnancial innovation. We employ computational
complexity theory to make this notion precise. Speciﬁcally, we consider the
problem of clearing a ﬁnancial network after a shock. Prior work has shown that
when banks can only enter into simple debt contracts with each other, then this
problem can be solved in polynomial time. In contrast, if they can also enter
into credit default swaps (CDSs), i.e., ﬁnancial derivative contracts that depend
on the default of another bank, a solution may not even exist. In this work, we
show that deciding if a solution exists is NP-complete if CDSs are allowed. This
remains true if we relax the problem to ε-approximate solutions, for a constant ε.
We further show that, under suﬃcient conditions where a solution is guaranteed
to exist, the approximate search problem is PPAD-complete for constant ε. We
then isolate the “origin” of the complexity. We show that already determining
which banks default is hard. Further, we show that the complexity is not driven
by the dependence of counterparties on each other, but rather hinges on the
presence of so-called naked CDSs. If naked CDSs are not present, we receive a
simple polynomial-time algorithm. Our results are of practical importance for
regulators’ stress tests and regulatory policy.
1 Introduction
The year 2008 has provided a painful example of how moderate losses in a com-
paratively small ﬁnancial market can spread and amplify in the ﬁnancial system to
create the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. It has since become
widely accepted that this was not just the result of ﬁnancial institutions’ individual
∗Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken: Department of Informatics, University of Zurich,
Switzerland, Email: {schuldenzucker,seuken}@ifi.uzh.ch. Stefano Battiston: Department of
Banking and Finance, University of Zurich, and Swiss Finance Institute, Switzerland, Email:
stefano.battiston@uzh.ch. Some of the ideas presented in this paper were previously described
in a one-page abstract that was published in the conference proceedings of EC’16 (Schuldenzucker,
Seuken and Battiston, 2016) and in a paper that was published in the conference proceedings of
ITCS’17 (Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston, 2017).
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risk-taking, but a consequence of the overall architecture of the ﬁnancial system
at the time. Haldane (2009), then Executive Director of Financial Stability at the
Bank of England, described the crisis as a manifestation of “the behaviour under
stress of a complex, adaptive network,” in which “ﬁnancial innovation [had] increased
further network dimensionality, complexity, and uncertainty.” Yellen (2013), then
Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve, described regulatory changes after the crisis that
are explicitly targeted at “excessive systemic risk arising from the complexity and
interconnectedness that characterize our ﬁnancial system.”
The ﬁnancial system has undergone rapid change since the 1990s. Financial
derivatives (i.e., ﬁnancial contracts where an obligation to pay depends on some other
event or market variable) today allow to trade and reallocate individual components
of risk. For example, an investment bank may bundle a loan in a foreign currency
with a derivative that will pay the diﬀerence between the domestic and the foreign
exchange rate. A domestic investor could then buy the bundle without having to
worry about a devaluation of the foreign currency. Another trader would take on the
other side of the derivative and thus the exchange rate risk. Of course, now both
the bank and the investor depend on the trader meeting her obligation to pay. If
the trader or the investor is another ﬁnancial institution, the process can continue
over any number of stages, with each party buying, rebundling, and reselling risk.
A network of obligations arises: a graph where the nodes are ﬁnancial institutions
(“banks” for short) and the edges are ﬁnancial contracts. We call this the ﬁnancial
network.
The above accounts by policymakers attribute the ﬁnancial crisis to excessive
“complexity” of the ﬁnancial network. The question remains, though, how exactly
we should understand the term “complexity” here. In particular, while a ﬁnancial
network could arise in a variety of ways,1 most people share an intuition that ﬁnancial
networks with derivatives are “more complex” than ones without. In this paper,
we will show that this informal notion materializes in the form of computational
complexity of a concrete problem that regulators need to solve.
More in detail, we study the clearing problem. We are given a ﬁnancial network
consisting of banks and contracts between banks. Each contract deﬁnes an obligation
to pay a certain amount of money under certain conditions. We assume that some
of the banks experienced a shock on their assets, which may render them unable
to meet their obligations towards other banks and force them into bankruptcy (or
default). Defaults may trigger defaults of other banks downstream. For each bank,
1Short-term loans between banks and securization, i.e., the pooling and re-selling of debt, are
two other ways how a financial network can form. The products resulting from securization (most
prominently collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)) are sometimes called “derivatives,” but in contrast
to the kinds of derivatives we discuss in this paper, they are defined using a priority structure and do
not depend on any market variable except for the debt they are based on. For the purpose of our
discussion, we therefore consider these products a form of debt.
2
we are now looking for its recovery rate, i.e, the percentage of its liabilities the bank
can pay to its creditors. These payments are made from its own (external) assets
and the money it receives from other banks. Recovery rates must be in accordance
with standard bankruptcy regulations, which imply a constraint reminiscent of a ﬂow
identity: defaulting banks must pay out all their assets to creditors and must do so
in proportion to the respective obligation. Banks may further incur default costs and
lose a percentage of their assets upon defaulting. The clearing problem is non-trivial
because the contractual relationships can form cycles in the network.2
The clearing problem serves as a model for how a ﬁnancial crisis will turn out
following the initial shock. Once a solution to the clearing problem has been found,
the eﬀect of the initial shock can be judged by metrics like the number of defaulted
banks or the total loss of money due to default costs. Researchers have used this
approach to study the eﬀect of network structure on systemic risk, such as ﬁnancial
diversiﬁcation and integration (Elliott, Golub and Jackson, 2014), the interplay of
shock size and network structure (Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015), and
to determine bounds on the extent of a crisis (Elsinger, Lehar and Summer, 2006;
Glasserman and Young, 2015), among many others.3
The clearing problem has practical relevance in the context of stress tests, where
regulators such as the European Central Bank (ECB) evaluate the stability of the
ﬁnancial system under an array of adverse economic scenarios. While today, the
oﬃcial stress tests still operate at a microprudential (individual bank) level, eﬀorts are
underway to transition to a macroprudential point of view, where the ﬁnancial system
is considered as a whole (Constâncio, 2017). These new stress tests need to take
network eﬀects into account. For example, the ECB’s STAMP€ framework (Dees,
Henry and Martin, 2017) includes a model for the assessment of interbank contagion
that is very close to the literature on clearing. The clearing problem is solved many
thousands of times in the context of a Monte Carlo simulation. Therefore, these
stress tests crucially depend on having access to eﬃcient algorithms for the clearing
problem.4
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) showed that, if banks can only enter into simple debt
2Perhaps contrary to intuition, cyclic structures are overwhelmingly common in real financial
networks. See D’Errico et al. (2018), for example, for an empirical study of the network structure of
credit default swap markets, which will be discussed below.
3While the exact rules of clearing vary across the literature, they all share as a common feature
that payments (or, in some cases, contract valuations) happen simultaneously and some kind of
input-output identity needs to hold at each bank. The essential properties of these models with
respect to existence and computation of a solution are very similar. In this paper, unless specifically
indicated, the term “clearing” refers to the model by Eisenberg and Noe (2001), discussed below, and
its extensions.
4The size of the financial systems analyzed in stress tests must be expected to lie in the order of
100 banks, making brute-force approaches impractical. For example, Dees, Henry and Martin (2017,
Chapter 12) consider 144 banks and the European Banking Authority (2014) stress tests covered
123 banks. Only few of these banks are trivial, i.e., sources or sinks in the network Dees, Henry and
Martin (2017, Chart 12.1).
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contracts with each other, then the clearing problem always has a solution and it
can be computed in polynomial time. A debt contract is any contract where the
obligation to pay is a ﬁxed number. This could be just a loan from one bank to
another, but it can also serve as a model for, e.g., a derivative when the obligation to
pay only depends on variables that are external to the ﬁnancial system and that can
assumed to be ﬁxed for the purpose of clearing. Rogers and Veraart (2013) extended
the result to default costs. These clearing models have seen widespread adoption in
research and stress testing, such as in the above-mentioned STAMP€ framework. We
argue, however, that it is necessary to consider extensions of the model, where the
obligation to pay may not be ﬁxed.
Speciﬁcally, we study ﬁnancial networks that contain credit default swaps (CDSs)
in addition to debt. A CDS is a ﬁnancial derivative where the obligation to pay
depends on the default of a third party, the reference entity. Market participants
use CDSs to insure themselves against a default of the reference entity or to place a
speculative bet on this event. CDSs have played a major role in the default of Lehman
Brothers and the bailout of AIG during the 2008 crisis (Fender and Gyntelberg,
2008). Both ﬁrms were among the most important institutions in this market, both
as counterparties and as reference entities (Fitch Ratings, 2007). It has hence become
conventional wisdom that they were counterparties in signiﬁcant amounts of CDSs
where the respective other bank was the reference entity. Such CDSs on other banks
cannot accurately be modeled as debt contracts because they depend on an event
that is fundamentally endogenous to the ﬁnancial system. At the same time, future
stress tests cannot aﬀord to neglect the dependencies implied by a Lehman–AIG
type situation. That is why it is necessary to consider an extension of the existing
debt-only to CDSs where reference entities can be other ﬁnancial institutions.5
We consider such a model that extends the Rogers and Veraart (2013) clearing
model to CDSs in a straightforward way. In our own recent work (Schuldenzucker,
Seuken and Battiston, 2019), we have studied existence of a solution in this model.
We have found that there are ﬁnancial systems where the clearing problem has no
solution. At the same time, the clearing algorithms for debt-only networks do not
extend to CDSs even in cases where a solution is known to exist. This immediately
raises two questions regarding the computational aspects of the clearing problem with
CDSs:
1. Given a ﬁnancial network, can we eﬃciently determine whether a solution to
the clearing problem exists?
2. Given a ﬁnancial network in which a solution is known to exist, can we eﬃciently
5The market for CDSs on financial firms alone currently has a size of about USD 900 billion.
In the years following the 2008 crisis, this number was as high as USD 5 trillion. See Bank for
International Settlements (2018, Section Single-name instruments, Subsection Financial firms) and
the graph linked there.
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compute it?
In this paper, we answer both questions in the negative. Towards the ﬁrst question,
we show that it is NP-complete to distinguish networks that have an (exact) solution
from those that have no ε-approximate solution, for a natural approximate solution
concept and suﬃciently small constant ε. In particular, deciding existence of an exact
solution or an ε-approximate solution is NP-hard (Section 3).
Towards the second question regarding the computation of a solution, we restrict
our attention to the special case where banks do not incur default costs. Here, it is
known that a solution always exists (Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston, 2019),
but the only known proof of this statement is non-constructive via a ﬁxed-point
theorem and so the question regarding computation has remained open so far. As
exact solutions can be irrational, we need to consider an approximation problem. We
show that the total search problem of ﬁnding an ε-approximate solution in a ﬁnancial
system without default costs is PPAD-complete if ε is a suﬃciently small constant.
Thus, no polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) exists unless P=PPAD
(Section 4).
At this point, we have shown that ﬁnancial networks with CDSs are indeed “more
complex” than those without. However, we should also be able to explain where
this newfound complexity comes from. This is important to be able to inform future
decisions on regulatory policy beyond an overly simple statement like “CDSs are
problematic.”
In our quest for an “origin” of the computational complexity, we proceed in two
steps. In a ﬁrst step, we ask what aspect of a solution to the clearing problem is hard
to compute. We show that hardness in the decision and search problems does not
arise exclusively from the need to compute precise numerical values for the recovery
rates. Instead, it is already NP-hard to decide if some given bank will default in some
ε-solution (an appropriate distinction variant is NP-complete) and in the case without
default costs, it is already PPAD-complete to ﬁnd a set of banks that will default in
some ε-solution (Section 5).
In a second step, we study restrictions on the network structure to discern what
economic aspects of ﬁnancial networks the computational complexity might originate
from. It follows from our reductions that the problems are still hard in a model where
counterparty risk (i.e., the dependence of a bank on its debtors) is neglected. Thus,
we can say that the complexity originates from fundamental risk (i.e., the dependence
of CDS counterparties on the reference entity). Finally, we obtain an upper bound on
complexity. We show that hardness hinges on the presence of naked CDSs, i.e., CDSs
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that are held without also holding a corresponding debt contract.6 If naked CDSs are
not allowed, a solution always exists and we show that a simple iterative algorithm
ﬁrst presented in Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston (2019) constitutes a fully
polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS; Section 6). These insights will allow
us to frame a rather complete picture regarding the “origin of the complexity” and
they have various implications for regulatory policy (Section 7).
Attempts to capture the “complexity” of the ﬁnancial network have, of course, been
made before. We diﬀerentiate between informal complexity due to i) the structure
of interconnections and ii) the nature of the contracts themselves. Complexity due
to the network structure has previously been approached using various measures
from graph theory, such as the length of a path between ultimate borrowers and
lenders (Shin, 2010), average degree (Gai, Haldane and Kapadia, 2011), network
concentration (Arinaminpathy, Kapadia and May, 2012), network entropy (Battiston
et al., 2016), or spectral measures (Bardoscia et al., 2017). As these measures require
ordinary graphs as their inputs, where edges cannot contain more information than
weights, they need to abstract over details of the contracts, such as the dependence of
a ﬁnancial derivative on its underlying market variable. Sensitivity results (Hemenway
and Khanna, 2016; Liu and Staum, 2010; Feinstein et al., 2017) are another way to
capture “complexity due to interconnectedness” and are also related to computational
complexity. These results have so far only been obtained for networks of debt or
cross-holdership. Basel III regulations measure a bank’s “interconnectedness” by the
size of its intra-ﬁnancial assets, while its “complexity” (of individual contracts) is
measured by its amount of OTC7 derivatives, among others (Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, 2014).
The second kind of complexity, due to the nature of individual contracts, has
begun to receive attention from theoretical computer science. Arora et al. (2011) and
Zuckerman (2011) studied the cost of asymmetric information in ﬁnancial derivatives
markets with computationally bounded agents. Braverman and Pasricha (2014)
showed that compound options8 are computationally hard to price correctly. These
pieces of work study types of contracts that are “complex” even in isolation. In
6Naked CDSs are a common phenomenon in practice. While we are not aware of any empirical
studies that quantify the share of CDSs that are naked, there seems to be a broad consensus that
they form the majority of CDS positions. Kiff et al. (2009) noted that the (gross) notional of CDSs
“continues to far exceed the stock of corporate bonds and loans on which most contracts are written.”
Crotty (2009) quotes Eric Dinallo, then Superintendent of Insurance for New York State, saying that
80 percent of the CDSs outstanding are speculative (i.e., naked). Regulatory changes after 2009,
like central clearing and portfolio compression (see Section 7), may have reduced the share of naked
CDSs, but they cannot eliminate it below a significant level.
7Over-the-counter, i.e., traded directly with other banks rather than through an exchange. In this
paper we only consider OTC derivatives.
8An option is a derivative that grants the holder the right to buy (call option) or sell (put option)
an asset A at a specified time in the future for a previously agreed-upon price K. A compound
option is an option where A is itself an option.
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contrast, a single CDS is a very simple contract.9 Hence, we show in this paper that
otherwise simple derivatives, if they occur as part of an otherwise simple network
structure, create a ﬁnancial system of high (computational) complexity.
The only other computational complexity result for ﬁnancial networks we are
aware of is by Hemenway and Khanna (2016), who studied the clearing model by
Elliott, Golub and Jackson (2014). The authors showed that it is computationally
hard to determine the distribution of a given total negative shock to the banks that
does the worst damage in terms of value. In contrast, we prove in this work that in
ﬁnancial networks with CDSs, it is already hard to determine the impact of a known
distribution of shocks to banks. To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to
present a computational hardness result for the clearing problem.
Note that we do not claim that the “complexity” we reveal in this paper is
necessarily what the regulatory authorities had in mind during and after the 2008
crisis. Neither do we claim that it was the most pressing issue or the cause of
the crisis. There were many issues, such as counterparty risk, opacity, and lack
of regulatory constraints for the OTC derivatives market (Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission, 2011). However, the “complexity” we reveal separates ﬁnancial networks
with derivatives from those without in a fundamental way. Today, new regulatory
requirements have reduced counterparty risk and new reporting obligations have
reduced opacity, while algorithmic tools to analyze the reported data are still under
development. This is why we believe that the “complexity” we illustrate in this paper
is even more relevant today.
Techniques Used
Since the clearing problem refers to an explicit network, it is natural for us to employ
reduction from circuit problems to prove our hardness results.
To prove that deciding existence of a solution is NP-hard, we perform reduction
from the Circuit Satisfiability problem. We encode Boolean circuits in a way
reminiscent of electrical circuits. Boolean values are represented by recovery rates
that are bounded away from 1/2 by a constant and we deﬁne two ﬁnancial system
gadgets: one that allows a bank to have either a low or a high recovery rate, for
the inputs, and one that implements a NAND operation, for the gates. We prevent
accumulation of errors via a special reset gadget that maps low values to 0± ε high
values to 1± ε. Finally, we add a ﬁnancial sub-network that has no solution iﬀ the
recovery rate of the “output bank” of the circuit is low.
We frame the decision problem as a promise problem: algorithms are only re-
quired to show any useful behavior on “clear-cut” instances where either an exact
solution exists or not even an ε-approximate solution exists, for some small ε. For
9Valuation of a CDS is straightforward if distributions of recovery rates are known for the reference
entity and counterparty. See Duffie (1999).
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intermediate instances (only an approximate solution exists), any behavior including
non-termination is acceptable. Promise problems are useful for problems where
solutions may not be of polynomial length. For example, Schoenebeck and Vadhan
(2012) used this approach in the context of certain classes of Nash equilibria. See
Goldreich (2005) for a further discussion.
We show PPAD-hardness of the search problem via reduction from generalized
circuits. Originally developed for the analysis of the complexity of ﬁnding a Nash
equilibrium (Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou, 2009; Chen, Deng and Teng,
2009; Rubinstein, 2018), generalized circuits have found application in the study of
other total search problems. A generalized circuit consists of arithmetic gates and
comparison gates,10 and it can have cycles. The associated search problem asks for
a vector of values that is approximately consistent with each gate. Our reduction
is straightforward: for each type of gate, we deﬁne a gadget that (approximately)
performs the respective operation on the recovery rates. PPAD-hardness then follows
from hardness of generalized circuits for constant ε (Rubinstein, 2018). Hardness for
constant ε is the strongest kind of hardness result one can obtain here and precludes
existence of a PTAS unless P=PPAD. If ε shrinks polynomially as the input grows, this
only precludes an FPTAS. If it shrinks exponentially, it only precludes membership
in P.
To show that already ﬁnding a set of defaulting banks is PPAD-hard, we deﬁne a
new discrete variant of the generalized circuit problem, which may be of independent
interest. In this problem, we only ask for one of three states for each gate: high,
medium, or low. These states correspond to “decision” or “truncation points” in the
deﬁnition of the gates. For example, the addition gate is in a high state if and only if
its inputs sum to more than one and its output is therefore truncated at one. States
also allow for ε errors. It is PPAD-complete to ﬁnd a collection of states consistent
with some ε-solution of the circuit because with states ﬁxed, the constraints on the
gates are linear and one can reconstruct an ε-solution via linear programming. We
then show that in our above reduction from ﬁnancial networks to generalized circuits,
the set of defaulting banks already determines the states of the gates. We hope that
our technique may be useful to prove hardness of discrete versions of other search
problems in the future.
2 Preliminaries
We now describe the formal model for simultaneous clearing in ﬁnancial networks with
CDSs (Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston, 2019). We present a new relaxation
10Traditionally, generalized circuits have also supported Boolean gates that operate on approxi-
mately Boolean values similar to above. Schuldenzucker and Seuken (2019) recently showed that the
Boolean gates are in fact redundant and can therefore be omitted.
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of the solution concept, which is necessary to be able to receive an (approximate)
solution of ﬁnite, polynomial length. We then discuss how the addition of CDSs
changes the mathematical properties of the model compared to debt-only ﬁnancial
networks.
2.1 Basic Notation
Throughout this paper, we say that ε is suﬃciently small (in symbols: ε≪ 1) if it
is below a certain positive threshold, where the exact value of the threshold is not
relevant in the following. The threshold may depend on parameters that are arbitrary,
but ﬁxed, but it will never depend on the input to any computational problem and
should therefore treated as a constant. We sometimes write ε≪ β to indicate that
the threshold is a monotonic (not necessarily linear) function of a term β. We write
Θ(ε) for cε where c > 0 is a certain constant that is not relevant in the following and
does not depend on any values or parameters. We deﬁne [x] := min (1, max (0, x)),
the truncation of x to the interval [0, 1]. We write x = y ± ε for |x− y| ≤ ε if x and
y are scalars and for ‖x− y‖∞ ≤ ε if they are vectors. We also use the notation
“±ε” in compound expression like [x± ε] to indicate a range of values. This notation
formally corresponds to interval arithmetic.
2.2 Financial Systems and Clearing Recovery Rates11
Financial System. Let N denote a ﬁnite set of banks. Each bank i ∈ N holds a
certain amount of external assets, denoted by ei ≥ 0. Between any two banks i and
j, |N |+ 1 numbers capture the contracts from the contract writer i to the holder j.
Let c∅i,j ≥ 0 be the total notional amount of debt that i owes to j and for k ∈ N let
cki,j ≥ 0 be the total notional amount of CDSs from i to j with reference entity k. If
cki,j > 0 for some k ∈ N ∪ {∅}, we call j a creditor of i and j a debtor of i.
We make two sanity assumptions to rule out pathological cases. First, no bank
may enter into a contract with itself and no bank may enter into a CDS on itself (i.e.,
c∅i,i = c
j
i,i = c
j
i,j = c
i
i,j = 0 for all i, j ∈ N). Second, as CDSs are deﬁned as insurance
on debt, we require that any bank that is a reference entity in a CDS must also be
a writer of some debt contract (i.e., if
∑
k,l∈N c
i
k,l > 0, then
∑
j∈N c
∅
i,j > 0, for all
i ∈ N).12
We model default costs following Rogers and Veraart (2013): there are two default
cost parameters α, β ∈ [0, 1]. Defaulting banks are only able to pay to their creditors
a share of α of their external assets and a share of β of their incoming payments.
11Parts of this sub-section until and excluding the definition of approximate solutions have previously
appeared in our prior work (Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston, 2019, Section 2). Also see the
aforementioned paper for a discussion of alternative models for financial networks with CDSs.
12For technical reasons, we will allow our financial system gadgets in Sections 3 and 4 to violate
the second assumption. In this case, the violating banks will be “dummy banks” that hold and write
no contracts and are ignored when considering solutions.
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Thus, α = β = 1 means that there are no default costs and α = β = 0 means that
assets held by defaulting banks are worthless. The values 1− α and 1− β are the
default costs.13
A ﬁnancial system is a tuple (N, e, c, α, β) where N is a set of banks, e is a vector
of external assets, c is a 3-dimensional matrix of contracts, and α and β are default
cost parameters. Note that, even though α and β are part of the deﬁnition of a
ﬁnancial system, our results in this paper will be for restrictions of the respective
problems to arbitrary but ﬁxed values of α and β. The parameters can therefore be
considered constant.
Note that when banks enter into a contract, there is typically an initial payment.
In addition, the values of banks’ assets are usually assumed to be subject to random
ﬂuctuation. We do not model these complications explicitly but rather, we assume
that they are implicitly reﬂected in the external assets.
Assets and Liabilities. We are ultimately looking for a vector of recovery rates
ri ∈ [0, 1]. For any two banks i and j, the contracts from i to j give rise to a liability
from i to j. This is the amount of money that i has to pay to j. A debt contract
gives rise to an unconditional liability equal to its notional, while the liability in a
CDS with reference entity k depends on the recovery rate of k and is proportional to
1− rk. The total liability from i to j at r is therefore:
li,j(r) := c
∅
i,j +
∑
k∈N
(1− rk) · cki,j
The total liabilities of i at r are the aggregate liabilities that i has toward all other
banks, denoted by
li(r) :=
∑
j∈N
li,j(r).
The actual payment pi,j(r) from i to j at r can be lower than li,j(r) if i is in
default. A bank that is in default makes payments in its contracts in proportion to
the respective liability;
pi,j(r) := ri · li,j(r).
The total assets ai(r) of a bank i at r consist of its external assets ei and the incoming
payments;
ai(r) := ei +
∑
j∈N
pj,i(r).
In case bank i is in default, its assets after default costs a′i(r) are the assets reduced
13Default costs could arise from a variety of sources, such as legal costs, operational losses, or
from a discount in prices when assets need to be sold off quickly during bankruptcy. See Rogers and
Veraart (2013) for details.
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according to the factors α and β. This is the amount that will be paid out to creditors;
a′i(r) := αei + β
∑
j∈N
pj,i(r).
Remark 1. To see that CDSs indeed act as insurance on default, let i, j, k ∈ N and
assume that bank j holds both debt from k and a CDS on k, both with the same
notional: cki,j = c
∅
k,j =: δ > 0. Then the assets of j contain the term rk ·δ+ri ·(1−rk)·δ.
As long as ri = 1, this term is equal to δ independently of rk; thus, i is insured against
k’s default.
Clearing Recovery Rate Vector. Following Eisenberg and Noe (2001), we call
a recovery rate vector r ∈ [0, 1]N clearing if it satisﬁes the essential principles of
bankruptcy law:
1. Banks with suﬃcient assets to pay their liabilities in full must do so.
2. Banks with insuﬃcient assets to pay their liabilities in full are in default and
must pay out all their assets to creditors after default costs have been subtracted.
This leads to the following formal deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1 (Clearing Recovery Rate Vector). Let X = (N, e, c, α, β) be a ﬁnancial
system. Deﬁne the update function
F : [0, 1]N → [0, 1]N
Fi(r) :=


1 if ai(r) ≥ li(r)
a′i(r)
li(r)
if ai(r) < li(r).
A recovery rate vector r ∈ [0, 1]N is called clearing for X if it is a ﬁxed point of the
update function, i.e., if Fi(r) = ri for all i. We also call a clearing recovery rate vector
a solution to the clearing problem.
Approximate Solutions. There exist ﬁnancial systems with CDSs where all solu-
tions contain irrational numbers (see Appendix B for an example). To receive ﬁnite
(polynomial-length) objects for our computational considerations in the present paper,
we relax Deﬁnition 1 to an approximate solution as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 (Approximately Clearing Recovery Rate Vector). Let X = (N, e, c, α, β)
be a ﬁnancial system and let ε ≥ 0. A recovery rate vector r is called ε-approximately
clearing (or an ε-solution) for X if for each i ∈ N at least one of the following two
11
conditions is satisﬁed:
ri = 1± ε and ai(r) ≥ (1− ε)li(r)
ri =
a′i(r)
li(r)
± ε and ai(r) < (1 + ε)li(r)
Note how both the “case selection part” and the “output part” of the deﬁnition
of the function F in Deﬁnition 1 are relaxed. Banks with much higher assets than
liabilities are unambiguously not in default (ri = 1 ± ε) and those with much
lower assets than liabilities are in default (ri = a
′
i(r)/li(r) ± ε). But when assets
approximately equal liabilities, either of the two states are possible. This is an
appropriate model for the real world, where default is not a knife-edge decision, but
has some tolerance.14 Therefore, the above deﬁnition likely reﬂects what (say) a
regulator running a stress test will be interested in. Recall that the precision ε is
deﬁned in the space of recovery rates. That is why ε is used as an additive error in the
output recovery rate, but a multiplicative one when comparing assets and liabilities.
We take the following elementary properties as evidence that our approximate
solution concept is natural. The proof is straightforward and hence omitted.
Proposition 1. Let X = (N, e, c, α, β) be a ﬁnancial system.
1. An exact solution is the same as a 0-solution. If ε′ > ε ≥ 0, then any ε-solution
is also an ε′-solution.
2. If F (r) = r ± ε, then r is an ε-solution.
3. If α = β = 1 (i..e, there are no default costs), then F (r) = r ± ε if and only if
r is an ε-solution.
4. If r is an ε-solution, then we have:
ai(r) ≥ (1 + ε)li(r)⇒ ri = 1± ε
ai(r) < (1− ε)li(r)⇒ ri = a
′
i(r)
li(r)
± ε
5. If r is an ε-solution and li(r) > 0, then ri ≤ ai(r)li(r) + ε.
6. If r is an ε-solution and ri < 1 − ε, then ri ≤ max(α, β) + ε. If in addition
ei = 0, then ri ≤ β + ε.
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Figure 1 Example ﬁnancial system. Let α = β = 0.5
A
B C
1
2
1
0
2 1
2.3 Example and Visual Representation15
Figure 1 shows a visual representation of an example ﬁnancial system. There are
three banks N = {A,B,C}, drawn as circles, with external assets of eA = 0, eB = 2,
and eC = 1, drawn as rectangles on top of the banks. Debt contracts are drawn as
blue arrows from the writer to the holder and they are annotated with the notionals
c∅B,A = 2 and c
∅
B,C = 1. CDSs are drawn as orange arrows, where a dashed line
connects to the reference entity, and are also annotated with the notionals: cBA,C = 1.
Default cost parameters α = β = 0.5 are given in addition to the picture.
A clearing recovery rate vector for this example is given by rA = 1, rB =
1
3 ,
and rC = 1. The liabilities arising from this recovery rate vector are lB,A(r) = 2,
lB,C(r) = 1, and lA,C(r) =
2
3 . Payments are pB,A(r) =
2
3 , pB,C =
1
3 , and pA,C(r) =
2
3 .
This is the only solution for this system.
Let now ε = 0.1. The ε-approximate solutions are exactly the recovery rate
vector r that can be chosen according to the following process. Note that aB(r) <
(1− ε)lB(r) ∀r and thus choose rB ∈
[
1
3 − 0.1, 13 + 0.1
]
≈ [0.23, 0.43] arbitrary. Let
rC ∈ [0.9, 1] arbitrary. To choose rA, perform case distinction over the chosen value
of rB:
• If rB ≥ 1+ε3+ε ≈ 0.35, then aA(r) ≥ (1 + ε)lA(r) and thus choose rA ∈ [1− ε, 1] =
[0.9, 1] arbitrary.
• If rB <
1−ε
3−ε ≈ 0.31, then aA(r) < (1− ε)lA(r) and thus choose rA =
a′
A
(r)
lA(r)
± ε =
0.5rB
2(1−rB)
± 0.1 = 14 · rB1−rB ± 0.1 arbitrary. Note that in this case, rA can take on
exactly the values in
[
0.5(1/3−0.1)
1/3−0.1 − 0.1, 0.5(1/3+0.1)1/3+0.1 + 0.1
]
= [0.4, 0.6].
• If neither of the two above conditions applies, choose rA according to either of
the two above rules.
Note that some of the ε-approximate solutions are close to the exact solution while
14In the real world, edge cases are decided by determinations committees, which are panels
consisting of representatives of financial institutions (specifically, the most active dealers and non-
dealer members). See International Swaps and Derivatives Association (2012).
15This example has been adopted and extended from our prior work (Schuldenzucker, Seuken and
Battiston, 2019).
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others are not. We will discuss this phenomenon in Section 3.
2.4 Effects of Allowing CDSs
If there are no CDSs (i.e., cki,j = 0 ∀k ∈ N), then a solution to he clearing problem
always exists (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001; Rogers and Veraart, 2013). In this case, the
assets ai of each bank i are linear and monotonic functions of r and the liabilities are
constant. This implies that the update function F is piecewise linear and monotonic,
where the linear segments are given by regions where the set of defaulting banks
does not change. Eisenberg and Noe (2001) exploited this for their ﬁctitious default
algorithm: we keep track of a candidate set of defaulting banks, beginning with the
empty set. In each step, we solve a linear equation system to compute clearing recovery
rates assuming this set of banks defaults. We then update the set of defaulting banks.
By monotonicity, this set can only grow over time and we terminate at a solution
after at most |N | steps. In particular, a rational solution of polynomial length always
exists. If there are default costs, a discontinuity appears at the boundary of the
default regions, but, as Rogers and Veraart (2013) have shown, the algorithm still
works.
The ﬁctitious default algorithm does not extend to CDSs. This is because the
assets of a bank i can then contain terms of form ckj,i · rj · (1− rk) and can thus be
non-linear and non-monotonic, and so can the update function F . Since F is no
longer linear (and also not convex or concave), the individual steps of the ﬁctitious
default algorithm cannot easily be performed in polynomial time. Further, by non-
monotonicity, the set of defaulting banks need not grow monotonically over time and
thus the algorithm would not necessarily terminate.16
If there are default costs and CDSs are allowed, a solution to the clearing problem
need not even exist (Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston, 2019). The intuition for
this is that if a bank holds a CDS on itself, then this can lead to a situation where a
default of this bank implies non-default and vice versa. In a network, an equivalent
situation can arise indirectly. The discontinuity due to default costs implies that a
“middle ground” is not attainable.
In two important special cases, existence of a solution is guaranteed. First, if
there are no default costs (α = β = 1), continuity is restored17 and one can show
using a ﬁxed-point theorem that a solution always exists. It has not been studied
how computationally hard it is to actually ﬁnd (an approximation of) this solution.
The second special case is when naked CDSs (see Section 3) are not allowed and
where monotonicity is restored. In this case, a solution can be described as the
16Cycling behavior is easy to construct, see for instance Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston
(2019, Appendix A).
17The function F can still contain a discontinuity at the boundaries of the sets {r | li(r) = 0}. This
is easy to circumvent, though.
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limit of an iteration sequence. No easy-to-check condition is known that is equivalent
to the existence of a solution to the clearing problem. The question regarding the
computational complexity of this decision problem has thus remained open.
3 The Complexity of Deciding Existence of a Solution
In this section, we prove our ﬁrst main result: It is hard to distinguish between ﬁnancial
systems that have an exact solution and those that have no ε-solution. To make this
problem well-deﬁned, we make the following additional technical assumption.
Deﬁnition 3 (Non-degenerate Financial System). A ﬁnancial systemX = (N, e, c, α, β)
is called non-degenerate if every bank that writes any contracts also writes a debt
contract. That is, for all i ∈ N , if ∑j,k∈N cki,j > 0, then ∑j∈N c∅i,j > 0.
Note that non-degeneracy is a very weak requirement in the real world. All we
demand is that every bank has some constant liabilities, for example to its customers.
The following lemma shows that non-degenerate ﬁnancial systems are suﬃciently
“smooth” to ensure that ε-solutions are not too long.
Lemma 1. Let ε > 0 and let X be a non-degenerate ﬁnancial system. If X has an
exact solution, then X has an ε-solution of size polynomial in the sizes of ε and X.
The proof can be found in Appendix A and works by rounding. Note that, since
the update function F is not usually continuous, this does not necessarily lead to an
approximate ﬁxed point. Instead, we make use of the fact that we relaxed both sides
of the deﬁnition of F in our deﬁnition of an ε-solution. Note further that the lemma
does not imply that all ε-solutions are close to an exact solution (if one exists) or
have polynomial length. This is common for approximate solution concepts.18
We can now state our ﬁrst main result in the language of promise problems.
Theorem 1. For any ﬁxed α and β such that α < 1 or β < 1 and for ε suﬃciently
small depending on α and β, the promise problem ε-HasClearingα,β, deﬁned as
follows, is NP-complete: given a non-degenerate ﬁnancial system X = (N, e, c, α, β),
• if X has an exact solution, return Yes.
• if X has no ε-solution, return No.
18Using a theorem by Anderson (1986), it follows from the syntactic structure of the definition
that for any X and δ there is an ε such that any ε-solution for X is δ-close to an r that is
almost an exact solution: ri = Fi(r) unless ai(r) = li(r), in which case we can have ri = 1 or
ri = a
′
i(r)/li(r) = a
′
i(r)/ai(r). However, ε depends on X in this case, while we consider a constant ε
in this paper. It is easy to construct examples where for constant ε, exact and approximate solutions
are far apart. Search problems for strong approximate fixed points, which are defined as being
close to an exact fixed point, have previously been studied by Etessami and Yannakakis (2010).
Computational complexity is markedly higher than for the regular approximate variants. For example,
it is an open question if finding a strong approximate Nash equilibrium is even in NP.
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Note that if α = β = 1, then we know from prior work that an exact solution
always exists and so ε-HasClearingα,β is trivial (see Section 2.4). For general α
and β, membership in NP follows immediately via Lemma 1:
Proof of Theorem 1, membership. GivenX and ε, let, via Lemma 1, L = poly(size(X),
size(ε)) be such that if an exact solution exists, then so does an ε-solution of size ≤ L.
Check if an ε-solution of size ≤ L exists; return Yes if so and No otherwise. This
is in NP via complete enumeration. If now there is an exact solution, by Lemma 1
there is also an ε-solution of length ≤ L and we correctly return Yes. If there is no
ε-solution, we correctly return No.
Remark 2 (A Non-Promise Variant of the Decision Problem). If none of the two
conditions in Theorem 1 is satisﬁed, any behavior including non-termination is allowed.
One might argue that it would be more natural to instead consider the problem
“Given X, return Yes if an ε-solution exists and No otherwise.” Theorem 1 implies
that this problem is NP-hard for 0 ≤ ε≪ 1, but it does not imply that it is a member
of NP. This is because Lemma 1 does not imply that there is always an ε-solution of
polynomial length if an ε-solution exists, but only when an exact solution exists.19
Note further that ε-HasClearingα,β becomes (weakly) easier as we increase ε, while
this is not clear for the non-promise variant. Framing the problem as a promise
problem avoids these issues.
The remainder of this section is dedicated to showing NP-hardness of the
ε-HasClearingα,β problem. Our reduction is from Circuit Satisfiability. We
represent Boolean values by recovery rates that are contained in the set [0, 1/4]∪[3/4, 1],
with the low part of this set representing False and the high part representing True.
We then encode the inputs and the gates using ﬁnancial system gadgets and we force
the output to True by adding another special ﬁnancial sub-system. We prevent error
accumulation using a special reset gadget reminiscent of the brittle comparison gadget
in Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2009).
3.1 Financial System Gadgets
We ﬁrst introduce two technical tools that we will use for the proofs in this section as
well as in Section 4. We deﬁne a ﬁnancial system gadget as a small ﬁnancial system
where the recovery rate of an output bank depends on a collection of input banks in a
certain way. We can “apply” a gadget into another ﬁnancial system by identifying its
input banks with some other banks, thereby extending the existing ﬁnancial system
with new banks. We will use this to successively build up ﬁnancial systems.
19The proof of the lemma implies that an ε-solution of length polynomial in the length of ε− ε0
exists if an ε0-solution exists, for some 0 ≤ ε0 < ε. To derive membership in NP for the non-promise
variant, we would need to bound inf {ε0 | an ε0-solution exists} from above relative to the length of
X. We leave it to future work to explore to which extent this might be possible.
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Deﬁnition 4 (Financial System Extension). An extension of a ﬁnancial system
X = (N, e, c, α, β) is a ﬁnancial system X ′ = (N ′, e′, c′, α, β) such that N ⊆ N ′ and
the assets and liabilities of each bank i ∈ N are the same in X and X ′. That is, we
have i) e′i = ei ∀i ∈ N and ii) if c′ki,j > 0 and one of i, j is in N , then both i, j ∈ N ,
k ∈ N ∪ {∅}, and c′ki,j = cki,j . We call X ′ an extension of X on N0 ⊆ N if this holds
whenever one of i, j is in N0. We call r ∈ [0, 1]N an ε-solution on N0 if the condition
from Deﬁnition 2 holds for all i ∈ N0.
Deﬁnition 5 (Financial System Gadget). A ﬁnancial system gadget is a ﬁnancial
system G = (N, e, c, α, β) with a set of distinguished input banks A := {a1, ... , am} ⊆
N that have no assets or liabilities (i.e., eai = c
k
ai,j
= ckj,ai = 0 for i = 1, ... ,m, j ∈ N ,
and k ∈ N ∪ {∅}) such that the following property holds: for any rA ∈ [0, 1]A there
exists an rN\A ∈ [0, 1]N\A such that rA ∪ rN\A is an exact solution on N \ A. We
say that G implements a property P : [0, 1]N → {True,False} if for any suﬃciently
small ε and any ε-solution r of G on N \A, P (r) holds. If X is a ﬁnancial system and
a′1, ... , a
′
m are banks in X that each write some debt contract, then the application
of G to X and a′1, ... , a
′
m is a new ﬁnancial system X
′ obtained as the union of X
and G where we identify ai and a
′
i for i = 1, ... ,m. Note that X
′ is an extension of
X and an extension of G on N \A.
Remark 3 (Applying Several Gadgets). The properties implemented by gadgets are
preserved under further extensions of the resulting ﬁnancial system, in particular by
other gadgets. To see this, ﬁrst note that if X ′ is an extension of X on N0 and r
′ is
an ε-solution for X ′, then the restriction r′|N is an ε-solution for X on N0. Assume
now that a gadget G = (N, e, c, α, β) with inputs A implements a property P and
X ′′ is an extension of G on N \A. X ′′ could result, for example, from applying G to
some ﬁnancial system and then applying arbitrary other gadgets on top of it. Let
ε≪ 1 and let r be an ε-solution for X ′′. Then, by the extension, r|N is an ε-solution
for G on N \A and thus, P (r|N ) holds.
Our ﬁnancial system gadgets will have between zero and two input banks, which
we will call a and b for convenience. They will also have an output bank, which we
will call v, and they will implement properties that make the recovery rate of the
output bank equal to a certain function of the recovery rates of the input banks, up
to errors. Each gadget will contain a source bank s that holds no contracts and a
sink bank t that writes no contracts. The other banks hold CDSs from s and write
a debt contract of notional 1 to t, so that li(r) = 1 for each of these banks i. The
connection to the inputs is established via CDS references. We set c∅s,t = 1 to ensure
non-degeneracy and we further always set es ≥ 2∑i∈N, k∈N∪{∅} cks,i. This implies that
s cannot default and thus rs, rt = 1± ε in any ε-solution. For the sake of conciseness,
we will leave out these contracts and external assets in our descriptions of the gadgets.
We mark the input banks via dashed circles in our ﬁgures.
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Figure 2 Zero-One Gadget. Variant of Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston (2019,
Figure 3).
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3.2 Reducing Boolean Circuits to Financial Systems
We begin with a ﬁnancial system gadget where the output bank can have recovery
rates approximately 0 or 1. We will use this to encode variables.
Lemma 2 (Zero-One Gadget). For all α, β ∈ [0, 1] there is a ﬁnancial system gadget
with no input banks such that the following hold:
• There exists an exact solution where rv = 0 and there exists an exact solution
where rv = 1.
• The gadget implements the following property: rv = 0±Θ(ε) or rv = 1±Θ(ε).
Proof. Consider the ﬁnancial system in Figure 2. We distinguish the cases β < 1 and
β = 1.
If β < 1, let δ = 2 11−β . It is easy to see that (ru, rv) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0)} are exact
solutions. We show that in any ε-solution r we have rv = 1± ε or rv = 0± 2ε. To see
this, let rv < 1− ε. Then rv ≤ β + ε by Proposition 1 and thus au(r) = δrs(1− rv) ≥
δ(1− ε)(1−β− ε) = 2(1− ε)(1− ε1−β ) ≥ 1+ ε = (1+ ε)lu(r) where the last inequality
holds for ε≪ 1− β. Thus, ru = 1± ε and thus av(r) ≤ ε, so rv ≤ av(r)lv(r) + ε = 2ε.
If β = 1, let δ = 2. It is again easy to see that (ru, rv) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0)} are exact
solutions. Let r be an ε-solution. For i = u, v we have ai(r) = a
′
i(r) ∀r. This follows
from the deﬁnition of a′i because β = 1 and ei = 0. Like in Proposition 1 part 3, this
implies ri = Fi(r)± ε = [ai(r)]± ε. That is:
rv = [(1± ε)(1− ru)]± ε = 1− ru ± 2ε
ru = [2(1± ε)(1− rv)]± ε = [2(1− rv)]± 3ε
Taken together, these imply:
rv = 1− [2(1− rv)]± 5ε = [1− 2(1− rv)]± 5ε = [2rv − 1]± 5ε (∗)
We now perform a case distinction on rv.
• If rv ≥ 1/2, then [2rv − 1] = 2rv − 1 and thus by (∗), rv = 1± 5ε.
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Figure 3 Cutoﬀ Gadget
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• If rv < 1/2, then [2rv − 1] = 0 and thus by (∗), rv = 0± 5ε.
We next work towards a NAND gadget to encode Boolean gates. We begin by
introducing a versatile tool that can be used to map values signiﬁcantly above or
below certain thresholds to approximately 0 or 1. We will use this cutoﬀ gadget in
this section and Section 4.
Lemma 3 (Cutoﬀ Gadget). Let 0 < K < L < 1. There exists a ﬁnancial system
gadget with one input bank that implements the following property for all α, β ∈ [0, 1]:
ra ≤ K −Θ(ε)⇒ rv = 0±Θ
(
ε
L−K
)
ra ≥ L+Θ(ε)⇒ rv = 1±Θ
(
ε
L−K
)
.
Proof. Consider the gadget in Figure 3 where we set:20
γ :=
1
1−K
δ :=
1−K
L−K
Consider an ε-solution. Let ﬁrst ra ≤ K − 3ε. Then au(r) = γrs(1 − ra) ≥
γ(1− ε)(1−K + 3ε) = (1− ε)(1 + 3ε1−K ) ≥ (1− ε)(1 + 3ε) = 1 + 2ε− 3ε2 ≥ 1 + ε if
ε≪ 1. Thus, ru = 1± ε. Now av(r) = δrs(1− ru) ≤ δε ≤ 2εL−K . And rv ≤ av(r)lv(r) + ε =
av(r) + ε ≤ av(r) + 3εL−K .
Let now ra ≥ L+ 4ε. Then au(r) ≤ γ(1− L− 4ε) = 1−L1−K − 4ε1−K and thus ru ≤
1−L
1−K − 4ε1−K +ε. Now av(r) ≥ δ(1−ε)
(
1− 1−L1−K + 4ε1−K − ε
)
= (1−ε)
(
1 + (3+K)εL−K
)
≥
(1− ε)(1 + 3ε) = 1 + 2ε− 3ε2 ≥ 1 + ε for ε≪ 1. Thus, rv = 1± ε.
20Note that the gadget violates our sanity assumptions because the input bank is a CDS reference
entity, but not writers of any debt contracts. In this case, this does not cause any problems. Note in
particular that, as soon as the gadget is applied to some other system, the sanity assumption will
hold.
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Figure 4 NAND Gadget
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The cutoﬀ gadget has two kinds of errors. First, there is always a region ra ∈
(K −Θ(ε), L+Θ(ε)) ⊃ (K,L) where the output value is unspeciﬁed and depends
on error terms more than on the input. This is reminiscent of the brittle comparison
gate in generalized circuits (see Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2009) and
Section 4 in the present paper). Second, there is an error in the output that becomes
larger the less “brittleness” we are willing to tolerate. This trade-oﬀ in errors is not
fundamental and we will use in Section 4 an extension of our construction where both
errors are small. In this section, we use a large brittleness to receive a gadget that
will prevent error accumulation in the Boolean gadgets we will introduce afterwards.
Lemma 4 (Reset Gadget). There exists a ﬁnancial system gadget with one input
bank that implements the following property for all α, β ∈ [0, 1]:
ra ≤ 1/4⇒ rv = 0±Θ(ε)
ra ≥ 3/4⇒ rv = 1±Θ(ε) .
Proof. Use a cutoﬀ gadget with K = 2/5 and L = 3/5. For ε ≪ 1 we have
1/4 ≤ K −Θ(ε) and 3/4 ≥ L+Θ(ε) and L−K = 1/5 is a constant.
To represent Boolean gates, we introduce a gadget that mirrors the Boolean
operation xNAND y = ¬(x ∧ y).
Lemma 5 (NAND Gadget). There exists a ﬁnancial system gadget with two input
banks that implements the following property for all α, β ∈ [0, 1]:
ra ≤ 1/4 or rb ≤ 1/4 ⇒ rv = 1±Θ(ε)
ra ≥ 3/4 and rb ≥ 3/4 ⇒ rv = 0±Θ(ε)
Proof. Apply the reset gadget each to a and b and call the output banks a′ and b′,
respectively. Then apply the gadget in Figure 4.
Assume ﬁrst that ra ≤ 1/4 or rb ≤ 1/4. Then ra′ , rb′ = 0 ± Θ(ε) and thus
av(r) ≥ 2(1−ε)(1−Θ(ε)) ≥ 1+ε if ε≪ 1. Thus, rv = 1±ε. Assume next that ra ≥ 3/4
and rb ≥ 3/4. Then ra′ , rb′ = 1±Θ(ε) and thus rv ≤ av(r)+ε ≤ 4Θ(ε)+ε = Θ(ε).
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Using the previous lemma, we easily construct gadgets for all Boolean functions.
Note in particular that we can chain NAND gadgets without having to worry about
error accumulation because rv = 1±Θ(ε)⇒ rv ≥ 3/4 if ε≪ 1, and likewise for 0. A
chain of NAND gadgets will thus produce the appropriate output if the inputs to the
chain are in [0, 1/4] ∪ [3/4, 1]. This is why we use a reset gadget. We can combine a
collection of zero-one and NAND gadgets to represent a Boolean circuit.
Proposition 2 (Financial Boolean Circuit). Let C be a Boolean circuit with m inputs.
For χ ∈ {0, 1}m write C(χ) ∈ {0, 1} for the value of the output of C given values χ
at the inputs. For any α, β ∈ [0, 1] and ε suﬃciently small there exists a ﬁnancial
system X = (N, e, c, α, β) with m+ 1 distinguished banks V := {a1, ... , am, v} such
that the following hold:
1. For any assignment χ ∈ {0, 1}m there exists an exact solution r such that
rai = χi for i = 1, ... ,m.
2. If r is an ε-solution, then ri = 0±Θ(ε) or ri = 1±Θ(ε) for all i ∈ V .
3. If r is an ε-solution and i ∈ V , let χi = 0 if ri ≤ 1/4 and χi = 1 if ri ≥ 3/4.
Then χv = C(χa1 , ... , χam).
Proof. Assume WLOG that C consists only of NAND gates. We will identify the
nodes of C with certain banks in the to-be-constructed ﬁnancial system. We begin
our construction with an empty ﬁnancial system and build it up iteratively. First
apply the zero-one gadget (Lemma 2) m times and identify the output banks of these
gadgets with the input nodes of C. Now iterate over the gates of C in topological
order. For each NAND gate connecting two inputs to an output, by the topological
order, the inputs are already nodes in the ﬁnancial system and the output is not.
Apply the NAND gadget (Lemma 5) to the inputs and identify the output bank with
the output node of the gate.
Property 1 is satisﬁed by the zero-one gadget, as is Property 2 for i = a1, ... , am.
Property 2 for i = v and property 3 follow by induction on the number of gates by
the NAND gadgets.
3.3 Reducing Satisfiability to Existence of a Solution
The ﬁnal step in our construction is a way to “destroy” certain unwanted ε-solutions.
We use this to remove exactly those solutions that correspond to falsifying assignments
of the Boolean circuit in our previous construction, leaving only those corresponding
to satisfying assignments, if any. Note that this cannot be done using a ﬁnancial
system gadget because it does not preserve all existing solutions. The approach is
otherwise exactly the same, though.
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Figure 5 High-level structure of the ﬁnancial system in Lemma 6, case β < 1. Gray
boxes indicate gadgets with their output banks. A dashed line with a hollow arrow
tip connects a bank to a gadget of which it is an input bank. The parameters of the
cutoﬀ gadget are chosen such that β < K < β+12 < L < 1 evenly spaced.
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Lemma 6 (Removing Solutions). Let α, β be such that α < 1 or β < 1. There exists
a ﬁnancial system G = (N, e, c, α, β) with a distinguished input bank a ∈ N with no
assets or liabilities such that the following hold:
1. For any rv ≥ 3/4, there exists an rN\{a} ∈ [0, 1]N\{a} such that ra ∪ rN\{a} is
an exact solution on N \ {a}.
2. For ε≪ 1, there is no ε-solution r on N \ {a} where ra ≤ 1/4.
Proof. We distinguish the cases β < 1 and α < β = 1.
If β < 1, perform the construction outlined in Figure 5: assume we have a source
and a sink bank as usual. Add a new bank B and let eB = 0 and c
∅
B,t = 1. Apply a
cutoﬀ gadget to B with K = 3β+14 and L =
β+3
4 . Note that β < K <
β+1
2 < L < 1
evenly spaced and the output error of the cutoﬀ gadget is Θ( εL−K ) = Θ(
ε
1−β ). Call
the output bank of the cutoﬀ gadget u, apply an OR gadget to a and u and call the
output A. Finally, add CDS cAs,B = 2.
Towards property 1, if ra ≥ 3/4, then by the OR gadget (and this by the NAND
gadget), we can set rA = 1 independently of ru. We can then extend r to the other
banks via rB = 0 and by setting the recovery rates for the intermediate nodes of the
gadgets accordingly.
Towards property 2, if ra ≤ 1/4, assume towards a contradiction that r is an
ε-solution on N \ {a}. We perform case distinction on rB.
• If rB ≥ 1− ε, then in particular rB ≥ L+Θ( ε1−β ) if ε≪ 1− β.21 Thus, by the
21The threshold for ε is Θ((1 − β)2). The fact that this is nonlinear in 1 − β is not a problem.
Recall that we did not assume that ε = Θ(1− β) if ε≪ 1− β.
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cutoﬀ gadget and the OR gadget, rA = 1±Θ(ε). But then rB ≤ aB(r) + ε ≤
2Θ(ε) + ε < 1− ε for ε≪ 1. Contradiction.
• If rB < 1 − ε, then rB ≤ β + ε ≤ K − Θ( ε1−β ), where the ﬁrst inequality is
by Proposition 1 and the second inequality holds for ε ≪ 1 − β. Therefore,
ru = 0 ± Θ(ε) and since rv ≤ 1/4 we have ra = 0 ± Θ(ε). This implies
aB(r) ≥ 2(1 − ε)(1 − Θ(ε)) ≥ 1 + ε for ε ≪ 1. This implies rB ≥ 1 − ε.
Contradiction.
If α < β = 1, let eB = c
A
s,B = 4/5 and K =
3α+1
4 and L =
α+3
4 , and keep everything
else the same as above. Note that α < K < α+12 < L < 1 evenly spaced and the
output error of the cutoﬀ gadget is Θ( ε1−α). It is clear that property 1 follows just
like above. We show that property 2 follows in a similar way to above. Assume that
ra ≤ 1/4.
• If rB ≥ 1− ε, then this implies rB ≥ L+Θ(ε) for ε≪ 1− α, so rA = 1±Θ(ε)
and thus rB ≤ aB(r)+ ε ≤ 4/5+4/5 ·Θ(ε)+ ε < 1− ε for ε≪ 1. Contradiction.
• If rB < 1− ε, we must have aB(r) < 1 + ε and rB = a′B(r)± ε ≤ aB(r)− (1−
α)eB + ε < 1− (1− α)eB + 2ε. The middle inequality is by deﬁnition of a′B in
case β = 1. We further receive
1− (1− α)eB + 2ε = 1− 4
5
(1− α) + 2ε
=
3α+ 1
4
− 1
20
(1− α)− 2ε
= K − 1
20
(1− α)− 2ε ≤ K −Θ
(
ε
1− α
)
where the last line holds for ε ≪ 1 − α. This implies rA = 0 ± Θ(ε) and
aB(r) ≥ 4/5+4/5(1−ε)(1−Θ(ε)) ≥ 1+ε for ε≪ 1 and this implies rB ≥ 1−ε.
Contradiction.
Theorem 1 now follows by application of Lemma 6 to our ﬁnancial Boolean circuit.
Proof of Theorem 1, hardness. Reduction from Circuit Satisfiability. Given a
Boolean circuit C, apply Proposition 2 to construct the ﬁnancial system X with
output bank v corresponding to C. Apply the system from Lemma 6 to X and v
(where by “application” we mean the same like for gadgets) to construct an extended
system X ′. Let ε≪ 1 and solve ε-HasClearingα,β for X ′.
If C has a satisﬁable assignment χ, this yields an exact solution for χ where
rv = 1 ≥ 3/4, so we can extend this to an exact solution of X ′. If C has no
satisfying assignment, then any solution to X satisﬁes rv = 0±Θ(ε) and therefore,
no ε-solution for X ′ exists. As these are the only two cases, any algorithm for
ε-HasClearingα,β must terminate on this instance and return Yes if C is satisﬁable
and No otherwise.
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4 The Complexity of the Search Problem without Default
Costs
We now focus on ﬁnancial systems without default costs, i.e., where α = β = 1. In
these systems, we know that a solution always exists:
Theorem (Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston, 2019, Theorem 2). Any ﬁnancial
system (N, e, c, α = 1, β = 1) has an exact solution.
The proof of the above theorem is by Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem and thus
not constructive. In this section, we study the associated search problem. Since it
may still be the case that all solutions are irrational (see Appendix B), we study the
associated approximation problem of computing an ε-solution.
Theorem 2. For ε ≪ 1, the total search problem ε-FindClearing, deﬁned as
follows, is PPAD-complete: Given a non-degenerate ﬁnancial system X = (N, e, c, α =
1, β = 1), compute an ε-solution.
The theorem immediately implies that no polynomial-time approximation scheme
(PTAS) exists, unless P=PPAD.
ε-FindClearing is a well-deﬁned total search problem because, by Lemma 1
and existence of a solution, there is always an ε-solution of polynomial length. Recall
from Proposition 1 that for α = β = 1, an ε-solution is the same as an ε-approximate
ﬁxed point of the update function, i.e., an r ∈ [0, 1]N such that F (r) = r ± ε. Note
further that, since α = β = 1 and we assume non-degeneracy, F simpliﬁes to:
Fi(r) =


1 if cki,j = 0 ∀j ∈ N, k ∈ N ∪ {∅}[
ai(r)
li(r)
]
otherwise.
Recall that [x] := min (1, max (0, x)) is the truncation of x to [0, 1]. Membership in
PPAD easily follows.
Proof of Theorem 2, membership. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1. By
the above considerations, F is polynomially continuous. And ﬁnding a (Brouwer) ﬁxed
point of a polynomially continuous function is in PPAD (Papadimitriou, 1994).
The remainder of this section is dedicated to showing PPAD-hardness via a
reduction from generalized circuits.
4.1 Generalized Circuits
A generalized circuit (Chen, Deng and Teng, 2009) consists of nodes interconnected by
arithmetic or comparison gates. In contrast to regular arithmetic or Boolean circuits,
generalized circuits may contain cycles, which turns ﬁnding a consistent assignment
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Figure 6 Conditions that should hold at a gate g for an ε-solution x of a generalized
circuit. Assume that the inputs of g are called a and b (if any) and the output is
called v. The gates Cζ ,C×ζ , and C>ζ take an additional parameter ζ ∈ [0, 1].
g = Cζ ⇒ x[v] = ζ ± ε
g = C+ ⇒ x[v] = [x[a] + x[a]]± ε
g = C− ⇒ x[v] = [x[a]− x[b]]± ε
g = C×ζ ⇒ x[v] = ζ · x[a]± ε
g = C>ζ ⇒ x[a] < ζ − ε ⇒ x[v] = 0± ε
x[a] > ζ + ε ⇒ x[v] = 1± ε
of node values into a non-trivial ﬁxed point problem. Rubinstein (2018) introduced
a variant of generalized circuits that is well-suited for our purposes. To make our
reduction to ﬁnancial systems as simple as possible, we consider a reduced set of gates,
which does not change the computational complexity of the problem (see Appendix C
for a detailed comparison).
Deﬁnition 6 (Generalized Circuit and Approximate Solution). A generalized circuit
is a collection of nodes and gates, where each node is labeled input of any number
of gates (including zero) and output of at most one gate. Inputs to the same gate
are distinguishable from each other. Each gate has one of the following types: Cζ
(constant, no inputs), C×ζ (scaling, one input), C+ or C− (addition and subtraction,
two inputs), or C>ζ (comparison to a constant, one input). For the gate types Cζ ,
C×ζ ,and C>ζ ,a numeric parameter ζ ∈ [0, 1] is speciﬁed in addition to the input and
output nodes of the gate. The length of a generalized circuit is the number of bits
needed to describe the circuit, including the nodes, the mapping from nodes to inputs
and outputs of gates, and numeric parameters ζ involved.
For ε ≥ 0, an ε-solution of a generalized circuit is a mapping x that assigns to
each node v a value x[v] ∈ [0, 1] such that the constraints in Figure 6 hold at each
gate of type g with inputs a and b (if any) and output v.
We know from prior work that ﬁnding an ε-solution is hard:
Theorem (Essentially Rubinstein (2018)). For a (constant) suﬃciently small ε, the
total search problem ε-GCircuit, deﬁned as follows, is PPAD-complete: Given a
generalized circuit, ﬁnd an ε-solution.
4.2 Reducing Generalized Circuits to Financial Systems
We now show how to encode a generalized circuit into a ﬁnancial system via ﬁnancial
system gadgets corresponding to the ﬁve gate types. Any ε-solution to the ﬁnancial
system will give rise to a Θ(ε)-solution of the generalized circuit. Compared to
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Figure 7 Constant Gadget
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Section 3, our gadgets need to be more precise because we do not only have to map
between the appropriate parts of the set [0, 1/4] ∪ [3/4, 1] to each other, but we have
to encode arithmetic operations on continuous inputs in [0, 1]. The fact that we do
not have default costs in this section will help us achieve this higher precision. In our
gadgets, all banks except for the source and sink banks will have liabilities constant
1. We therefore have ri = Fi(r)± ε = [ai(r)]± ε in any ε-solution.
Our simplest gadget establishes a constant recovery rate at the output bank:
Lemma 7 (Constant Gadget). Let ζ ∈ [0, 1]. If α = β = 1, there is a ﬁnancial
system gadget with no input banks that implements the property rv = ζ ±Θ(ε).
Proof. Consider Figure 7. Clearly, av(r) = ζ(1± ε) = ζ ± ε and rv = [av(r)]± ε =
ζ ± 2ε.
An important building block for the following constructions is a gadget that
“inverts” the recovery rate of a bank.
Lemma 8 (Inverter Gadget). If α = β = 1, there is a ﬁnancial system gadget with
one input bank that implements the property rv = 1− ra ±Θ(ε).
Proof. Consider Figure 8. Clearly, av(r) = (1 ± ε)(1 − ra) = 1 − ra ± ε and rv =
[av(r)]± ε = [1− ra]± 2ε = 1− ra ± 2ε.
Note that we could not have used the inverter gadget as a Boolean NOT gadget
in Section 3 because i) it relies on the assumption α = β = 1 and ii) it accumulates
errors, i.e., 2n inverters in a row yield ra ±Θ(nε), not ra ± ε. We proceed with the
addition and subtraction gadgets, which are slight variants of each other.
Lemma 9 (Sum Gadget). If α = β = 1, there is a ﬁnancial system gadget with two
input banks that implements the property rv = [ra + rb]±Θ(ε).
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Figure 9 Sum Gadget. a¯ and b¯ are the outputs of inverters applied to a and b,
respectively.
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Proof. Apply inverter gadgets (Lemma 8) to both a and b and call the output banks
a¯ and b¯, respectively. Now apply the gadget in Figure 9. Then:
rv = [(1± ε)(1− ra¯) + (1± ε)(1− rb¯)]± ε = [ra + rb]± 3ε
Note the similarity of Figure 9 with Figure 4, which was used in the construction
of the NAND gadget in Section 3. Indeed. a similar operation is performed given that
aNAND b = ¬a∨¬b and addition is somewhat similar to Boolean “∨”. Note however
that these two constructions need to deal with diﬀerent challenges: the NAND gadget
needs to work with default costs and the sum gadget needs to provide a correct sum
across all input values, not just approximately Boolean values.
Lemma 10 (Diﬀerence Gadget). There is a ﬁnancial system gadget without default
costs with two input banks that implements the property rv = [ra − rb]±Θ(ε).
Proof. Apply an inverter gadget (Lemma 8) to a and call the output bank a¯. Apply
the gadget in Figure 9 to a¯ and b¯ := b and call the output bank u. From the proof of
the previous lemma we know that ru = [1− ra + rb]±Θ(ε). Now apply an inverter
to u and call the output bank v. It follows that
rv = 1− [1− ra + rb]±Θ(ε) = [ra − rb]±Θ(ε) ,
where the last equality follows by case distinction.
Our last two gadgets are scaling and comparison. Scaling is easily achieved by
noting that a chain of two inverters approximately copies the input. We then adjust
the notional in one of those gadgets. This happens to be a degenerate variant of the
cutoﬀ gadget (Lemma 3).
Lemma 11 (Scaling Gadget). Let ζ ∈ [0, 1]. If α = β = 1, there exists a ﬁnancial
system gadget that implements the property rv = ζra ±Θ(ε).
Proof. We use the ﬁnancial system in Figure 3 from Section 3 with γ = 1 and δ = ζ.
We have ru = 1− ra ±Θ(ε) like in the inverter gadget and thus av(r) = ζ(1± ε)(1−
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(1−ra±Θ(ε))) = ζ(1±ε)(ra±Θ(ε)) = ζra±Θ(ε). And rv = [av(r)]±ε = ζra±Θ(ε).
Here we use ζ, ra ≤ 1 to bound the error.
For the comparison gate, the cutoﬀ gadget (Lemma 3) almost does what we want.
However, the comparison gate makes demands to low brittleness (at the order of ε)
and low output error (also at the order of ε) that the cutoﬀ gadget is not able to
achieve. Fortunately, we can use our previously introduced reset gadget (which itself
happens to be another incarnation of the cutoﬀ gadget) to ﬁx the output error.
Lemma 12 (Comparison Gadget). Let ζ ∈ [0, 1]. If α = β = 1, there exists a
ﬁnancial system gadget with one input bank that implements the following property:
ra ≤ ζ −Θ(ε)⇒ rv = 0±Θ(ε)
ra ≥ ζ +Θ(ε)⇒ rv = 1±Θ(ε)
Proof. Let C > 0 be a constant such that C is an upper bound on the implicit
constant factors in the expressions Θ( εL−K ) on the right-hand sides of Lemma 3
(i.e., the output error; we can choose C = 3). Let c = 2C. Assume WLOG that
cε < ζ < 1− cε. If this is not the case, we can simply give v recovery rate constant 0
or 1. Apply now a cutoﬀ gadget (Lemma 3) with K = ζ − cε and L = ζ + cε and call
the output gate u. Then apply a reset gadget (Lemma 4) to u and call the output v.
By the cutoﬀ gadget, if ra ≤ K − Θ(ε) = ζ − Θ(ε), then ru = 0 ± C εL−K =
0 ± C ε2cε = 0 ± 1/4. Thus, by the reset gadget, rv = 0 ± Θ(ε). Likewise for
ra ≥ ζ +Θ(ε).
With all gadgets in place, we can connect our gadgets to represent a generalized
circuit and prove PPAD-hardness.
Proof of Theorem 2, hardness. Reduction from Θ(ε)-GCircuit. Let C be a general-
ized circuit. We construct a ﬁnancial system. For each node v of C, add a bank with
no assets or liabilities and identify that bank with v. For each gate g of C, execute
the corresponding gadget from this section with the appropriate input banks and
identify the output bank of the gadget with g. Finally, if a node v is the output of
gate g, take a copy of the scaling gadget with ζ = 1 (this is the same as two inverters
connected) and identify the input of the gadget with g and the output of the gadget
with v.22
22In the language of gadgets, this operation can be interpreted as applying the constructed financial
system, say X0, and the ×1-scaling gadget “to each other.” Note that in X0, v has no assets and
liabilities and can thus be considered an input bank. The result of the “application” will be an
extension of X0 at all banks but v and of the scaling gadget at all banks but its input. By Remark 3.,
this implies that all gadgets still behave as expected. In particular, we have rv = rg ±Θ(ε) in any
ε-solution.
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Now, by the gadgets, if ε ≪ 1 and r is an ε-solution for the ﬁnancial system,
setting x[v] = rv for all nodes yields a Θ(ε)-solution of the generalized circuit. And
ﬁnding this is hard for ε≪ 1.
5 Origin of the Complexity: Determining Defaults
Given the results in the previous two sections, one may wonder if we can pin down
the “origin” of the computational complexity. What is it really that CDSs do to
a ﬁnancial system that makes the decision and search problems so much harder to
solve? In this section and the next we explore this question.
To understand where the computational complexity comes from, we look for ways
to circumvent it. One way to do this might be to ask for less information than the
recovery rates themselves. If it is easy to ﬁnd some bounds on the recovery rates,
for example, this could already be very useful. The minimum level of detail we will
likely be interested in is which banks default. To this end, we deﬁne a default set as
a collection of banks that (approximately) default in some (approximate) solution. A
default set thus provides a kind of “coarse representation” of a solution to the clearing
problem.
Deﬁnition 7. Let X = (N, e, c, α, β) be a ﬁnancial system and let ε ≥ 0. A set
D ⊆ N is called an ε-default set for X if there is an ε-solution r for X such that for
all i ∈ N :
i /∈ D ⇒ ai(r) ≥ (1− ε)li(r)
i ∈ D ⇒ ai(r) < (1 + ε)li(r).
In this case, we call r and D ε-compatible.
We have relaxed the notion of being in default in the same way as in the deﬁnition
of an ε-solution. Again, this ensures that the problem will not be hard for the wrong
reasons, namely because of “knife-edge” defaults, where a small error in the assets or
liabilities could otherwise determine whether a bank defaults and thus lead to a large
error in the recovery rate. Banks at the edge of default can instead be considered
either in default or not in default. A side eﬀect of this freedom is that, say, i /∈ D does
not generally imply ri = 1± ε. It could also be that ai(r) ∈ [(1− ε)li(r), (1 + ε)li(r))
and ri =
a′i(r)
li(r)
. That is, the decision about default in D and r need not coincide.
In the remainder of this section, we show that computational complexity does not
arise exclusively from the need to compute precise numeric values for the recovery
rates. Rather, the computational problems discussed in Sections 3 and 4 are already
hard at the level of default sets.
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5.1 Deciding the Default of a Given Bank
In the decision variant of our problem, we ask if there is a solution where a speciﬁed
bank defaults. This is a basic question a regulator might ask in a stress test: for
example, given a certain shock scenario, will this make it necessary to save AIG
again? If there are multiple solutions and AIG only defaults in some of them, our
answer should still be “Yes,” i.e., we should consider the worst case.
We can consider this decision problem for any value of the default cost parameters.
If there are default costs, a naive framing of the problem would contain the question
if there is any solution in the ﬁrst place. Since this is not what we are interested in at
this point, we exclude it by a promise. We then consider a distinction variant similar
to ε-HasClearingα,β (Theorem 1). The proof is rather straightforward using our
ﬁnancial Boolean circuits from Section 3. The key technical step is to notice that
assets are either very small or very large compared to liabilities, so that defaults are
never ambiguous.
Theorem 3. For any ﬁxed α, β ∈ [0, 1] and any ε≪ 1, the following promise problem
is NP-complete: Given a non-degenerate ﬁnancial system X = (N, e, c, α, β), and a
bank i ∈ N . . .
• if X has an exact solution and there is an exact default set D such that i ∈ D,
return Yes.
• if X has an exact solution and there is no ε-default set D such that i ∈ D,
return No.
Proof. Membership: By the proof of Lemma 1, if r is an exact solution and D exactly
compatible, we receive a polynomial-length ε-solution with which D is ε-compatible
with via rounding. Hence, it is enough to check all ε-solutions of a certain polynomial
maximum length. Note that if r is an ε-solution, then i ∈ D for some ε-compatible
default set D iﬀ ai(r) < (1 + ε)li(r).
Hardness: Reduction from Circuit Falsifiability. Given a Boolean circuit C,
consider the ﬁnancial Boolean circuit system X from Proposition 2 and the output
node v =: i. Recall that v is the output of a NAND gadget (Lemma 5). If C
is falsiﬁable, let r be the exact solution corresponding to a falsifying assignment
and D its exactly compatible default set. By the proof of Lemma 5, we then have
av(r) = 0 < 1 = li(r) and thus v ∈ D. If C is not falsiﬁable, let ε≪ 1, let r be any
ε-solution and D ε-compatible. By Proposition 2, the inputs to v’s NAND gadget are
approximately Boolean and not both True and again by the proof of the lemma, we
have av(r) ≥ 1 + ε, so v /∈ D.
The theorem immediately implies that the following problem is NP-hard: Given a
non-degenerate ﬁnancial system with the promise that it has an exact solution and
a bank i, decide if i ∈ D for some ε-default set D. The problem may not be in NP
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because it is not guaranteed that every ε-solution has polynomial length. See the
discussion after Theorem 1. Note in particular that it is not clear how to check if a
given D ⊆ N is an ε-default set.
It is easy to see that the distinction problem is still NP-complete if we replace
“∈ D” by “/∈ D” (proof by negation of the circuit) and it is coNP-complete if we replace
“there exists D” by “for all D” (proof by reduction from Circuit Contradiction).
5.2 Finding Default Sets Without Default Costs
We return to the search problem from Section 4, where we are given a ﬁnancial system
without default costs and we are looking for an ε-solution. Given an ε-solution, it is
trivial to compute a default set compatible with it, while the converse is not so clear.
Thus, ﬁnding ε-default sets may a priori be easier than ﬁnding the ε-solution itself.
We will show that this is not the case.
Theorem 4. For ε ≪ 1, the following problem is PPAD-complete: Given a non-
degenerate ﬁnancial system X = (N, e, c, α = 1, β = 1), compute an ε-default set.
For some search problems, statements like the above follow trivially from hardness
of the respective continuous variant. For example, in a two-player normal-form
game, the supports of the strategies of the two players (i.e., the strategies that are
played with nonzero probability) could be taken as a “coarse representation” of a
Nash equilibrium, similar to default sets in our case. Finding the supports of a
Nash equilibrium is trivially PPAD-complete because a Nash equilibrium can be
reconstructed from its supports via linear programming, and ﬁnding Nash equilibria
in two-player games is hard (Chen, Deng and Teng, 2009).23 Given an ε-default
set however, there does not seem to be an easy way to reconstruct a corresponding
ε-solution, given that already the assets ai can contain terms like rj(1− rk), which
are non-linear, non-convex/concave, and non-monotonic. This remains true for the
particular construction we perform in Section 4. Here, the assets of the relevant
banks contain terms of form rs(1− ra) where s is the source bank and rs ∈ [1− ε, 1].
It may be tempting to just assume rs = 1 to make the problem linear. However,
given a default set of an ε-solution where (say) rs = 1− ε, assuming rs = 1 implicitly
introduces an error of ε into rs. As the notionals in the system can be at the order of
1/ε,24 this may in turn imply a large (constant in ε) change in the recovery rate of
some other bank. No ε-solution with such a recovery rate may exist.
Rather than reconstructing an ε-solution to the ﬁnancial system from a default
set, we introduce a new discrete variant of the ε-GCircuit problem that is still
PPAD-complete. We then show that any ε-default set gives rise to a solution for the
discrete Θ(ε)-GCircuit problem. Our approach may be of independent interest for
23ε must be polynomial, not constant, in the size of the game in this particular example.
24The comparison gadget (Lemma 12) introduces notionals of order 1/ε.
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Figure 10 Constraints that need to hold at each gate g when x is an ε-solution for a
generalized circuit compatible with an assignment d. Let a and b be the inputs (if
any) and v the output of g.
g = C+ ⇒ dg ∈ {L,M} ⇒ x[a] + x[b] ≤ 1 + ε ∧ x[v] = x[a] + x[b]± ε
dg = H ⇒ x[a] + x[b] ≥ 1− ε ∧ x[v] = 1± ε
g = C− ⇒ dg = L ⇒ x[a]− x[b] ≤ ε ∧ x[v] = 0± ε
dg ∈ {M,H} ⇒ x[a]− x[b] ≥ −ε ∧ x[v] = x[a]− x[b]± ε
g = C>ζ ⇒ dg = L ⇒ x[a] ≤ ζ + ε ∧ x[v] = 0± ε
dg =M ⇒ x[a] = ζ ± ε
dg = H ⇒ x[a] ≥ ζ − ε ∧ x[v] = 1± ε
the study of other “support ﬁnding” problems where hardness does not follow from
hardness of the continuous variant.
5.3 The discrete ε-GCircuit problem
The main idea for our discrete variant of ε-GCircuit is that the constraints for a
generalized circuit (Figure 6) are piecewise linear with a ﬁnite number of “cutoﬀ”
or “decision points.” For example, the C+ gate corresponds to either a sum or a
constant depending on whether the sum of its inputs lies in [0, 1] or (1,∞). Once
we know on which side of these “decision points,” deﬁned in an appropriate way,
each constraint lies, we can reconstruct a solution by solving a linear feasibility
problem. Thus, already obtaining this information is hard. Our approach is similar
in spirit to Vazirani and Yannakakis (2011), where the authors split equilibrium
computation in Fisher markets into two steps: ﬁrst, a PPAD-complete problem is
solved to determine the combinatorial structure of the equilibrium. Second, the exact
numbers are computed in polynomial time.
In our deﬁnition of the discrete ε-GCircuit problem, we relax the constraints in
a way that mirrors the deﬁnition of an ε-default set, allowing ambiguity when we are
close to the respective “decision point.”25 Note that Cζ and C×ζ gates have linear
constraints and therefore do not need any “decision” speciﬁed, which leaves us with
three gate types.
Deﬁnition 8. Let C be a generalized circuit and ε ≥ 0. A discrete ε-solution for C
assigns to each gate g of C a value dg ∈ {H,M,L} such that there exists an ε-solution
x for C such that the constraints in Figure 10 hold for each gate g with inputs a and
b and output v. In this case, we call x and d ε-compatible.
25This relaxation is crucial for our following reduction from ε-default sets. This is not just because
ε-default sets have this kind of relaxation, but due to ε errors in the solution itself. That is, even
if we required exact compatibility in the definition of an ε-default set, we would have to make this
relaxation here.
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Note that our deﬁnition is monotonic in ε: if d is a discrete ε-solution and
ε′ > ε, then d is also a discrete ε′-solution. This is what we typically expect of an
approximate solution concept and we take it as an indication that our concept of a
discrete ε-solution is natural. We will exploit monotonicity in our proofs below.
Remark 4. If x is an ε-solution for C, we can deﬁne a discrete ε-solution dg as follows.
• If g = C+, let dg = H if x[a] + x[b] ≥ 1 and dg =M otherwise.
• If g = C−, let dg = L if x[a]− x[b] ≤ 0 and dg =M otherwise.
• If g = C>ζ , let
dg =


L if x[a] < ζ − ε
M if x[a] = ζ ± ε
H if x[a] > ζ + ε.
The fact that x is an ε-solution will now ensure that the outputs match, too, and
thus d is a discrete ε-solution compatible with x.
Theorem 5. For a (constant) ε≪ 1, the following total search problem, which we
call the discrete ε-GCircuit problem, is PPAD-complete: Given a generalized circuit,
ﬁnd a discrete ε-solution.
Proof. Membership is obvious by reduction to the (continuous) ε-GCircuit problem.
For hardness, we perform reduction from the continuous problem. Let C be a
generalized circuit and let d be a discrete ε-solution for C. Consider the linear
feasibility problem (LFP) with a variable x[v] for each node v of C and the following
constraints:
1. For each v, add the constraint 0 ≤ x[v] ≤ 1.
2. For each gate g of type C+, C−, or C>ζ , add the constraint from Figure 6
corresponding to the value of dg.
3. For each gate g of type Cζ or C×ζ , add the constraint from Figure 6 corresponding
to the type of g.
Note that all constraints are linear. It is easy to verify that a vector x is feasible for
the LFP iﬀ it is an ε-solution ε-compatible with d. By assumption, such an x exists
and we can ﬁnd it in polynomial time via the LFP.
The proof of the theorem implies that a generalized circuit always has an exact
solution of polynomial length. This was previously noted by Etessami and Yannakakis
(2010) in their study of their FIXP complexity class. To see it from our proof, let d be
the default set of an exact solution (which exists by Kakutani’s ﬁxed-point theorem)
and solve the LFP for ε = 0.
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5.4 ε-Default Sets Define a Discrete Θ(ε)-Solution
We now re-examine the sum, diﬀerence, and comparison gadget from Section 4. We
show that the default states of some banks can be used to deﬁne a discrete Θ(ε)-
solution for the respective gate type that will be Θ(ε)-compatible with any ε-solution
of the gadget.
Remark 5 (Bounding Recovery Rates via Default Sets). In contrast to the case with
default costs, if α = β = 1, we can bound the recovery rates based on the default set.
More in detail, if r is an ε-solution ε-compatible with D, then:
i /∈ D ⇒ ri = 1± 2ε
i ∈ D ⇒ ri = ai(r)
li(r)
± 2ε
This follows by case distinction using the equivalence between an ε-solution and an
ε-approximate ﬁxed point of F .
If G is a gadget with input banks A and P : 2N × [0, 1]N → {True,False} is a
property, we say that G implements P on default sets if for ε≪ 1, any ε-solution r
on N \A, and any D ⊆ N ε-compatible with r, P (D, r) holds.
For the sum gadget, we can simply consider the default state of the output bank.
Lemma 13 (Default Set of the Sum Gadget). If α = β = 1, then the sum gadget
(Lemma 9) implements the following property on default sets:
v /∈ D ⇒ ra + rb ≥ 1−Θ(ε) ∧ rv = 1±Θ(ε)
v ∈ D ⇒ ra + rb < 1 + Θ(ε) ∧ rv = ra + rb ±Θ(ε)
Proof. Recall that av(r) = ra + rb ±Θ(ε) and lv(r) = 1. The statement now follows
from Remark 5 and the fact that rv = [ra + rb]±Θ(ε).
For the diﬀerence gadget, the default state of the output bank is not informative.
To see this, recall that this bank is the output of an inverter gadget. In the inverter
gadget, though, the output bank is never unambiguously not in default because its
assets are at most 1 (see Figure 8). Thus, we could have v ∈ D independently of the
input or output recovery rates. To extract information from the default set, we need
to consider the input bank to the inverter gadget instead.
Lemma 14 (Default Set of the Diﬀerence Gadget). Let α = β = 1 and consider the
diﬀerence gadget (Lemma 10). Let u be the intermediate bank in that gadget. Then
the gadget implements the following property on default sets:
u /∈ D ⇒ ra − rb ≤ Θ(ε) ∧ rv = 0±Θ(ε)
u ∈ D ⇒ ra − rb > −Θ(ε) ∧ rv = ra − rb ±Θ(ε)
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Proof. Recall that we have au(r) = 1− ra + rb ±Θ(ε) and rv = 1− ru ±Θ(ε). The
statement now follows just like in Lemma 13.
For the comparison gadget, we proceed in a similar way and consider the default
states in the ﬁrst cutoﬀ gadget (before the reset gadget). We need to consider the
default states of both of the banks in this gadget to determine in which of the three
possible states the gadget is. Compared to the other two gadgets, we need to consider
the details of the construction in much greater detail.
Lemma 15 (Default Set of the Comparison Gadget). Let α = β = 1 and consider
the comparison gadget (Lemma 12). Let u1 and v1 be the intermediate banks that
correspond to the ﬁrst cutoﬀ gadget. Then the comparison gadget implements the
following property on default sets:
u1 /∈ D ∧ v1 ∈ D ⇒ ra ≤ ζ +Θ(ε) ∧ rv = 0±Θ(ε)
u1 ∈ D ∧ v1 /∈ D ⇒ ra ≥ ζ −Θ(ε) ∧ rv = 1±Θ(ε)
u1 ∈ D ∧ v1 ∈ D ⇒ ra = ζ ±Θ(ε)
u1 /∈ D ∧ v1 /∈ D is impossible.
Proof. Recall from the proof of Lemma 12 that the ﬁrst cutoﬀ gadget has parameters
K = ζ − cε and L = ζ + cε where c > 4 is a suﬃciently large constant. Recall from
the deﬁnition of the cutoﬀ gadget (Lemma 3) that this implies for the notionals in
Figure 3 that
γ =
1
1−K =
1
1− ζ + cε
δ =
1−K
L−K =
1− ζ + cε
2cε
=
1− ζ
2cε
+
1
2
.
Assume ﬁrst that u1 /∈ D. By deﬁnition of an ε-default set and lu1(r) = 1, we have
1−ε ≤ au1(r) = γ(1−ra). Rearranging yields ra ≤ ζ−cε+ε(1−ζ+cε) ≤ ζ−(c−2)ε
if ε ≪ c. We further must have ru1 ≥ 1 − 2ε, so rv1 ≤ av1(r) + ε ≤ δ · 2ε + ε =
(1 − ζ)/c + 2ε ≤ 1/4 for ε ≪ 1. This implies v1 ∈ D and, as v1 is input to a reset
gadget with output v, rv = 0±Θ(ε).
Assume next that u1 ∈ D. Then by Remark 5, ru1 = au1(r)± 2ε = γ(1− ra)±
(γ + 2)ε.
If now u1 ∈ D ∧ v1 /∈ D, then
1− ε ≤ av1(r) ≤ δ(1− ru1)
≤ δ(1− (γ(1− ra)− (γ + 2)ε))
= δ − δγ + δγra + (δγ + 2δ)ε.
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Rearranging yields: ra ≥ 1δγ − 1γ + 1−
(
1 + 2γ +
1
δγ
)
ε ≥ L− 4ε = ζ + (c− 4)ε, where
the middle inequality follows using the identities 1δγ = L −K and 1γ = 1 −K. Of
course, rv1 = 1± 2ε because v1 /∈ D and thus rv = 1± ε.
If u1 ∈ D ∧ v1 ∈ D, then
1 + ε ≥ av1(r) ≥ δ(1− ε)(1− ru1)
≥ δ(1− (γ(1− ra) + (γ + 2)ε)− δε
= δ − δγ + δγra − (δγ + 3δ)ε.
Rearranging like above yields: ra ≤ L + 5ε = ζ + (c + 5)ε. This bounds ra from
above. To bound ra from below, notice that, since u1 ∈ D, we have 1 + ε > au1(r) ≥
γ(1− ε)(1− ra). This implies ra ≥ 1− 1γ · 1+ε1−ε ≥ 1− 1γ (1+3ε) ≥ K−3ε ≥ ζ− (c−2)ε,
where the second inequality holds for ε≪ 1.
Note that the implicit constants in the Θ(ε) expressions in the above lemma are
not the same. That is why the diﬀerent cases in the previous lemma overlap.
Note that the proof of the previous lemma actually gives us slightly stronger
bounds on ra than stated. For example, in case u1 /∈ D ∧ v1 ∈ D, we receive from the
proof that ra ≤ ζ − (c− 2)ε = ζ −Θ(ε), not just ra ≥ ζ +Θ(ε). Beyond uniformity
with the deﬁnition of a discrete ε-solution, the weaker version of the conditions has
the beneﬁt of monotonicity: the conditions continue to hold if we increase ε. We will
exploit this in the following proof.
Using the above three lemmas, we can deﬁne a discrete ε-solution to a generalized
circuit given an ε-default set. This proves our theorem:
Proof of Theorem 4. Let C be a generalized circuit and let X be the ﬁnancial system
without default costs corresponding to C like in the proof of Theorem 2. Let ε≪ 1
and let D be an ε-default set of X. We show that for some ε′ = Θ(ε), D induces a
discrete ε′-solution d of C. This proves the theorem because ﬁnding the latter is hard
for ε′ ≪ 1. We deﬁne d following the preceding lemmas. For each gate g of C, . . .
• If g = C+, consider the corresponding sum gadget and let dg = H if v ∈ D and
dg =M if v /∈ D.
• If g = C−,consider the corresponding diﬀerence gadget and let dg = L if u /∈ D
and dg =M if u ∈ D.
• If g = C>, consider the corresponding comparison gadget and let
dg =


L if u1 /∈ D ∧ v1 ∈ D
H if u1 ∈ D ∧ v1 /∈ D
M if u1 ∈ D ∧ v1 ∈ D.
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Let r be an ε-solution of X ε-compatible with D and let ε′ = Θ(ε) be the maximum
of all the incarnations of Θ(ε) in Lemma 13–15, in the proof of Theorem 2, and ε
itself. By the proof of Theorem 2, r induces an ε′-solution of C by restriction to the
output banks of the gadgets corresponding to gates. Since the above lemmas still hold
if one replaces every instance of Θ(ε) by ε′ (due to monotonicity), they imply that
this induced ε′-solution of C is ε′-compatible with d. Thus, d is a discrete ε′-solution
of C.
In this section, we have shown that already ﬁnding an ε-default set of a ﬁnancial
system with CDSs is hard. En-route, we have developed a general methodology to
show that “coarse” or “discrete” versions of PPAD-hard search problems are hard. We
believe that our methodology can be applied to other problems to receive this type
of result when the reduction is suﬃciently faithful to the structure of a generalized
circuit. For example, Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2009) introduced
gadgets that encode a generalized circuit in a binary, degree-3 graphical game. It
is not hard to show that the supports of certain players in these gadgets inform a
discrete ε-solution of the generalized circuit. Thus, already ﬁnding the supports of an
ε-Nash equilibrium in such a game is hard.26 Unlike for two-player, n-action games,
this result is not trivial because graphical games can contain nonlinear interactions
and two-player games are not an immediate special case of graphical games. However,
in this particular instance, the result can be shown more directly. This is because
the game gadgets can easily be modiﬁed to ensure that players’ utilities are linear
combinations of other players’ strategies (Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou,
2009, Section 6.1) and then an equilibrium can be reconstructed from the supports
using linear programming. Future work may well encounter other domains where,
like in ﬁnancial networks with CDSs, no such modiﬁcation is possible and where our
methodology can be of use.
6 Origin of the Complexity: Structural Restrictions on the
Contract Space
We continue our exploration of the “origin” of the computational complexity in
ﬁnancial networks with CDSs. In this section, we study under which restrictions
on the network structure the distinction and search problems are still hard. This is
important, following our original program of study, to understand how the informal
“complexity” due to CDSs arises and to inform potential regulatory policies that
reduce it.
26Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2009) showed hardness when ε decreases with the size
of the game exponentially. Rubinstein (2018) extended their result to a constant ε using the same
gadgets. From this, we receive hardness of finding supports for constant ε as well.
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6.1 Counterparty Risk and Fundamental Risk
Inspection reveals that that our gadgets, and thus all hard instances constructed in
Sections 3 and 4, share three properties that make them particularly simple ﬁnancial
systems:
1. Acyclic Liabilities: The liability graph, where each writer of a contract is
connected to the respective holder, is acyclic. In fact, this graph is a disjoint
union of chains of form s→ i→ t, where s and t are the source and sink banks
and i is some other bank.
2. No Intermediation: No bank both holds and writes a CDS on the same reference
entity. The liability graphs for individual reference entities are therefore disjoint
unions of (in- or out-) star graphs.
3. No Counterparty Risk: For each contract, either the holder or the writer is
a highly capitalized bank, i.e., its external assets are signiﬁcantly (by factor
2 ≥ 1+ ε, for any relevant ε) higher than its maximum liabilities and thus, they
cannot default. Further, only highly capitalized banks are writers of CDSs.
Properties 1 and 2 are in stark contrast to much of the prior work on ﬁnancial
networks, which has often only considered the liability graph, where either reference
entities were ignored altogether or they were treated as mere edge labels, but were
not identiﬁed as nodes in the network (see our literature review in Section 1). No
such approach would be able to capture the computational complexity we illustrate
in this paper because the liability graph of our hard instances is always trivial.
Property 3 helps us discern the “origin of the complexity” from an economic point
of view. The holder of a CDS is dependent on two banks: the reference entity (this is
called fundamental risk) and the writer of the contract (this is called counterparty
risk; see D’Errico et al. (2018)). By property 3 however, unless the holder of the CDS
is highly capitalized, the recovery rate of the writer is ﬁxed to 1 (up to ε errors) so
that counterparty risk is only the risk of ε errors. Thus, counterparty risk does not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect recovery rates.27 The statement also holds for debt contracts. From
this, it follows that computational complexity remains high if we neglect counterparty
risk and it must therefore be driven by fundamental risk:
Proposition 3. All our complexity results (Theorems 1–4) still hold in a variant of
the clearing model where the assets of a bank i are deﬁned as
ai(r) := ei +
∑
j∈N
c∅j,i +
∑
j,k∈N
ckj,i(1− rk).
27In Section 5, we have argued that errors at source banks can have a large impact because notionals
are large in the order of 1/ε. We have shown, however, that these errors do not have an impact on
computational complexity because they do not significantly affect the outputs of our gadgets.
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The above modiﬁed model corresponds to a world where a governmental agency
like a central bank guarantees the payment in each and every contract while banks
are still in default if they cannot pay their obligations.28 The proof of the above
proposition is by revisiting our gadget proofs and is omitted. The proof becomes
slightly easier in the model without counterparty risk because we do not have to deal
with ε errors at the source bank any more.
Overall, we have now seen that the computational complexity of the problems
related to clearing with CDSs is not driven by counterparty risk, but by fundamental
risk in CDSs. Since CDS writers are highly capitalized in our construction (property 3),
it is not driven by fundamental risk on the liability side of banks’ assets sheets and
must thus be driven by fundamental risk on the asset side of their balance sheets.
Mathematically, it does not arise from non-linearity and must therefore arise from
non-monotonicity (see Section 2.4) This is because, in the above model without
counterparty risk and with all liabilities of possibly-defaulting banks equal to 1, the
update function F is piecewise linear and weakly decreasing in the point-wise ordering.
To eventually receive a polynomial-time algorithm and thus bound the com-
putational complexity from above, since computational complexity is driven by
non-monotonicity, it seems promising to study structural restrictions under which
monotonicity is restored. This is what we do in the following.
6.2 Naked CDSs
Non-monotonicity of the update function emerges because a bank that holds a CDS
and no other contracts proﬁts from an ill-being of the reference entity. Economically,
we say that it is short on the reference entity. This eﬀect is only present when CDSs
are held by banks in a naked fashion, i.e., without holding a corresponding debt
contract from the reference entity. The opposite is called a covered CDS. In general
networks, we need to consider all potential CDS writers to deﬁne what a covered and
a naked CDS position are. We thus arrive at the following technical deﬁnition from
our prior work.
Deﬁnition 9 (Covered and Naked CDS Position; Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Bat-
tiston (2019)). Let X = (N, e, c, α, β) be a ﬁnancial system. A bank j has a covered
CDS position towards another bank k if
∑
i∈N
cki,j ≤ c∅k,j .
28Leduc, Poledna and Thurner (2017) studied a model where payments are guaranteed for CDSs,
but not for debt contracts. Our computational problems are hard under this assumption as well by
the same argument as for Proposition 3. Leduc, Poledna and Thurner restricted their attention to
covered CDSs, defined below. This is why the computational problems that emerged in the context
of their paper were not hard.
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Otherwise, j has a naked CDS position towards k. X has no naked CDSs if no bank
has a naked CDS position towards another bank.
If j has a covered CDS position towards k and the recovery rate of k decreases,
then j may receive a higher payment in the CDSs it holds on k (this depends on the
recovery rates of the CDS writers), but it also receives a lower payment in the debt
contract from k and the latter eﬀect weakly dominates. Hence, j can never proﬁt
from the ill-being of k. A covered CDS thus functions as an insurance against default,
while a naked CDS is often considered speculation on default.29
For an example for a ﬁnancial system without naked CDSs, see Appendix B. This
also shows that it can still be the case that all solutions are irrational even without
naked CDSs, so we still need to consider an approximation problem still.
In a ﬁnancial system without naked CDSs, the update function is point-wise
monotonically increasing. This implies that a solution always exists and a simple
iteration sequence converges to a solution (Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston,
2019). It is easy to see that it does so in polynomial time:
Theorem 6. For any ﬁnancial system X = (N, e, c, α, β) without naked CDSs and
for any ε > 0, the iteration sequence (rn) deﬁned by r0 = (1, ... , 1) and rn+1 = F (rn)
reaches an ε-approximate ﬁxed point of the update function F after |N | · 1/ε steps. In
particular, this deﬁnes is a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for
the total search problem of ﬁnding an ε-solution in a ﬁnancial system with no naked
CDSs.
Proof. In each step where rn is not an ε-approximate ﬁxed point of F , some component
rni must decrease by at least ε in the next step. This follows from the deﬁnition
of an ε-approximate ﬁxed point and monotonicity of F . Since r is bounded below
by (0, ... , 0), there can be at most |N | · 1/ε such steps. This deﬁnes an FPTAS
because evaluating F and testing for an ε-approximate ﬁxed point can obviously be
done in polynomial time and any ε-approximate ﬁxed point of F is an ε-solution
(Proposition 1).
The above result extends to a slightly larger class of networks. In Schuldenzucker,
Seuken and Battiston (2019), we have deﬁned a structure called the colored dependency
graph of a ﬁnancial network. The nodes of this graph are the banks and an edge
i→ j exists whenever Fj(r) depends on ri (some of the edges may be false positives).
Naked CDS positions are colored red and all other edges are colored green. We have
shown in our prior work that, if no cycle in this graph contains a red edge, then
29A covered CDS always acts as insurance, but a naked CDS need not be speculative per se. For
example, a bank may hold a naked CDS on an entity that has very strong ties with one of its debtors,
so that the CDS holder would still never profit from a default of the reference entity. It might also
act as a mere intermediary. Detecting and appropriately handling these “indirectly covered” CDSs is
a promising topic for future work, but beyond the scope of this paper.
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a solution is still guaranteed to exist and we receive an approximation algorithm,
essentially by iterating F on each strongly connected component in topological order.
Theorem 6 implies that this algorithm is an FPTAS for the no-red-containing-cycle
case.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the clearing problem in ﬁnancial networks that consist
of debt and credit default swap (CDS) contracts. While in the debt-only case, the
clearing problem can be solved in polynomial time, we have shown in this paper that
the situation is markedly diﬀerent if CDSs are allowed. Deciding if an (approximate)
solution exists is NP-complete and ﬁnding an approximate solution when existence
is guaranteed is PPAD-complete. In fact, already determining if a speciﬁc bank
defaults or ﬁnding a consistent set of defaulting banks are hard problems. Hardness
is preserved under various structural restrictions, but the case where no naked CDSs
are present allows an FPTAS.
We can now answer our original question: Are ﬁnancial networks with debt
and CDSs “more complex” than those with only debt? Operationalizing informal
“complexity” as computational complexity of the clearing problem, we can conclude:
Yes, they are more complex, and in a precisely deﬁned way so: understanding the
interactions between banks in ﬁnancial systems with CDSs is at least as challenging
as understanding the structure of Boolean and generalized circuits. The complexity
prevents us from even knowing which banks default following a shock. Complexity
does not arise due to counterparty risk, but due to fundamental risk on the asset
side of banks’ balance sheets. If anything like a structural “origin” of the complexity
can be called out, it should be naked CDSs positions that occur as part of a cycle of
dependencies.
These insights are relevant for regulatory policy. The post-2008 regulatory reforms
related to the CDS market predominantly target counterparty risk. For example,
margin requirements mandate counterparties to keep a “buﬀer account” from which
ﬂuctuations in the contract value are oﬀset. Mandatory use of central counterparties
(CCPs) re-routes all contracts via a highly capitalized central node. Portfolio com-
pression eliminates cycles of liabilities for each individual reference entity.30 All of
these policies aim to reduce counterparty risk, but they do not aﬀect fundamental
risk. CCPs and portfolio compression modify the network structure, but they leave
all reference entity–holder relationships of non-intermediaries as they are. Our results
from Section 6.1 imply that this does not eliminate the kind of complexity we reveal
in this paper.
30See Financial Stability Board (2017) for details on the different market reforms. Benos, Wetherilt
and Zikes (2013) provide an accessible introduction.
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Another policy that will likely not aﬀect the hardness of our problems are regulatory
capital constraints. In our model, this would mean to require a minimum level γ ∈ [0, 1)
of external assets relative to maximum liabilities. Banks then have possible recovery
rates in [αγ, 1] rather than [0, 1]. We believe that it will be straightforward to modify
our constructions to re-map the latter to the former interval. This is why capital
constraints do likely not eliminate the complexity we describe.
What would eliminate the complexity, by our results from Section 6.2, is banning
all naked CDSs. This idea has been part of the public debate following the 2008
crisis (see, for instance, Soros (2009) and Reuters (2009)). During the European
sovereign debt crisis in 2011, such a ban was in fact implemented for the subset of
CDSs written on sovereign states. The ban is in eﬀect until this day (European
Commission, 2011; European Securities and Markets Authority, 2017). The policy
implications we describe here echo earlier results regarding existence of a solution
(Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston, 2019).
Since the structure of our hard instances is so simple, our results are robust to
changes to the details of the model. For example, our model abstracts over special
provisions in bankruptcy code that essentially give derivatives priority over other
contract types (debt in our model) in case of bankruptcy.31 As our constructions are
not aﬀected by counterparty risk and, in fact, relevant banks only ever write a single
contract, priority is not relevant and our results persist. Our results do crucially
depend on the assumption that all contracts are cleared at the same time. That
is why they likely do not transfer to any variant of the dynamic clearing model in
Banerjee, Bernstein and Feinstein (2018) or to a multi-maturity model (Kusnetsov
and Veraart, 2019) when debt and CDSs mature at diﬀerent points in time.
Future work should study which empirical properties of ﬁnancial networks may
make the clearing problem with CDSs feasible. For example, if the number of reference
entities is small compared to the number of banks, we might be able to exploit the
fact that with recovery rates of reference entities ﬁxed, the update function is linear
and monotonic. A similar approach may be feasible when the share of naked CDSs is
positive, but small. All of these properties are incompatible with the constructions in
our hardness proofs, which leaves hope that eﬃcient algorithms might be available.
A Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume WLOG that every bank writes a debt contract. If this is
not true for some bank, no other bank depends on its recovery rate by non-degeneracy
and our sanity assumptions. We can thus simply set its recovery rate to 1.
Note that the functions aili and
a′i
li
are polynomially continuous inX, i.e., continuous
with a Lipschitz constant that is O
(
2poly(size(X))
)
. This is because ai, a
′
i, and li are
31For details see, for example, Bolton and Oehmke (2015).
42
Figure 11 Financial System where the unique solution is irrational. Let α = β = 1
(no default costs).
B C
1
A
21
1 0
0
polynomially continuous and li is bounded above
∑
j c
∅
i,j > 0 because every bank
writes a debt contract. In particular, ai(r)li(r) and
a′i(r)
li(r)
is well-deﬁned for all r. Let M
be the maximum of the Lipschitz constants of these functions and 1.
Let r be an exact solution and let r′ be r rounded to a multiple of δ := ε/(M +1),
so that r′ = r ± δ. By polynomial continuity, r′ has a size as required. To see that r′
is an ε-solution, we perform a case distinction for each i:
• If ri = 1, then r
′ satisﬁes the ﬁrst case in Deﬁnition 2. We have r′i = ri±δ = 1±ε.
Further, since ri = 1 we have
ai(r)
li(r)
≥ 1, by choice of M and r′, ai(r′)li(r′) =
ai(r)
li(r)
±Mδ ≥ 1− ε, and thus ai(r′) ≥ (1− ε)li(r′).
• If ri < 1, then r
′ satisﬁes the second case. We have r′i = ri ± δ = a
′
i(r)
li(r)
± δ =
a′i(r
′)
li(r′)
± (M + 1)δ = a′i(r′)li(r′) ± ε. Since ri < 1,we have
ai(r)
li(r)
< 1 and thus
ai(r
′)
li(r′)
= ai(r)li(r) ± ε < 1 + ε, that is, ai(r′) < (1 + ε)li(r′).
B Example That Financial Systems with CDSs May Have
Only Irrational Exact Solutions
Figure 11 shows a ﬁnancial system the unique exact solution of which is irrational. To
see this, note that by the contract structure, ai(r) ≤ li(r) ∀r, i = A,B and therefore
r is clearing iﬀ
rA =
rB
2
, rB =
1
2− rA ,
and rC = 1. One easily veriﬁes that the unique solution in [0, 1]
2 to this system of
equations is given by
rA = 1− 1√
2
, rB = 2−
√
2.
C Comparison of our Generalized Circuit Definition to
Rubinstein (2018)
Rubinstein’s generalized circuits contain additional gates compared to ours. First,
there is a C= gate that simply copies its input and can of course be replaced by a
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C×1 gate. Second, there are additional Boolean gates that operate on approximately
Boolean values.32 While we could represent Boolean operations in a ﬁnancial system
using the gadgets from Section 3, Schuldenzucker and Seuken (2019) have shown in
prior work that the Boolean operations are in fact redundant and can be represented
using the comparison and arithmetic gates. To simplify our analysis, we omit these
gates.
The third diﬀerence to Rubinstein (2018) is that Rubinstein assumed a binary
comparison gate with two inputs where x[v] = 0± ε if x[a] < x[b]− ε and x[v] = 1± ε
if x[a] > x[b] + ε. One can emulate a binary comparison gate using our unary variant
such that ε increases only by a constant factor. To see this, construct a sub-circuit
corresponding to the expression
(
1
2
+ (a− b)
)
− (b− a)
and call the output node u. Note that the order of operations matters due to
truncation at 0 and 1. Then add a C>1/2 gate with input u and output v. It follows
immediately from the gates that if x is an ε-solution, then x[u] = u˜± 5ε where
u˜ :=
[[
1
2
+ [x[a]− x[b]]
]
− [x[b]− x[a]]
]
=
[
1
2
+ x[a]− x[b]
]
.
Note that u˜− 1/2 = min (1/2, max (−1/2, x[a]− x[b])). From this, it follows that
for ε≪ 1 (ε < 1/10 to be precise), v satisﬁes the deﬁnition of the binary comparison
gadget for ε′ := 5ε.
Acknowledgments
We would like thank (in alphabetical order) Vitor Bosshard, Yu Cheng, Constantinos
Daskalakis, Timo Mennle, Noam Nisan, and Joseph Stiglitz for helpful comments
on this work. Furthermore, we are grateful for the feedback we received from the
anonymous reviewers and from various participants at EC 2016 and ITCS 2017.
All authors gratefully acknowledge ﬁnancial support from the European Union’s
FP7 and Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under Future and Emerging
Technologies grant agreements No 610704 (SIMPOL) and No 640772 (DOLFINS).
Additionally, Stefano Battiston acknowledges funding from the Swiss National Fund
Professorship grant No PP00P1-144689 and from the Institute of New Economic
Thinking through the Task Force in Macroeconomic Eﬃciency and Stability.
32The definition of approximately Boolean values was weaker than what we did in Section 3, though.
See Schuldenzucker and Seuken (2019) for a discussion.
44
References
Acemoglu, Daron, Asuman Ozdaglar, and Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi. 2015. “Systemic
Risk and Stability in Financial Networks.” American Economic Review, 105(2): 564–608.
Anderson, Robert M. 1986. “‘Almost’ implies ‘near’.” Transactions of the American
Mathematical Society, 296(1): 229–237.
Arinaminpathy, Nimalan, Sujit Kapadia, and Robert M. May. 2012. “Size and
complexity in model ﬁnancial systems.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
109(45): 18338–18343.
Arora, Sanjeev, Boaz Barak, Markus Brunnermeier, and Rong Ge. 2011. “Compu-
tational complexity and information asymmetry in ﬁnancial products.” Communications of
the ACM, 54(5): 101–107.
Banerjee, Tathagata, Alex Bernstein, and Zachary Feinstein. 2018. “Dynamic Clear-
ing and Contagion in Financial Networks.” Working Paper, https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.
02091.
Bank for International Settlements. 2018. “Semiannual OTC derivatives statistics, credit
default swaps, by sector of reference, H1 2018.” http: // stats. bis. org/ statx/ srs/
table/ d10. 4? p= 20181 , Retrieved November 23, 2019.
Bardoscia, Marco, Stefano Battiston, Fabio Caccioli, and Guido Caldarelli. 2017.
“Pathways towards instability in ﬁnancial networks.” Nature Communications, 8: 14416.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 2014. “The G-SIB assessment methodology
— score calculation.” Retrieved November 23, 2019, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/
d296.htm.
Battiston, Stefano, Guido Caldarelli, Robert M May, Tarik Roukny, and
Joseph E Stiglitz. 2016. “The price of complexity in financial networks.” Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences, 113(36): 10031–10036.
Benos, Evangelos, Anne Wetherilt, and Filip Zikes. 2013. “The structure and dynamics
of the UK credit default swap market.” Bank of England Financial Stability Paper, 25.
Bolton, Patrick, and Martin Oehmke. 2015. “Should derivatives be privileged in
bankruptcy?” The Journal of Finance, 70(6): 2353–2394.
Braverman, Mark, and Kanika Pasricha. 2014. “The computational hardness of pricing
compound options.” In Proceedings of the 5th conference on Innovations in Theoretical
Computer Science.
Chen, Xi, Xiaotie Deng, and Shang-Hua Teng. 2009. “Settling the complexity of
computing two-player Nash equilibria.” Journal of the ACM (JACM), 56(3): 14.
Constâncio, Vítor. 2017. “Macroprudential stress tests: A new analytical
tool.” VoxEU.org. Retrieved November 23, 2019, http://voxeu.org/article/
macroprudential-stress-tests-new-analytical-tool.
Crotty, James. 2009. “Structural causes of the global financial crisis: a critical assessment
of the ‘new financial architecture’.” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 33(4): 563–580.
Daskalakis, Constantinos, Paul W Goldberg, and Christos H Papadimitriou. 2009.
“The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium.” SIAM Journal on Computing, 39(1): 195–
259.
Dees, Stéphane, Jérôme Henry, and Reiner Martin, ed. 2017. STAMPe: Stress-Test
Analytics for Macroprudential Purposes in the euro area. Frankfurt:European Central Bank.
45
D’Errico, Marco, Stefano Battiston, Tuomas Peltonen, and Martin Scheicher.
2018. “How does risk ﬂow in the credit default swap market?” Journal of Financial
Stability, 35: 53–74.
Duﬃe, Darrell. 1999. “Credit Swap Valuation.” Financial Analysts Journal, 55(1): 73–87.
Eisenberg, Larry, and Thomas H Noe. 2001. “Systemic risk in ﬁnancial systems.” Man-
agement Science, 47(2): 236–249.
Elliott, Matthew, Benjamin Golub, and Matthew O. Jackson. 2014. “Financial
Networks and Contagion.” American Economic Review, 104(10): 3115–53.
Elsinger, Helmut, Alfred Lehar, and Martin Summer. 2006. “Risk assessment for
banking systems.” Management Science, 52(9): 1301–1314.
Etessami, Kousha, and Mihalis Yannakakis. 2010. “On the complexity of Nash equilibria
and other ﬁxed points.” SIAM Journal on Computing, 39(6): 2531–2597.
European Banking Authority. 2014. “EBA publishes 2014 EU-
wide stress test results.” Press Release, http://www.eba.europa.eu/-/
eba-publishes-2014-eu-wide-stress-test-results.
European Commission. 2011. “Regulation on Short Selling and Credit Default Swaps —
Frequently asked questions.” Press Release, http: // europa. eu/ rapid/ press-release_
MEMO-11-713_ en. htm , Retrieved November 23, 2019.
European Securities and Markets Authority. 2017. “Policy Activities / Short
Selling.” https: // www. esma. europa. eu/ regulation/ trading/ short-selling , Re-
trieved November 23, 2019.
Feinstein, Zachary, Weijie Pang, Birgit Rudloﬀ, Eric Schaanning, Stephan Sturm,
and Mackenzie Wildman. 2017. “Sensitivity of the Eisenberg-Noe clearing vector to
individual interbank liabilities.” Working Paper, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3033476.
Fender, Ingo, and Jacob Gyntelberg. 2008. “Overview: global financial crisis spurs
unprecedented policy actions.” BIS Quarterly Review, 1(1).
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. 2011. “The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report.” http:
// fcic. law. stanford. edu/ report .
Financial Stability Board. 2017. “OTC Derivatives Markets Reform —
Twelfth Progress Report on Implementation.” http: // www. fsb. org/ 2017/ 06/
otc-derivatives-market-reforms-twelfth-progress-report-on-implementation/ .
Fitch Ratings. 2007. “CDx Survey — Market Volumes Continue Growing while New
Concerns Emerge.”
Gai, Prasanna, Andrew Haldane, and Sujit Kapadia. 2011. “Complexity, concentra-
tion and contagion.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 58(5): 453–470.
Glasserman, Paul, and H. Peyton Young. 2015. “How likely is contagion in financial
networks?” Journal of Banking & Finance, 50(0): 383–399.
Goldreich, Oded. 2005. “On promise problems (in memory of Shimon Even (1935–2004)).”
In Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity.
Haldane, Andrew G. 2009. “Rethinking the Financial Network.” Speech at the Financial
Student Association, Amsterdam, April 28, 2009, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
speech/2009/rethinking-the-financial-network.
Hemenway, Brett, and Sanjeev Khanna. 2016. “Sensitivity and computational complex-
ity in financial networks.” Algorithmic Finance, 5(3–4).
International Swaps and Derivatives Association. 2012. “The ISDA Credit Deriva-
46
tives Determinations Committees.” http: // www2. isda. org/ attachment/ NDM1NA= =/
AGM% 202012_ DC% 20anniversary_ appendix_ 043012. pdf , Retrieved November 23, 2019.
Kiﬀ, John, Jennifer A. Elliott, Elias G. Kazarian, Jodi G. Scarlata, and Carolyne
Spackman. 2009. “Credit Derivatives: Systemic Risks and Policy Options.” IMF Working
Paper, 9(254).
Kusnetsov, Michael, and Luitgard Anna Maria Veraart. 2019. “Interbank clearing in
ﬁnancial networks with multiple maturities.” SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics,
10(1): 37–67.
Leduc, Matt V, Sebastian Poledna, and Stefan Thurner. 2017. “Systemic Risk Man-
agement in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps.” Journal of Network Theory in
Finance, 3(3).
Liu, Ming, and Jeremy Staum. 2010. “Sensitivity analysis of the Eisenberg–Noe model
of contagion.” Operations Research Letters, 38(5): 489–491.
Papadimitriou, Christos H. 1994. “On the complexity of the parity argument and other
ineﬃcient proofs of existence.” Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 48(3): 498–532.
Reuters. 2009. “Geithner testiﬁes on ﬁnancial regulation reform.” Reuters. News
Item, Business News, 26 March, 2009, https://uk.reuters.com/article/
uk-financial-regulation-highlights-idUKTRE52P4UX20090326.
Rogers, LCG, and Luitgard AM Veraart. 2013. “Failure and rescue in an interbank
network.” Management Science, 59(4): 882–898.
Rubinstein, Aviad. 2018. “Inapproximability of Nash equilibrium.” SIAM Journal on
Computing, 47(3): 917–959.
Schoenebeck, Grant R., and Salil Vadhan. 2012. “The Computational Complexity of
Nash Equilibria in Concisely Represented Games.” ACM Transactions on Computation
Theory, 4(2): 4:1–4:50.
Schuldenzucker, Steﬀen, and Sven Seuken. 2019. “Monotonicity and Non-Monotonicity
of Solution Concepts in Generalized Circuits.” Working Paper, https://arxiv.org/abs/
1907.12854.
Schuldenzucker, Steﬀen, Sven Seuken, and Stefano Battiston. 2016. “Clearing Pay-
ments in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps [Extended Abstract].” In Proceedings
of the 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. Maastricht, The Netherlands.
Schuldenzucker, Steﬀen, Sven Seuken, and Stefano Battiston. 2017. “Finding Clear-
ing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps is PPAD-complete.” In
Proceedings of the 8th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS) Conference.
Berkeley, USA.
Schuldenzucker, Steﬀen, Sven Seuken, and Stefano Battiston. 2019. “Default Ambi-
guity: Credit Default Swaps Create New Systemic Risks in Financial Networks.” Manage-
ment Science, Published in Articles in Advance.
Shin, Hyun Song. 2010. “Financial Intermediation and the Post-Crisis Financial System.”
BIS Working Paper, 304.
Soros, George. 2009. “One Way to Stop Bear Raids.” The Wall Street Journal. Op-ed,
https://www.georgesoros.com/2009/03/23/one_way_to_stop_bear_raids/.
Vazirani, Vijay V., and Mihalis Yannakakis. 2011. “Market Equilibrium Under Sepa-
rable, Piecewise-linear, Concave Utilities.” Journal of the ACM (JACM), 58(3): 10:1–10:25.
Yellen, Janet L. 2013. “Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk: Lessons from the Financial
47
Crisis and Policy Implications.” Speech at the American Economic Association / American
Finance Association Joint Luncheon, San Diego, California, January 4, 2013, https:
//www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20130104a.htm.
Zuckerman, David. 2011. “Pseudorandom Financial Derivatives.” In Proceedings of the
12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. New York, NY, USA:ACM.
48
4 Monotonic and Non-Monotonic Solution
Concepts for Generalized Circuits
I’m the operator with my pocket calculator.
I’m the operator with my pocket calculator.
I am adding and subtracting.
I’m controlling and composing.
I’m the operator with my pocket calculator.
Kraftwerk, Pocket Calculator
The content of this chapter has previously appeared in:
“Monotonic and Non-Monotonic Solution Concepts for Generalized Circuits.”
Steffen Schuldenzucker and Sven Seuken. Working Paper, July 2019.
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Abstract
Generalized circuits are an important tool in the study of the computational
complexity of equilibrium approximation problems. However, in this paper, we
reveal that they have a conceptual flaw, namely that the solution concept is not
monotonic. By this we mean that if ε < ε′, then an ε-approximate solution for
a certain generalized circuit is not necessarily also an ε′-approximate solution.
The reason for this non-monotonicity is the way Boolean operations are modeled.
We illustrate that non-monotonicity creates subtle technical issues in prior work
that require intricate additional arguments to circumvent. To eliminate this
problem, we show that the Boolean gates are a redundant feature: one can
simulate stronger, monotonic versions of the Boolean gates using the other gate
types. Arguing at the level of these stronger Boolean gates eliminates all of the
aforementioned issues in a natural way. We hope that our results will enable new
studies of sub-classes of generalized circuits and enabler simpler and more natural
reductions from generalized circuits to other equilibrium search problems.
1 Introduction
Generalized circuits (Chen, Deng and Teng, 2009) have become a vital tool in the study
of the computational complexity of equilibrium approximation problems. Reductions
from generalized circuits have been used to show PPAD-completeness of a wide range
of such problems, including the approximate search problems for: Nash equilibrium
of a normal-form game (Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou, 2009; Chen, Deng
and Teng, 2009; Daskalakis, 2013; Babichenko, Papadimitriou and Rubinstein, 2016;
Rubinstein, 2018), Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium (Chen, Paparas and Yannakakis,
2017), competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (Othman, Papadimitriou and
Rubinstein, 2016), and payment equilibrium in a financial network (Schuldenzucker,
Seuken and Battiston, 2017, 2019).
A generalized circuit consists of nodes that are connected by gates. Nodes take
values between 0 and 1 and each gate defines a constraint on the values of the
nodes connected to it. Generalized circuits differ from regular algebraic circuits in
1
three important aspects. First, in addition to arithmetic gates (constants, addition,
subtraction, and scaling by a constant), there are also a comparison gate and Boolean
gates that implement the standard Boolean operations (AND, OR, NOT). Second,
generalized circuits may contain cycles. Third, the constraints on the nodes are
approximate depending on a precision parameter ε. This enables generalized circuits
to express a large class of approximate-fixed-point problems. An ε-solution to a
generalized circuit is an assignment of values in [0, 1] to the nodes consistent with the
constraints induced by the gates for precision ε. While an ε-solution always exists,
the search problem ε-GCircuit of finding such an ε-solution is PPAD-complete for
a sufficiently small constant ε (Rubinstein, 2018).
In this paper, we reveal a conceptual flaw in the definition of the generalized
circuit concept, namely that the solution concept is not monotonic. By this we mean
that if ε < ε′, then an ε-solution to a given generalized circuit is not necessarily
also an ε′-solution to the same circuit. The issue lies with the Boolean gates NOT,
AND, and OR and the way how these gates operate on approximately Boolean values
(Section 3).
Not having monotonicity violates our intuition for an approximate solution concept.
For example, the simple idea that finding an ε-approximate solution gets (weakly)
harder as ε gets smaller implicitly relies on the assumption of monotonicity.
To overcome this problem of non-monotonicity, we introduce a new variant
of the generalized circuits problem that has stronger constraints for the Boolean
gates that satisfy monotonicity. We call this variant ε-GCircuitSB (“SB” for
“stronger Boolean”).1 ε-GCircuitSB serves as a monotonic drop-in replacement
for ε-GCircuit in hardness proofs about generalized circuits themselves. In a second
step, we show that Boolean gates (our stronger version or the original weaker version)
are in fact a redundant feature: we can represent each of the Boolean gates using only
the other (arithmetic and comparison) gate types. Our result implies that two new
monotonic search problems are PPAD-complete: ε-GCircuitSB and the restriction
ε-GCircuitNB of ε-GCircuit where no Boolean gates are allowed (“NB” for “no
Boolean”; see Section 4).2
We then illustrate that the lack of monotonicity in ε-GCircuit has led to several
subtle technical issues in prior work (to be precise, in Chen, Deng and Teng (2009)
1The distinguishing feature of ε-GCircuitSB, which makes the solution concept monotonic,
is shared by a variant of generalized circuits considered earlier by Othman, Papadimitriou and
Rubinstein (2016). However, this variant is heavily customized to their application (fair allocation),
while we aim to stay as faithful to the standard definition of generalized circuits as possible. The
authors also did not discuss the relevance of monotonicity.
2The problem ε-GCircuitNB and its PPAD-completeness have been discussed before. See,
for instance: Constantinos Daskalakis, “Algorithmic Lower Bounds: Fun with Hardness Proofs.
Lecture 23. PPAD Reductions,” MIT Course, Fall 2014, available online: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Ih0cPR745fM (the problem is called ε-ArithmCircuitSAT here). What was not discussed
previously is the property of monotonicity, how it affects natural arguments and prior work, and that
different variants of the generalized circuit problem differ in terms of monotonicity.
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and Rubinstein (2018)) that, to the best of our knowledge, have been overlooked so
far. While these issues are of a mere technical nature and can be circumvented using
more careful argumentation, we demonstrate that ε-GCircuitSB can be used as a
drop-in replacement for ε-GCircuit in these pieces of work and provides a clean and
conceptually simple way to eliminate these issues (Section 5).
We argue that, due to the desirability of monotonicity, the ε-GCircuit problem
in its current form is difficult to work with and future studies of generalized circuits
should either consider the ε-GCircuitSB problem or the ε-GCircuitNB problem
(i.e., leave out Boolean gates altogether). Monotonic solution concepts match our
expectations and are thus easier to reason about. The fact that the Boolean gates
are optional will simplify reductions from generalized circuits to other problems. We
hope that this will enable new complexity results for equilibrium search problems in
the future.
2 Preliminaries: Generalized Circuits
We follow the definition of a generalized circuit in Rubinstein (2018). A generalized
circuit is a collection of nodes and gates, where each node is labeled as an input of
any number of gates (including zero) and as an output of at most one gate. Inputs to
the same gate are distinguishable from each other. Each gate has one of the types Cζ ,
C×ζ , C=, C+, C−, C<, C∨, C∧, or C¬. For the gate types Cζ and C×ζ , a numeric
parameter ζ is specified in addition to their input and output nodes. The length of
a generalized circuit is the number of bits needed to describe the circuit, including
the nodes, the mapping from nodes to inputs and outputs of gates, and numeric
parameters ζ involved.
For any ε > 0, an ε-approximate solution (or ε-solution for short) of a generalized
circuit is a mapping x that assigns to each node v a value x[v] ∈ [0, 1] such that at
each gate, the constraints in Table 1 hold. We write [x] := min(1, max(0, x)) and we
write y = x±ε to mean that |x−y| ≤ ε. ε-GCircuit is the search problem of finding
an ε-solution of a given generalized circuit. It is easy to show that an ε-solution
always exists (using Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem), has polynomial length, and
that ε-GCircuit is in PPAD. This is true even if ε decreases exponentially with the
input size.
The gates can be grouped into three categories: the arithmetic gates Cζ , C×ζ , C=,
C+, and C−, the comparison gate C<, and the Boolean gates C∨, C∧, and C¬. Note
from Table 1 how the comparison gate is brittle: its output value is unconstrained in
[0, 1] if x[a1] and x[a2] are ε-close to each other. This is crucial to guarantee existence
of an ε-solution3 and it is also necessary to enable reductions from generalized circuits
3A brittle comparison gadget, and thus all gadgets, can be represented by a continuous function
with Lipschitz constant O(1/ε). By Brouwer’s fixed point theorem and rounding, an ε-approximate
3
Table 1 Conditions required to hold at a gate of the respective type with input
nodes ai and output node v in an ε-solution for a generalized circuit. For each gate,
one output node and between 0 and 2 input nodes (depending on the gate type) are
specified. For the gates Cζ and C×ζ , an additional numeric parameter ζ ∈ [0, 1] is
specified.
Gate Type Short Constraint
Constant Cζ x[v] = ζ ± ε
Scaling C×ζ x[v] = [ζ · x[a1]]± ε
Copy C= x[v] = x[a1]± ε
Addition C+ x[v] = [x[a1] + x[a2]]± ε
Subtraction C− x[v] = [x[a1]− x[a2]]± ε
Comparison C< x[a1] < x[a2]− ε ⇒ x[v] ≤ ε
x[a1] > x[a2] + ε ⇒ x[v] ≥ 1− ε
OR C∨ x[a1] ≤ ε and x[a2] ≤ ε ⇒ x[v] ≤ ε
x[a1] ≥ 1− ε or x[a2] ≥ 1− ε ⇒ x[v] ≥ 1− ε
AND C∧ x[a1] ≤ ε or x[a2] ≤ ε ⇒ x[v] ≤ ε
x[a1] ≥ 1− ε and x[a2] ≥ 1− ε ⇒ x[v] ≥ 1− ε
NOT C¬ x[a1] ≤ ε ⇒ x[v] ≥ 1− ε
x[a1] ≥ 1− ε ⇒ x[v] ≤ ε
to other approximate solution concepts like approximate Nash equilibrium, where
an exact comparison gadget may not be attainable (see Daskalakis, Goldberg and
Papadimitriou (2009) for a discussion). The Boolean gates are defined in a similar
way, operating on approximately Boolean values. That is, we consider any value within
[0, ε] Boolean false and any value within [1− ε, 1] Boolean true. The Boolean gates
are then only required to return an approximately Boolean value at their output if
their inputs are also approximately Boolean. If the inputs are not approximately
Boolean, i.e., if they lie in the interval (ε, 1 − ε), any output value is allowed. For
example, the C¬ gate can map an input 0.5 to any number in [0, 1]. This provides a
minimal specification of “approximate Boolean gates” and is important for reductions
because the problem one wants to reduce to may only be able to express Boolean
functions up to such errors (e.g., approximate fixed point problems, see Section 3
below). Note further how the arithmetic gates accumulate errors (a chain of, say n
C= gates has a total error of nε) while the Boolean gates do not. This is exploited,
for example, in Rubinstein (2018).
ε-GCircuit is known to be PPAD-complete for a sufficiently small constant ε
(Rubinstein, 2018). Thus, no polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) exists
unless P=PPAD. This is the strongest hardness result for ε-GCircuit known to date.
solution of length O(1/Length(ε)2) always exists.
4
3 ε-GCIRCUIT Does Not Satisfy Monotonicity
We now formally define monotonicity and we show that ε-GCircuit does not in
general satisfy it. Let X be a set and let Pε : X → {true, false} for 0 < ε < 1 be a
family of properties of elements of X. We call the family P monotonic if for all ε < ε′
and all x ∈ X, Pε(x) implies Pε′(x).
Essentially anything we would call an “approximate solution concept” is monotonic.
For example, if G is a game, X is the set of mixed strategy profiles of G, and
Pε(x) = true iff x is an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium of G, then the family P
is monotonic. Likewise, well-supported approximate Nash equilibria (Daskalakis,
Goldberg and Papadimitriou, 2009) and relative approximate Nash equilibria are
monotonic. Another important family of monotonic properties are approximate fixed
points. Let n ≥ 1, X = [0, 1]n, and let F : X → X be a function. Let Pε(x) = true
iff Fi(x) = xi ± ε for all i. x is then called an ε-approximate fixed point of F . P is
obviously monotonic.4
We now show that “ε-solution to a certain generalized circuit” is not in general
monotonic.
Proposition 1. There exists a generalized circuit C such that the family of properties
Pε(x) := “x is an ε-solution for C” is not monotonic.
Proof. Let C consist of two nodes a and v connected by a single C¬ gate. Let
0 < ε < 1/4 and let x[a] = 1.5ε and x[v] = 0.5. Since x[a] /∈ [0; ε] ∪ [1 − ε; 1], the
C¬ gate does not constrain the value of the output and thus x is an ε-solution. Let
ε′ = 2ε. Now x[a] ≤ ε′, so the C¬ gate requires that x[v] ≥ 1− ε′. But this is not the
case. Thus, x is not an ε′-solution, which violates monotonicity.
Remark 1. In the specific, stylized example in the above proof, there are of course
many ε-solutions that are also ε′-solutions for ε′ > ε, like (x[a] = 0, x[v] = 1). One
might argue that one should only consider these “normal” solutions and that the
ε-solution we discuss is pathological. If the gate is part of a larger circuit, however,
it is not clear anymore how one would transition to a “normal” solution while still
satisfying the constraints at all gates. We discuss this in Appendix B.
At a conceptual level, the reason why “ε-solution to a generalized circuit” is not
monotonic is because for the Boolean gates, the respective constraint is a collection
of implications where conditions like x ≤ ε and x ≥ 1− ε occur on both sides of each
implication (see Table 1). Both sides get weaker as ε is increased and thus the effect
on the overall constraint is ambiguous. Indeed, it is not hard to construct analogous
counterexamples to the proof of Proposition 1 for the C∨ and C∧ gates. Note that,
4Approximate fixed points occur in many search problems, where F is then defined in some way
based on the input. A related concept are strong approximate fixed points (Etessami and Yannakakis,
2010), which need to be close to an exact fixed point.
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in contrast to the Boolean gates, the comparison gate is not affected by this problem.
This is because here, the left-hand side of the implication becomes stronger as ε is
increased, so the whole implication becomes unambiguously weaker.
The fact that “ε-solution to a generalized circuit” is not monotonic violates our
intuition for approximation problems. For example, we would typically assume that
the ε-GCircuit search problem becomes (weakly) harder when we decrease ε. This
is of course based on the assumption that a solution to ε-GCircuit will also be a
solution to ε′-GCircuit if ε < ε′ (i.e., monotonicity). However, since monotonicity
is not guaranteed, we cannot immediately exclude the possibility that the problem
becomes easier again when we decrease ε far enough. This might be because for a
low ε, many inputs to Boolean gates can be chosen to be not approximately Boolean
and so the outputs of these gates can be arbitrary, giving us additional degrees of
freedom to satisfy other constraints. We show in Appendix B that the problem does
not actually become easier in a computational complexity sense, but this requires
careful argumentation.
4 Restoring Monotonicity
We have just seen that the lack of monotonicity creates subtle pitfalls in otherwise
trivial arguments. In fact, we will demonstrate in Section 5 that non-monotonicity
can lead to many more issues, including in prior work. To overcome this problem,
we now present a way to restore monotonicity. We will show in Section 5 that our
approach eliminates the above-mentioned issues at a conceptual level.
Non-monotonicity arises due to the Boolean gates. Of course, we cannot sim-
ply remove the Boolean gates from consideration because the hardness proofs for
ε-GCircuit rely on having access to Boolean gates. Instead, to restore monotonic-
ity, we define a new variant of the problem that has stronger constraints for the
Boolean gates that satisfy monotonicity. We call this variant ε-GCircuitSB (“SB” for
“stronger Boolean”). ε-GCircuitSB is very useful for hardness proofs about general-
ized circuits themselves (see Section 5). However, the fact that we have strengthened
the Boolean gates creates two new problems: first, reductions from ε-GCircuit to
other problems do not automatically provide reductions for the stronger Boolean
gates. Second, it is not clear at this point that ε-GCircuitSB is in PPAD. To resolve
these problems, we show that Boolean gates (our stronger version or the original
weaker version) are a redundant feature: we can represent each of the Boolean gates
using only the other (arithmetic and comparison) gate types.5 This immediately
implies that the restriction of ε-GCircuit where no Boolean gates are allowed, and
5Of course, many more gates beyond the Boolean gates are redundant or could be replaced by
simplified versions of the respective gate. For example, C= can be replaced by C×1. However, only
the Boolean gates are relevant for monotonicity. See Othman, Papadimitriou and Rubinstein (2016)
and Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston (2019) for reduced sets of gates.
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Table 2 Conditions required to hold at a gate g with input nodes ai and output node
v in a strong ε-solution for a generalized circuit. The constraints differ from Table 1
only with regards to the Boolean gates (highlighted in gray).
Gate Type Short Constraint
Constant Cζ x[v] = ζ ± ε
Scaling C×ζ x[v] = [ζ · x[a1]]± ε
Copy C= x[v] = x[a1]± ε
Addition C+ x[v] = [x[a1] + x[a2]]± ε
Subtraction C− x[v] = [x[a1]− x[a2]]± ε
Comparison C< x[a1] < x[a2]− ε ⇒ x[v] ≤ ε
x[a1] > x[a2] + ε ⇒ x[v] ≥ 1− ε
OR C∨ x[a1] < 1/2− ε and x[a2] < 1/2− ε ⇒ x[v] ≤ ε
x[a1] > 1/2 + ε or x[a2] > 1/2 + ε ⇒ x[v] ≥ 1− ε
AND C∧ x[a1] < 1/2− ε or x[a2] < 1/2− ε ⇒ x[v] ≤ ε
x[a1] > 1/2 + ε and x[a2] > 1/2 + ε ⇒ x[v] ≥ 1− ε
NOT C¬ x[a1] < 1/2− ε ⇒ x[v] ≥ 1− ε
x[a1] > 1/2 + ε ⇒ x[v] ≤ ε
which we call ε-GCircuitNB (“NB” for “no Boolean”), is already PPAD-complete.
Note that ε-GCircuitNB is also monotonic.
4.1 The ε-GCIRCUITSB Problem
Recall that non-monotonicity of the ε-solution concept arises because expressions of
the form x[a1] ≥ 1−ε (which occur on the left-hand side of the constraints for Boolean
gates) become weaker as ε increases. To resolve this, we replace these conditions
so that they become stronger as ε increases, so that the whole implication becomes
weaker. More in detail, we replace expressions of the form x[a1] ≥ 1−ε by expressions
of the form x[a1] > 1/2 + ε on the left-hand side of the implication for Boolean
gates.6 This yields the constraints in Table 2. We call an assignment x that satisfies
these constraints a strong ε-solution and we call the corresponding search problem
ε-GCircuitSB.7 This restores monotonicity.
Proposition 2. Let C be a generalized circuit.
6Note that we also replace weak by strict inequalities in the process. We do this to simplify the
following arguments in this paper and to receive the continuity property discussed in Remark 2 below.
It is not crucial for our construction, though.
7A similar variant of the generalized circuits problem was first studied by Othman, Papadimitriou
and Rubinstein (2016). The authors introduced an additional parameter β = Θ(ε) and then specified
the Boolean gates like in Table 2 if we replace ε by β on the left-hand sides of the Boolean gates.
Their variant differs from the variant we describe here in other details of the problem. For example,
scaling is only allowed by a factor 1/2 and the definition of the C¬ gate is not analogous to the
two other Boolean gates. In this paper, we aim for the smallest deviation from Rubinstein’s (2018)
variant that eliminates the aforementioned problems.
7
1. For any ε < 1/4, any strong ε-solution of C is also an ε-solution of C
2. The family of properties Pε(x) := “x is a strong ε-solution of C” is monotonic.
Proof. 1: We can consider each gate separately and we only need to consider the
Boolean gates, since the constraints for the other gates are the same between
ε-GCircuit and ε-GCircuitSB. For the Boolean gates, note that for all z ∈ [0, 1]
and ε < 1/4 we have z ≤ ε ⇒ z < 1/2 − ε and z ≥ 1 − ε ⇒ z > 1/2 + ε. Thus,
whenever we require x[v] = 0± ε or x[v] = 1± ε in an ε-solution, we make the same
requirement in a strong ε-solution. Therefore, every strong ε-solution satisfies the
constraints for an ε-solution.
2: Again, we only need to consider the constraints corresponding to Boolean gates
since we have already seen that the others satisfy monotonicity. For the Boolean
gates, consider the C¬ gate, let x be an ε-solution and let ε < ε
′. We distinguish the
two cases in the constraint for the C¬ gate for a strong ε
′-solution.
• If x[a1] < 1/2 − ε′, then x[a1] < 1/2 − ε and thus, since x is an ε-solution,
x[v] = 1± ε = 1± ε′ as required.
• If x[a1] > 1/2 + ε′, then likewise x[a1] > 1/2 + ε and thus x[v] = 0± ε = 0± ε′.
The proofs for the other two Boolean gates are analogous.
Due to monotonicity, the ε parameter of ε-GCircuitSB now behaves as we
would intuitively expect. For example, the ε-GCircuitSB problem trivially becomes
(weakly) harder as ε decreases.
Remark 2 (Continuity of the solution concept). ε-GCircuitSB is distinguished from
ε-GCircuit by another intuitive property that we call continuity of the solution
concept.8 By continuity we mean the following. Fix a generalized circuit and let
xn → x and εn → ε be two convergent sequences such that xn is a strong εn-solution
for all n; then x is a strong ε-solution. In particular, if εn → 0, then x is a strong exact
solution. Continuity holds for ε-GCircuitSB because only strict inequalities appear
on the left-hand sides of the constraints for the Boolean gates.9 In ε-GCircuit,
these inequalities are weak and ε-GCircuit does not satisfy continuity.10 Note that
continuity of the solution concept is orthogonal to monotonicity and does not affect
any of the other results, and in particular it does not affect hardness of the problem.
8We thank Xi Chen for bringing this property to our attention.
9More in detail, note that continuity for ε-GCircuitSB is equivalent to closedness of the set
S := {(x, ε) | x is a strong ε-solution for C} for any generalized circuit C. This in turn holds because
S =
⋂
g gate
{(x, ε) | x satisfies the constraint in Table 2 for g with tolerance ε} and all of these sets
are closed. The first constraint of the C¬ gate, for example, is equivalent to x[a1] ≥ 1/2−ε∨x[v] ≥ 1−ε,
which obviously leads to a closed set. Also recall that we write y = x± ε for the weak inequalities
x − ε ≤ y ≤ x + ε. This is crucial for continuity at the arithmetic gates and differs from, e.g.,
Rubinstein (2018).
10To see that ε-GCircuit is not continuous, consider a single C¬ gate, let ε
n = 1/n, xn[a1] = 2/n,
and xn[v] = 0. WLOG assume n ≥ 4. Note that xn[a1] 6≤ εn and xn[a1] 6≥ 1 − εn, so xn is an
εn-solution for all n. However, x[a1] = 0 ≤ 0 = ε, but x[v] = 0 6≥ 1 = 1− ε, so x is not an ε-solution.
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Note further that continuity does not imply any statement regarding the “speed of
convergence.” That is, we do not receive an upper bound on ‖x− xn‖ dependent on
|ε− εn|. In light of the hardness results in Etessami and Yannakakis (2010) regarding
strong fixed points, such a result seems unlikely to be obtainable.
ε-GCircuitSB is monotonic and offers access to Boolean gates, which makes it
useful to study the hardness of generalized circuit problems themselves. However,
since we made the Boolean gates stronger, it might be the case that ε-GCircuitSB
is a strictly harder problem than ε-GCircuit. It is an immediate consequence of
the discussion in the following section that this is not the case. It will turn out that
(even our stronger) Boolean gates do not actually add any expressiveness on top of
the other gates.
4.2 Redundancy of Boolean Gates
We can construct the Boolean gates in the definition of ε-GCircuitSB from the
arithmetic and comparison gates. Thus, the Boolean gates are redundant as a feature
and we receive a reduction from Θ(ε)-GCircuitNB to ε-GCircuitSB. Recall that
ε-GCircuitNB is the restriction of ε-GCircuit where no Boolean gates are allowed.
In the following, we write “ε ≪ 1” (read: “ε sufficiently small”) to mean that a
statement holds for all ε below a certain positive threshold. Unless indicated, the
threshold is a constant that does not depend on the context of the statement.
Lemma 1. For any generalized circuit C we can construct in polynomial time a
circuit C ′ such that i) the nodes of C ′ are a superset of the nodes of C, ii) C ′ does not
contain any Boolean gates, and iii) for any ε≪ 1, any ε/2-solution for C ′ induces a
strong ε-solution for C via restriction to the nodes of C.
Proof. We need to model the Boolean gates. The C∧ gate is redundant because it can
be expressed using C¬ and C∨ (recall that Boolean gates do not accumulate errors!).
Assume ε < 1/3, let ε′ = ε/2, and consider an ε′-solution.
We model C¬ as the expression a1 < 1/2 using a C> and a Cζ gate. Call the output
of the Cζ gate z. We have x[z] = 1/2±ε′. If x[a1] < 1/2−ε, then x[a1] < x[z]−ε′ and
thus the output of the comparison gate is 1± ε′ = 1± ε. Likewise for x[a1] > 1/2 + ε.
We model C∨ as (a1 > 1/2)+(a2 > 1/2) > 1/2. If one of x[a1] or x[a2] is > 1/2+ε,
then like above, the respective inner C> gate will return 1± ε′ and thus the output
of the C+ gate is 1± 2ε′ > 1/2 + ε′ and the outer C> gate returns 1± ε′ = 1± ε. If
x[a1], x[a2] < 1/2 − ε, then both inner C> gates return 0 ± ε′, C+ returns a value
≤ 2ε′ < 1/2− ε′, and the final C> gate returns 0± ε′ = 0± ε.
Note that Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2009) previously suggested
that one could simulate Boolean gates using arithmetic gates, expressing x∨y as [x+y]
and ¬x as 1−x. However, they also noted that this would lead to various complications
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regarding accuracy (specifically, we note that such gates would accumulate errors
when several of them are put in a row). This is why, as a matter of convenience,
Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2009) use dedicated Boolean gadgets that
do not accumulate errors. In Lemma 1, we show how the Boolean gates can be
represented by arithmetic and comparison gates without error accumulation.11
The lemma immediately implies:
Corollary 1. The problems ε-GCircuitSB, ε-GCircuit, and ε-GCircuitNB are
all PPAD-complete for ε≪ 1:
Proof. We have:
ε/2-GCircuitNB ≥P ε-GCircuitSB ≥P ε-GCircuit ≥P ε-GCircuitNB
where “≥P” stands for polynomial-time reducibility. The first relation is by Lemma 1
and the others are trivial.
It is well-known that ε-GCircuit is in PPAD for all ε > 0. Thus, all of the
problems are in PPAD for all ε > 0. For PPAD-hardness for ε≪ 1, it is enough to
show that ε-GCircuitSB or ε-GCircuit are PPAD-hard for ε≪ 1. This follows via
Rubinstein’s (2018) hardness proof for ε-GCircuit. We defer a discussion of this proof
to Section 5, where we show that the proof is not affected by an implicit monotonicity
assumption and further applies to ε-GCircuitSB without modification.
Corollary 1 is useful because it implies that, when performing reductions from
generalized circuits, there is no need to provide a reduction for the Boolean gates. In
particular, via Lemma 1, all reductions from ε-GCircuit to other problems in prior
work also provide a reduction from ε-GCircuitSB.
5 Eliminating Issues With Non-Monotonicity in Prior Work
To the best of our knowledge, monotonicity has not been discussed in any piece of
prior work on generalized circuits. This raises the question whether or not it has
been carefully considered in the past. As explained in the previous section, mere
reductions from ε-GCircuit to other problems automatically provide reductions
from ε-GCircuitSB and will therefore not be affected. We thus take a close look
at those pieces of work where hardness of the ε-GCircuit problem itself and its
variants is established. Specifically, we discuss the three foundational papers on
11It should be noted that the Boolean game gadgets in Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou
(2009) satisfy a monotonic definition of the Boolean gates that is of intermediate strength between
ε-GCircuit and ε-GCircuitSB. For the OR game gadget, for example, we have that x[a1] + x[a2] >
1/2 + ε ⇒ x[v] = 1 and x[a1] + x[a2] < 1/2 − ε ⇒ x[v] = 0. This is not quite enough for a strong
ε-solution, but it is a monotonic property by itself. We discuss another such intermediate definition
of Boolean gates in Appendix C.
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generalized circuits: Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2009), Chen, Deng
and Teng (2009), and Rubinstein (2018). We show that the first of these papers is
not affected by non-monotonicity while in contrast, non-monotonicity does create
subtle technical issues in the latter two. We then show how replacing ε-GCircuit by
ε-GCircuitSB eliminates these issues. ε-GCircuitSB serves as a drop-in replacement
for ε-GCircuit, allowing us to keep all unaffected arguments the same.
We would like to stress that the purpose of our discussion is not to diminish the
contributions of these seminal papers. Rather, we find it instructive to demonstrate
what problems non-monotonicity can create by using the proofs in the three seminal
papers as examples, rather than inventing examples ourselves. Note that the issues in
prior work that we point out are of a mere technical nature and could be circumvented
by careful argumentation. We present a way how this could be done without relying
on ε-GCircuitSB in Appendix B. However, as we will see, ε-GCircuitSB provides a
particularly clean and conceptually simple solution to these problems. We will now
go through the proof steps in the three papers one by one. We will label the issues
#1–#5, to refer back to them in the appendix.
5.1 Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2009)
Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2009) were the first to prove PPAD-hardness
for the problem of finding an approximate Nash equilibrium, for an exponentially
small ε. The proof is by reduction from a variant of the Brouwer fixed-point problem
using a collection of game gadgets. These game gadgets correspond to a variant of
ε-GCircuit where the Boolean gates are defined via exact rather than approximately
Boolean values. For example, the output of the NOT gate is 1 if the input is 0, 0
if the input is 1, and unrestricted otherwise. The comparison gate also yields an
exact Boolean value rather than an approximately Boolean one. In contrast to the
(nowadays more standard) definition of generalized circuits we have presented in
Section 2, their variant of ε-GCircuit satisfies monotonicity. Thus, this paper is not
affected.
5.2 Chen, Deng and Teng (2009)
Chen, Deng and Teng (2009) proved PPAD-hardness of finding an approximate Nash
equilibrium in a two-player game for polynomially small ε. En-route to this result,
the authors provide the first explicit definition of the generalized circuit concept.
In this early variant, values of nodes are truncated to [0, 1/K] rather than [0, 1],
where K is the number of nodes of the circuit. Note that ε has to decrease at least
linearly in K, otherwise the error term ε would eventually become larger than the
range of the solution and the problem would become trivial. We call this variant
of the problem ε-GCircuitC to distinguish it from Rubinstein’s, nowadays more
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standard, variant. It is easy to see that ε-GCircuit is computationally equivalent to
ε/K-GCircuitC via scaling. Like Chen, Deng and Teng, we write Poly
c
-GCircuitC
for K−c-GCircuitC.
The hardness proof in Chen, Deng and Teng (2009) proceeds in three steps. (1)
The authors establish hardness of a variant of the Brouwer approximate fixed-point
problem. (2) They reduce this problem to Poly3-GCircuitC. (3) They reduce
Poly
3
-GCircuitC to the problem of finding an n
−12-approximate Nash equilibrium
in a two-player game, where n is the number of actions. The last step is carried out
using a collection of two-player game gadgets. Two additional reductions establish
that the exponents do not actually matter for the complexity of the problems.
A part that demands some scrutiny is step 2, where Brouwer is reduced to
Poly
3
-GCircuitC. Fortunately, detailed examination of the proof shows that no
implicit monotonicity assumption is made. This is because a single ε (namely exactly
ε = K−3) is considered over the whole course of the proof. The same is true for the
description of the game gadgets (step 3).
A place that does suffer from an implicit monotonicity assumption is the “padding
theorem” (Chen, Deng and Teng, 2009, Theorem 5.7), where the authors show
that the hardness of the Polyc-GCircuitC problem does not increase if we in-
crease c, as long as c ≥ 3. The proof is by reduction from Poly2b+1-GCircuitC to
Poly
3
-GCircuitC, for any integer b > 1. However, since we do not have monotonic-
ity, this only implies the statement for odd integer values of c. Poly4-GCircuitC,
for example, might still be a harder problem. Further, and again due to the lack of
monotonicity, we only receive a statement for the ε-GCircuitC problem where ε is
exactly of form ε = n−c for some c. We do not receive any statement for arbitrary
polynomials like 2n−3 + n−2. We call this issue #1.
To resolve this issue, we can define an ε-GCircuitSB analog to Chen, Deng
and Teng’s (2009) version of generalized circuits. To do this, we replace in Table 2
truncation to [0, 1] by truncation to [0, 1/K] and for the Boolean gates, we replace
the constant 1/2 by 1/(2K). We then consider the problem K−c-GCircuit′C where
c ≥ 1 is a constant. Note that, like before, ε has to decrease in K at least linearly.
When applied to this variant of the generalized circuit concept, the proof in the paper
yields:
Proposition 3 (Chen, Deng and Teng (2009), Theorem 5.7 for ε-GCircuitSB). For
any c ≥ 3, K−c-GCircuit′C ≤P K−3-GCircuit′C.
Proof. Since we now have monotonicity, it is enough to show the statement for every
c of form c = 2b+ 1 where b > 0 is an integer. To this end, let C be a generalized
circuit with K ≥ 2 nodes and let ε = K−c. The proof of Theorem 5.7 in Chen, Deng
and Teng (2009) constructs a new circuit with K ′ := Kb = 1/K ·K1−b nodes such
that for ε′ := εK1−b, any strong ε′-solution for the new circuit gives rise to a strong
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ε-solution for the original circuit via scaling by K1−b. And ε′ = K ′−3.
5.3 Rubinstein (2018)
Rubinstein (2018) proved PPAD-hardness for the problem of finding an ε-approximate
Nash equilibrium for a sufficiently small constant ε.12 The proof proceeds in four
steps. (1) The author establishes hardness of a new class of instances of the Brouwer
problem with constant ε. (2) He reduces this problem to ε-GCircuit for a certain
constant ε. (3) The author shows, using an additional black-box reduction, that
ε-GCircuit is still hard for some ε when we limit the fan-out13 of each gate to 2. (4)
The author employs the game gadgets from Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou
(2009) to reduce this problem to the problem of finding an approximate Nash equilib-
rium in a degree-3 graphical game. Based on the considerations at the start of this
sub-section, we should now take a closer look at steps 2-4.
The main hardness proof for ε-GCircuit (step 2) is a reduction from the problem
of finding an ε1/4-approximate fixed point of a certain function to ε-GCircuit, for
any sufficiently small ε, where the constructed ε-GCircuit instance depends on
ε. Detailed examination of the proof shows that none of the arguments implicitly
assume monotonicity. As the construction can be performed for arbitrarily small ε,
this indeed shows hardness of ε-GCircuit for any sufficiently small ε (and not just
for one specific ε, which is not a priori clear when monotonicity is not given).
The lack of monotonicity does lead to several problems in step 3, a black-box
reduction from any given generalized circuit to a circuit with fan-out 2 (Rubinstein,
2018, page 941). In this reduction, the outputs of each comparison or Boolean gate
with a fan-out greater than 2 are distributed using binary trees of double negation
gates. The outputs of arithmetic gates, in contrast, are first transformed into a
unary bit representation, then the resulting Boolean values are distributed using the
aforementioned trees of double negation gates, and finally each copy is converted
back into its numeric form. This distribution subroutine has maximum fan-out 2 and
guarantees that each of its outputs is equal to its input with an error of ±ε in any
ε2-solution. One thus has to reduce the allowed error to ε′ ∈ Θ(ε2).14
There are three problems with this reduction, all of which arise from non-
monotonicity at Boolean gates and all of which can lead to a situation where some
12To clarify the relationship between the three papers: the proof in Rubinstein (2018) is for
the sub-class of polymatrix degree-3 graphical games, but does not extend to two-player games.
It is therefore an unambiguous improvement upon the main result in Daskalakis, Goldberg and
Papadimitriou (2009), who considered the same class of games and exponentially small ε, but not
upon Chen, Deng and Teng (2009), who considered two-player games. In two-player games, the
problem is likely not PPAD-hard for constant ε (Rubinstein, 2018).
13The fan-out of a gate g is the number of gates g′ such that the output node of g is an input
node of g′.
14Note that we have interchanged ε′ and ε compared to Rubinstein’s (2018) formulation of the
theorem, notation-wise, to ensure consistency of notation within the present paper.
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ε′-solution to the reduced circuit is not an ε-solution to the original circuit. We
provide detailed examples for this in Appendix A. For the first issue, consider a
Boolean gate that already has fan-out ≤ 2. Since no changes are made to such gates
and we do not have monotonicity, the ε′-solution to the reduced circuit may fail to
be an ε-solution for the original circuit (call this issue #2). Next, there may be
arithmetic gates with fan-out > 2 whose outputs feed into Boolean gates. Here, the
distribution subroutine introduces an additional error, which may turn values from
approximately-Boolean to not-approximately-Boolean and may thus not correctly
copy these values (issue #3). Finally, there may be Boolean gates with fan-out > 2
that feed into arithmetic gates. For these gates, the fact that we use double negation
gates to distribute the outputs creates additional degrees of freedom in the reduced
circuit when the inputs to Boolean gates are not approximately Boolean and thus
their outputs are arbitrary (issue #4).
When we replace ε-GCircuit by ε-GCircuitSB, issue #2 is immediately resolved
because ε-GCircuitSB has monotonicity. To eliminate issues #3 and #4, the fact
that we use ε-GCircuitSB allows us to make a modification to Rubinstein’s original
proof to obtain the following lemma:
Proposition 4 (Rubinstein’s (2018) fan-out 2 reduction for ε-GCircuitSB). For
any ε≪ 1, there is an ε′ ∈ Θ(ε2) such that there is a polynomial-time reduction from
ε-GCircuitSB to the restriction of ε′-GCircuitSB to maximum fan-out 2.
Proof. Let ε¯ = ε/3. Assume that ε ≪ 1 in a way to be made precise below. We
perform the construction in Rubinstein (2018, Theorem 1.6) with respect to ε¯ where
we make the following modification: instead of differentiating between the outputs of
Boolean/comparison vs. arithmetic gates, we always apply the distribution subroutine
to the output of any gate with fan-out > 2. Recall that this subroutine has one input
and any number of outputs and ensures that for a certain ε′ ∈ Θ(ε¯2) = Θ(ε2), in an
ε′-solution, each output equals the input up to an error of ±ε¯. It is easy to see that
the distribution subroutine itself is not affected by any of the issues related to the
fan-out 2 reduction. Assume that ε′ ≤ ε¯.
Let C be the original circuit, C ′ the reduced circuit, and x′ a strong ε′-solution to
C ′. We show that the restriction of x′ to nodes in C is a strong ε-solution for C. Let g
be a gate with inputs a1 and a2 (if any). Assume WLOG that distribution is applied
to each of the inputs to g and let a′i be the output of the respective distribution
subroutine that is the new input to g in C ′. Let v be the output of g in C and C ′. We
have x′[ai] = x
′[a′i]± ε¯ by the distribution subroutine. We perform case distinction
over the type of g.
• If g is an arithmetic gate, then for a sufficiently small ε′ ∈ Θ(ε2) it follows from
Lipschitz continuity that x is an ε¯-solution, and thus a strong ε-solution at g,
just like in Rubinstein (2018).
14
• If g is a comparison gate, assume WLOG that x[a1] < x[a2] − ε, i.e., x[a1] <
x[a2]− 3ε¯. By the distribution subroutine, x′[a′1] < x′[a′2]− ε¯ ≤ x′[a′2]− ε′ and
thus, since x′ is a strong ε′-solution, x′[v] ≥ 1− ε′ ≥ 1− ε as required.
• If g is a Boolean gate, consider any input ai to g. If x′[ai] < 1/2 − ε, then
x′[a′i] < 1/2− ε+ ε¯ ≤ 1/2− ε′. Thus, if any input to g is approximately Boolean
false w.r.t. ε in C, then it is approximately Boolean false w.r.t. ε′ in C ′, and
likewise for true. Thus, if we require, based on the constraints, that x′[v] ≤ ε
in a strong ε-solution of C, we require x′[v] ≤ ε′ in a strong ε′-solution of C ′.
And the latter implies the former. Likewise for x′[v] ≥ 1− ε.
Observe how the above proof eliminates issues #3 and #4 compared to Rubinstein’s
original proof. Issue #3 is eliminated in the last step (Boolean gates) and this
crucially depends on the fact that we consider ε-GCircuitSB instead of ε-GCircuit:
by monotonicity, we can choose ε′ sufficiently small to compensate for the additional
error in the distribution subroutine. Issue #4 is eliminated because we use the
distribution subroutine, which does not create additional degrees of freedom, for all
gates.
The proposition together with Corollary 1 immediately yields:
Corollary 2. For each of the problems ε-GCircuitSB, ε-GCircuit, and ε-GCircuitNB,
the restriction to maximum fan-out 2 is PPAD-complete for ε≪ 1.
Proof. For ε-GCircuitSB, this follows from hardness of ε-GCircuitSB and Proposi-
tion 4. For ε-GCircuitNB, we observe that the reduction in Lemma 1 preserves the
fan-out 2 property. For ε-GCircuit, it now follows trivially.
Note that the lack of monotonicity introduces another subtle technical issue in
Rubinstein (2018), specifically in the reduction from ε-GCircuit to the problem of
finding an approximate Nash equilibrium (step 4 in the outline of the proof above).
Rubinstein uses the same game gadgets as Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou
(2009). However, for the Boolean game gadgets in that paper, we only know at this
point that they work with exact Boolean values 0 and 1 in both the input and output,
not necessarily approximately Boolean ones (see Section 5.1 above). And the former
does not imply the latter because we do not have monotonicity. A priori, these
gadgets might rely on receiving only values exactly 0 or 1 as their inputs (call this
issue #5). Fortunately, this issue is eliminated immediately using Lemma 1: since
the Boolean gates are redundant, it is not necessary to provide a reduction for them
in the first place.15
15The way how we eliminated issue #5 may not feel satisfying to some readers because the
graphical games that the Boolean gates are ultimately reduced to (via Lemma 1 and the game gadgets
for the other gates) will be quite complicated. For those cases where a more direct representation
is desired, we present a third PPAD-complete and monotonic variant of the ε-GCircuit problem,
called ε-GCircuitβ , that allows for this. The parameter β needs to be appropriately specified. See
15
Remark 3 (Exact Boolean Gates). For Rubinstein (2018), there is another solution to
the problems with non-monotonicity: rather than using ε-GCircuitSB, adopt the
definition of generalized circuits from Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2009),
where only exact Boolean values are mapped to each other (see Section 5.1), and
show hardness of this variant. For the case of graphical games, the game gadgets from
Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2009) provide a reduction from this variant
with exact Boolean values. In many other applications, however, such a reduction
is not possible. For example, any approximate fixed point problem inherently has ε
errors in every dimension, so we cannot ever expect to receive values exactly equal
to 0 or 1. The two-player game gadgets in Chen, Deng and Teng (2009) and the
market gadgets in Othman, Papadimitriou and Rubinstein (2016) also have this
inherent limitation. Note that exact Boolean gates could be represented using a
variant of Lemma 1 only once we have access to a comparison gate that produces an
exact Boolean output value, and such a gate does not seem to be attainable for the
previously-mentioned applications. Thus, using exact Boolean values would greatly
diminish the applicability of the generalized circuits framework.
6 Conclusion
Generalized circuits are a vital tool for reasoning about the computational complexity
of equilibrium approximation problems. In this paper, we have revealed a conceptual
issue in the generalized circuits framework, namely that it lacks monotonicity of its
approximate solution concept. We have shown that this creates subtle technical issues,
including in prior work. To overcome these issues, we have shown that the Boolean
gate types in these circuits are redundant features and that stronger Boolean gates
can be defined based on the other (arithmetic and comparison) gates. We have shown
that the resulting (equivalent) ε-GCircuitSB problem satisfies monotonicity, serves
as a drop-in replacement in prior work, and then eliminates the mentioned issues at a
conceptual level. We have established monotonicity as a fundamental desideratum
for any approximate solution concept.
Our results have implications for two potential future lines of research. First, future
studies of generalized circuits (for example, hardness proofs for sub-classes of circuits)
can consider either the ε-GCircuitSB problem or the ε-GCircuitNB problem, i.e.,
ignore Boolean gates altogether. Both of these variants satisfy monotonicity, which
makes for a much more natural way of reasoning and avoids the kinds of technical
pitfalls we have discussed. This may lead to new insights about computational
complexity in generalized circuits. One such area of research are “support finding”
Appendix C. Note that our proof in Appendix C implies that the Boolean game gadgets in do actually
satisfy the constraints for ε-GCircuit, even though this is not shown in the paper. ε-GCircuit
is, however, not monotonic and the gadgets do not satisfy the stronger Boolean constraints in
ε-GCircuitSB.
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problems, where we do not ask for numeric values, but only for a coarse discrete
description of a solution. In our own recent work (Schuldenzucker, Seuken and
Battiston, 2019, Section 5), we have studied one such PPAD-complete problem to
prove hardness in the context of financial networks.
Another example where ε-GCircuitSB could be useful is a conjecture by Babichenko,
Papadimitriou and Rubinstein (2016) that the following problem, termed (ε, δ)-GCircuit,
is already PPAD-complete for ε, δ ≪ 1: given a generalized circuit, find an assign-
ment where the constraints for an ε-solution hold at least at a fraction of 1 − δ
of the gates. This would settle various open questions regarding the Nash equilib-
rium search problem. Given the benefits of monotonicity illustrated in this paper
and towards a proof of the conjecture, it might be useful to instead consider the
(ε, δ)-GCircuitSB problem. Note that (ε, δ)-GCircuitSB is monotonic in both pa-
rameters and (ε, δ)-GCircuitSB ≤P (ε/2,Θ(δ))-GCircuitNB by Lemma 1.
The second strand of future research concerns reductions from generalized circuits
to other problems to show PPAD-hardness of these problems. The redundancy of
Boolean gates implies that no reduction needs to be provided for them, which will
hopefully simplify these kinds of proofs in the future. Since the reduction now happens
between two monotonic problems, their connection may further become more natural
and allow for a more detailed study of common features.
Appendix
A Examples for Issues #2–#4 in the Fan-Out 2 Reduction
in Rubinstein (2018)
We present examples for issue #2–#4.
Issue #2 For issue #2, an example is given by our very first counterexample to
monotonicity in Section 3.
Issue #3 For issue #3, assume that v is the output of some arithmetic gate, let
g = C¬ with input v, and assume that v is input to at least two other gates so
that its value needs to be distributed. Call this original circuit C and let C ′ be the
circuit where a distribution subroutine is inserted after v. Let v′ be an output of the
distribution subroutine and the new input to g in C ′. Let w be the output of g in
C and C ′. Assume that there exists an ε′-solution x′ to C ′ such that x′[v] ≥ 1− ε′,
x′[v′] ∈ (ε′, 1 − ε′), and x′[w] = 0.5. The distribution subroutine does not prevent
this, no matter what ε and ε’, and it is easy to construct C such that this actually
happens. In C, we have for the input of g that x′[v] ≥ 1 − ε′ ≥ 1 − ε, but for the
output x[w] = 0.5. So x′ is not an ε-solution for C. Note that this counterexample
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does not depend on the fact that ε 6= ε′.
Issue #4 For issue #4, consider a generalized circuit C corresponding to the
following definitions (where “=” assigns an output node to a gate):
z = 0.3
b = (a < z)
c = 1/2 · b
d = 1/3 · b
e = 1/4 · b
Note that node a is left unconstrained. We imagine that nodes a–e are part of a larger
circuit. Node b has fan-out 3 > 2, so Rubinstein’s fan-out 2 reduction would attach a
tree of double negation subroutines. The double negation subroutine is simply a chain
of two negation gates connected by a new node. This turns an approximate true
into an approximate true and an approximate false into an approximate false,
but can return any value if its input is not approximately Boolean. The fan-out 2
reduction would now replace the definitions of nodes c–e by the following to create a
new reduced circuit C ′:
b1 = ¬¬b
b2 = ¬¬b
b1,1 = ¬¬b1
b1,2 = ¬¬b1
b2,1 = ¬¬b2
c = 1/2 · b1,1
d = 1/3 · b1,2
e = 1/4 · b2,2
We now present a solution solution x′ to C ′ that does not give rise to a solution
to C. We will show that c and d can take on a combination of values in C ′ that is
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not possible in C. Let ε = 0.01. Define x′ as follows:
x′[a] := x′[z] := 0.3
x′[b] := 0.5
x′[b1] := 0.8
x′[b2] := 0.2
x′[b1,1] := x
′[b1] = 0.8
x′[b1,2] := x
′[b1] = 0.8
x′[b2,1] := x
′[b2] = 0.2
x′[c] := 1/2 · x′[b1,1] = 1/2 · 0.8 = 0.4
x′[d] := 1/3 · x′[b1,2] = 1/3 · 0.8 = 0.26¯
x′[e] := 1/4 · x′[b2,1] = 1/4 · 0.2 = 0.05
For the interior nodes of the double negation subroutines, if the input node to the
subroutine is v, set the interior node to value 1− x′[v]. This is always possible.
x′ is an ε-solution for C ′. Note that, by choice of x′[a], any value is allowed for
x′[b]. We chose a value that is not approximately Boolean w.r.t. ε. That is why the
following double negation subroutines can each output an arbitrary value at x′[b1]
and x′[b2]. The key to our counterexample is that these values need not be the same.
The other gates then copy and transform the values normally.
x′ does not become an ε-solution for C if we restrict it to nodes in C. That is
because, if x is any ε-solution to C, then x[c]− x[e] = 1/2 · x[b]± ε− 1/4 · x[b]± ε =
1/4 · x[b]± 2ε. However, we have x′[c]− x′[e] = 0.35 > 0.145 = 1/4 · x′[b] + 2ε.
Note further that i) the above value of x′[c]− x′[e] would not be allowed in C ′ for
any value of x′[b] and ii) we cannot guarantee the ε-solution property by increasing ε
by any constant factor.
B Minimal Modifications to Circumvent the Issues in Prior
Work
We present a minimal set of modifications to Rubinstein (2018) and Chen, Deng and
Teng (2009) that allow us to keep the current definition of the ε-GCircuit problem
and that eliminate the problems discussed above. Our modifications are based on
careful examination of the details of the involved proofs.
To show that issue 1–5 in Section 5 are not critical for the results of the respective
papers, we exploit a common feature of the generalized circuit constructions from
prior work, namely that Boolean gates do not occur at arbitrary positions. Their
inputs always come from gates that are meant to yield approximately Boolean values,
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namely other Boolean gates and the comparison gate. Further, the output of each gate
will be interpreted either as a Boolean value (by Boolean gates) or as a non-Boolean
value (by other gates), but not both at the same time. Such circuits formally still do
not satisfy monotonicity, but we can perform an additional normalization step after
which they “essentially” do.
Lemma 2 (Boolean-regular circuit). If g and g′ are gates in a circuit such that the
output of g is an input to g′, then g is called a predecessor of g′ and g′ is called a
successor of g. We call a generalized circuit Boolean-regular if the following two
conditions hold:
1. Any predecessor of any Boolean gate is either a Boolean gate itself or a compar-
ison gate.
2. For any gate, if one of its successors is a Boolean gate, then all of its successors
are Boolean gates.
If C is Boolean-regular, then for any ε and any ε-solution x for C, we can compute
in polynomial time an assignment x′ such that for any ε′ ≥ ε, x′ is an ε′-solution for
C. We call an x′ resulting from this procedure normalized.
Proof. Given x, define x′ as follows. If v is not an input to any Boolean gate, then
x′[v] = x[v]. If v is an input to a Boolean gate, then
x′[v] =


0 if x[v] ≤ ε
1/2 if x[v] ∈ (ε, 1− ε)
1 if x[v] ≥ 1− ε.
Let now ε′ ≥ ε. We show that x′ is an ε′-solution. Let g be any gate with inputs a1
and a2 (if any) and output v. We distinguish three cases.
• If g is an arithmetic gate, then neither its output (by condition 1) nor any of
its inputs (by condition 2) are input to any Boolean gate. Thus, x′ = x at
these nodes. Since the constraints of arithmetic gates are monotonic in ε, the
constraint at g is still satisfied for ε′.
• If g is a Boolean gate, then its constraints only distinguish the intervals [0, ε′],
(ε′, 1 − ε′), and [1 − ε′, 1]. For each input ai of g, by definition of x′ it does
not depend on ε′ to which of these three intervals x′[ai] belongs. Therefore, we
require x′[v] = 0± ε′ in an ε′-solution iff we require x[v] = 0± ε in an ε-solution.
And the latter implies the former, both if v is the input to another Boolean
gate and if not. Likewise for x′[v] = 1± ε′.
• If g is a comparison gate, by condition 2 its inputs are not also input to any
Boolean gate and thus x′[ai] = x[ai] for i = 1, 2. Now we apply the same
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argument as for the outputs of Boolean gates to see that the constraint is still
satisfied.
Detailed examination of the proofs in the aforementioned two pieces of prior work
shows that almost all construction steps lead to a Boolean-regular circuit. The only
exception we are aware of is the ExtractBits subroutine in Chen, Deng and Teng
(2009), where the output of a C< gate is fed into both Boolean gates (which simulate
a given Boolean circuit) and a C×ζ gate. Here, Boolean regularity can be easily
restored by a minor modification to the construction.16
Towards issue #1 in Chen, Deng and Teng (2009), we can now WLOG consider
the restriction of the ε-GCircuitC problem where only Boolean-regular circuits are
allowed as input and only normalized ε-solutions are allowed as output. Since this
problem has monotonicity by definition of a normalized solution and the reduction in
the proof of Theorem 5.7 in Chen, Deng and Teng (2009) preserves Boolean-regularity,
issue #1 is eliminated.
Towards issue #2 and #3 in Rubinstein (2018), we notice that the fan-out 2
reduction preserves Boolean-regularity.17 The restriction of ε-GCircuit to Boolean-
regular circuits and normalized solutions then resolves issues #2 (because it has
monotonicity) and #3 (because the described situation does not occur by Boolean-
regularity).
To see that issue #4 does not invalidate hardness of ε-GCircuit restricted to
fan-out 2, we again perform detailed examination of the arguments that are used in
the main hardness proof. Issue #4 arises because the values at outputs of Boolean
gates with non-Boolean input are allowed to be arbitrary and different in the reduced
instance while they are arbitrary, but must be equal in the original instance (see our
example in Appendix A). However, such a property is never exploited in the proof
of hardness of the ε-GCircuit problem. Instead, whenever the output of a Boolean
gate can be arbitrary, it is accounted for as an independent ±1 error. Thus, if we
apply the fan-out 2 reduction to the hard ε-GCircuit instance, a solution to the
reduced circuit is not necessarily a solution to the original circuit, but it is still a
solution to the original hard Brouwer instance. And thus, the restriction to fan-out
2 is still hard.
Finally, to eliminate issue #5, one can study the Boolean game gadgets from
Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2009) to see that they in fact do satisfy the
constraints for approximately Boolean values even though this is not stated explicitly
in the paper. The proof is like in Proposition 6 in Appendix C, where we show it for
ε-GCircuitβ.
16One way to restore Boolean-regularity is to insert a double negation in front of the C×ζ gate.
This will, of course, create additional degrees of freedom like in issue #4 (see Section 5). These are
not a problem in this case for the same reason why issue #4, discussed below, is not critical.
17Here we assume WLOG that the trees of double negations are constructed in such a way that
all outputs of the tree are all at the same level.
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C A More Direct Representation of Boolean Gates
The way how we eliminated issue #5 may not feel very satisfying. When we perform
reduction from ε-GCircuitSB to other problems via Lemma 1, the representation of
the Boolean gates will be rather indirect. Each Boolean gate is first represented by
comparison gates, arithmetic gates, and using De Morgan’s laws. Then these gates are
represented as (say) game gadgets. In some situations, a more direct representation
of Boolean gates may be desirable. This could be useful, for example, if one seeks to
further modify the generalized circuit concept in a way incompatible with Lemma 1.
In this section, we present a way how such a direct representation of monotonic
Boolean gates can be achieved. For our discussion, we focus on the reduction from
generalized circuits to graphical games via the game gadgets in Daskalakis, Goldberg
and Papadimitriou (2009). These are the same gadgets used in Rubinstein (2018). We
will show that these game gadgets do not provide a reduction from ε-GCircuitSB.
To overcome this, we will modify our solution concept again, which will lead to a
new family of PPAD-complete search problems ε-GCircuitβ, where β ∈ (0, 1/2)
is a parameter. We then show that the game gadgets provide a reduction from
ε-GCircuitβ if β is not too small. A drawback of this variant is that the β parameter
needs to be appropriately chosen for the individual application at hand.
Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2009) and Rubinstein (2018) study
binary graphical games in ε-approximately well supported Nash equilibrium (ε-WSNE
for short). This means that players only have two actions, called 0 and 1, and if
both strategies are played with positive probability in equilibrium, then the expected
utilities from both pure actions must be ε-close to each other.18 A mixed-strategy
equilibrium of a binary game can be encoded by assigning to each player i the
probability p[i] with which player i plays action 1. Game gadgets are sub-games
that in equilibrium enforce certain relationships, corresponding to the gates of a
generalized circuit, on the p[i] values of certain players.
The negation game gadget G¬ (Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou, 2009,
Lemma 5.5) satisfies the constraints for a strong ε-solution, but the other two, G∧
and G∨, do not. We consider G∧ in the following. The proof for G∨ is analogous. Let
a and b be two input players and let v be an output player. The utility function of
player v in G∧ is defined as follows:
uv =


1/2 if v plays 0
1 if v plays 1 ∧ a plays 1 ∧ b plays 1
0 if v plays 1 ∧ (a plays 0 ∨ b plays 0)
18Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2009) prove that ε-WSNE and regular ε-approximate
Nash equilibrium (where no deviation to any other mixed strategy can improve expected utility by
more than ε) are equivalent if one scales ε appropriately.
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If player v plays a pure strategy and the other players play mixed strategies according
to p, the expected utility of v is
E [uv] =


1/2 if v plays 0
p[a]p[b] if v plays 1.
This does not provide a reduction from ε-GCircuitSB, no matter how much we
reduce ε in the transition from generalized circuits to games:
Proposition 5. There exists an ε > 0 such that there is no ε′ > 0 such that,
whenever G∧ occurs as part of a larger game and p is an ε′-WSNE, x := p satisfies
the constraints for C∧ for a strong ε-solution.
Proof. Consider an ε for which such an ε′ does exist. Let p[a] = p[b] = 1/2+2ε. Then
Table 2 prescribes that p[v] ≥ 1− ε. To guarantee any statement of form “p[v] ≥ ...”
in an ε′-WSNE, we require
(
1
2
+ 2ε
)2
= p[a]p[b] = E [uv] (1, p−v) > E [uv] (0, p−v) = 1/2 + ε
′.
By simple algebra, this implies that
ε >
1
24
+
1
6
ε′ >
1
24
.
Therefore, for ε ≤ 124 , we can always choose p[v] = 0 even though the constraints for
a strong ε-solution prescribe p[v] ≥ 1− ε. Thus, x := p is not a strong ε-solution.
The previous proposition shows that the game gadgets in Daskalakis, Goldberg
and Papadimitriou (2009) do not imply sufficiently strong constraints to imply a direct
representation of the Boolean gates in ε-GCircuitSB. However, we can make the
solution concept itself slightly weaker to accommodate these gadgets while preserving
monotonicity and hardness.
To do this, let β < 1/2 and ε < β, 1/2− β. Given a generalized circuit, we call
an assignment x an εβ-solution19 if it satisfies the constraints in Table 2 where we
replace ε by β in the preconditions of all Boolean gates. That is, for the Boolean
gates we have the constraints in Table 3. We call the corresponding search problem
ε-GCircuitβ.20
19We chose this notation to avoid confusion with the (unrelated) concept of an (ε, δ)-solution in
Babichenko, Papadimitriou and Rubinstein (2016), where a 1− δ fraction of constraints needs to be
satisfied up to precision ε.
20Our definition of ε-GCircuitβ is inspired by Othman, Papadimitriou and Rubinstein (2016),
where we however do not consider β = Θ(ε), but ε ≪ β. Note further that we do not use β in
the precondition of the comparison gate. This would make for an even weaker problem, but a too
weak one: Rubinstein’s (2018) hardness proof performs comparison with multiples of
√
ε and the
“brittleness” of the comparison gate needs to be significantly smaller than that.
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Table 3 Constraints for the Boolean gates in an εβ-solution. All other constraints
are the same as in a (strong) ε-solution.
Gate Type Short Constraint
OR C∨ x[a1] < 1/2− β and x[a2] < 1/2− β ⇒ x[v] ≤ ε
x[a1] > 1/2 + β or x[a2] > 1/2 + β ⇒ x[v] ≥ 1− ε
AND C∧ x[a1] < 1/2− β or x[a2] < 1/2− β ⇒ x[v] ≤ ε
x[a1] > 1/2 + β and x[a2] > 1/2 + β ⇒ x[v] ≥ 1− ε
NOT C¬ x[a1] < 1/2− β ⇒ x[v] ≥ 1− ε
x[a1] > 1/2 + β ⇒ x[v] ≤ ε
The two parameters ε and β take on different roles. Typically, β will be fixed to
an arbitrary, not necessarily small, constant, like 1/4. Then ε is chosen arbitrarily
small. It is easy to see that the solution concept is monotonic in both parameters and
that, for any fixed β and sufficiently small ε depending on β, any strong ε-solution is
an εβ-solution and any εβ-solution is an ε-solution. This immediately implies that
ε-GCircuitβ is PPAD-complete for any β < 1/2 and ε≪ 1 depending on β.
The Boolean game gadgets satisfy the constraints for an εβ-solution, and thus
define a reduction from ε-GCircuitβ , as long as β is not too small.
Proposition 6. Let 1/4 < β < 1/2 and let ε ≤ β − 1/4. Let o ∈ {∨,∧,¬} and
consider the binary graphical game Go from Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou
(2009, Lemma 5.5) with input players a and b (if any) and output player v. Then
any ε-WSNE p satisfies the constraint corresponding to the gate Co and x := p for an
εβ-solution.
Proof. We show the statement for o = ∧. The other operations are similar. Assume
that p[a] > 1/2 + β and p[b] > 1/2 + β. Then E[uv](1, x−v) = p[a]p[b] > (1/2 + β)
2 >
1/2+ ε = E[uv](0, x−v)+ ε, where the middle inequality is by choice of β and ε. Since
we are in an ε-WSNE, this implies p[v] = 1 and in particular p[v] ≥ 1− ε.
Vice versa, assume that p[a] < 1/2− β or p[b] < 1/2− β. Then E[uv](1, x−v) =
p[a]p[b] < 1/2 − β < 1/2 − ε = E[uv](0, x−v) − ε and thus x[v] = 0 ≤ ε by the
ε-WSNE.
By more careful analysis of the error terms in the previous proof, one can show
that the gadget still works for all β > (
√
2− 1)/4 ≈ 0.10 and ε≪ 1 (the threshold
for ε depending on β), but not for smaller β.
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5 Portfolio Compression in Financial
Networks: Incentives and Systemic Risk
I was just guessing at numbers and figures,
Pulling your puzzles apart.
Questions of science, science and progress,
Do not speak as loud as my heart.
Tell me you love me,
Come back and haunt me,
Oh and I rush to the start.
Running in circles, chasing our tails,
Coming back as we are.
Coldplay, The Scientist
The content of this chapter has previously appeared in:
“Portfolio Compression in Financial Networks: Incentives and Systemic Risk.”
Steffen Schuldenzucker and Sven Seuken. Working Paper, November 2019.
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Abstract
We study portfolio compression, a post-trade mechanism that eliminates
cycles in a ﬁnancial network. We study the incentives for banks to engage
in compression and its systemic eﬀects in terms of all banks’ equities. We
show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, compression may be socially and
individually detrimental and incentives may be misaligned with the social good.
We show that these eﬀects depends on the parameters of the ﬁnancial system
and the compression in a complex and non-monotonic way. We then present
suﬃcient conditions under which compression is incentivized for participating
banks or a Pareto improvement for all banks. More in detail, compression is
universally beneﬁcial when interbank payments are subject to high default costs,
when recovery rates are high, or when the participating banks’ balance sheets
are suﬃciently homogeneous. Furthermore, we show that banks only have an
incentive to reject a compression if there are feedback paths of links that are not
compressed. Our results contribute to a better understanding of the implications
of recent regulatory policy.
1 Introduction
The 2008 ﬁnancial crisis is widely regarded as the result of a shock on a complex,
opaque, unregulated network of dependencies among ﬁnancial institutions.1 In
normal times, connections to other institutions provide ﬁnancial actors with means to
secure funding and hedge risks. Since potential losses are distributed to many other
institutions, diversiﬁcation stabilizes the system as a whole. In the 2008 crisis, however,
it quickly became clear that this network could just as well amplify and spread losses
between markets and institutions. Like a disease, ﬁnancial distress traveled through
the network and “infected” institutions — an idea known as ﬁnancial contagion.
1For this paragraph, see the well-known speeches by then Executive Director of Financial Stability
at the Bank of England Andrew Haldane (2009) and then Vice Chair of the Federal Reserve Janet
Yellen (2013).
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Financial regulators realized that, in the process of creating the ﬁnancial network,
ﬁnancial institutions (just “banks” from now on) had not just taken on individual
risk, but also created systemic risk, which endangered the ﬁnancial system as a
whole. After the crisis, diﬀerent regulatory policies were put into place to reduce
the “excessive systemic risk arising from the complexity and interconnectedness that
characterize our ﬁnancial system” (Yellen, 2013). Many of these policies were aimed
directly at reducing interconnectedness. After all, reducing interconnectedness should
also limit the “channels” through which ﬁnancial contagion could spread.2 For some
ﬁnancial products, this was achieved using central clearing counterparties (CCPs):
central nodes that act as middlemen to all trades and serve as buﬀers in case one of
the participants in the trade is unable to pay its obligations.
For other products, portfolio compression was made mandatory. The idea is simple:
banks’ daily business activities have the side eﬀect of creating cycles of obligations
in the network, where (say) a bank A has an obligation to a bank B, which has an
obligation to a third bank C, which has an obligation back to bank A — all for the
same financial product with the same parameters. Removing these cycles reduces
interconnectedness without affecting any bank’s net position with respect to any
product. Portfolio compression is the process of doing just that. This paper studies
the effects of portfolio compression on systemic risk and the incentives for banks to
engage in it.
Portfolio compression (just compression from now on) originated in the private
sector and has only later been endorsed by regulators.3 Compression has several
immediate benefits for the participating banks: it reduces their exposure to other
banks, it reduces their operational costs to keep track of their claims and obligations,
and, perhaps most importantly, it reduces the sizes of their balance sheets and thus
the amount of capital they need to hold available.4
In practice, several financial service providers offer compression services.5 We
explain the process at the example of TriOptima’s service triReduce.6 First, par-
ticipating institutions submit the trades they would like to compress. Second, the
2Reducing interconnectedness has another important benefit, namely improving transparency. —
A less dense network is easier to analyze for regulatory bodies when the next crisis strikes. In fact,
many of the reforms after the crisis were geared towards only making the network of interconnections
visible to regulatory bodies. See Financial Stability Board (2017) for an overview of the new regulatory
measures for the OTC derivatives market, which is the main financial market relevant for the present
piece of work.
3EMIR regulations include an “obligation to have procedures to analyse the possibility to conduct
the exercise” of portfolio compression when counterparties have more than 500 contracts with each
other (European Securities and Markets Authority, 2017).
4Basel III regulations require banks to hold liquid assets proportional to their risk-weighted assets
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011). This creates an incentive to, other things equal,
keep assets and liabilities as low as possible.
5The most important ones are: TriOptima, LMRKTS, Markit, Catalyst, and SwapClear (D’Errico
and Roukny, 2019).
6See TriOptima, “triReduce Overview”, https://www.trioptima.com/resources/
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service provider combines the information submitted by all participants to construct
the network and calculates an unwind proposal, i.e., a collection of suggested contract
modiﬁcations and terminations that together constitute the compression. The unwind
proposal is sent to the banks. Crucially, the unwind proposal itself carries no legal
force. Instead, all involved banks need to agree to the proposal in a third step. Once
this has happened, the compression is implemented. In practice, banks generally seem
to agree to unwind proposals.7
Compression is used in markets for OTC8 derivatives where insuﬃcient standard-
ization prohibits the use of a CCP, speciﬁcally: interest rate swaps, currency swaps,
and credit default swaps. According to TriOptima, their service has removed over
USD 1.5 quadrillion in notional since its inception in 2003. Aldasoro and Ehlers
(2018) cite compression as one of the main reasons for the drop in size of the credit
default swap market after the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
At ﬁrst sight, one might think that compression is always (weakly) beneﬁcial for
all banks: compression reduces the liabilities of involved banks at least as much as
their assets (at fair value) and thus beneﬁts involved banks, and it has no eﬀect on
the balance sheets of the other banks. However, in this paper, we show that, in a
networked system, this simple local view of compression is incorrect, as it does not
capture systemic eﬀects.
We study compression in a static setting ex-post to a shock, considering the
following time line of events. Initially, all banks were solvent. Then compression was
performed. At some point, a shock hit the banks, which caused some of the banks
to default on their obligations and triggered a contagion process. We compare the
ﬁnal outcome of this process (modeled by the Rogers and Veraart (2013) clearing
model) to the outcome had compression not been performed. In our analysis, we
focus on two questions: ﬁrst, was compression economically eﬃcient in retrospect
in terms of banks’ equities? We consider both a social welfare as well as a Pareto
perspective. Second, had the involved banks known the shock upfront, should they
still have agreed to compression, i.e., was compression incentivized in retrospect?
By incentivized we mean that all banks involved in the compression would agree
to it in step three of the aforementioned compression process. We assume that banks
derive a utility from any given (compressed or uncompressed) network equal to their
7Further complications, which we not model in this paper, apply. The main reason for this is that
compression is also performed among products whose characteristics (such as maturity, coupons,
start and end dates) do not match exactly, but only approximately. This increases the amount of
compression that can be done, but it may necessitate compensation payments. These payments are
determined using a special market mechanism called a compression auction (Duffie, 2018). In this
paper, we abstract away from these complications by assuming that all contracts in the network have
the same characteristics. We further do not consider any exotic variants of compression, where one
may be allowed to both add and remove liabilities. That is, we only consider conservative compression
(D’Errico and Roukny, 2019) in this paper.
8Over-the-counter, i.e., traded directly between banks, rather than through an exchange. In this
work, we only consider OTC derivatives markets.
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equity and decide based on that. Note that in this paper, our goal is not to perform
an equilibrium analysis. We do not consider compressions actions that banks perform.
Rather, we assume that compressions are suggested by a central ﬁnancial service
provider that is not a bank.
For a given network, shocks, and compression, it is easy to answer the above
questions regarding economic eﬃciency and incentives algorithmically: simply evaluate
the clearing model on the uncompressed and the compressed network and compare
the two outcomes. However, we want to answer these questions at a more general
level: what determines whether or not compression will be eﬃcient or incentivized?
When are incentives misaligned with the social good? How do these eﬀects depend
on the structure of the ﬁnancial system?
Portfolio compression is systemically important, as evidenced by regulators’ at-
tention to it. However, while there is an extensive literature on netting in the context
of CCPs (for example, Duﬃe and Zhu, 2011; Duﬃe, Scheicher and Vuillemey, 2015;
Amini, Filipović and Minca, 2015; Cui et al., 2018), there has only been a surprisingly
small amount of work on compression (without a CCP). Where compression was
studied, authors mostly focused on algorithmic questions to achieve the optimal
compressed amount subject to risk tolerances (O’Kane, 2017; D’Errico and Roukny,
2019). The impact of compression was therefore measured in terms of eliminated
notional, rather than the consequences of a shock. Many researchers have studied
the eﬀect of diﬀerent aspects of network structure in general on systemic risk (e.g.,
Elliott, Golub and Jackson, 2014; Glasserman and Young, 2015; Acemoglu, Ozdaglar
and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015; Demange, 2016). However, these results can at best provide
a very broad estimate of what the speciﬁc changes to the network structure due
to compression may imply. We discuss this in Appendix A. Feinstein et al. (2017)
studied the sensitivity of the outcome of a crisis to changes in relative interbank
liabilities, where the total liabilities of each bank remain the same. Compression,
however, explicitly reduces the liabilities of each bank involved, which is why their
theory does not apply.
In a recent research note, we were, to the best of our knowledge, the ﬁrst to
present an example where portfolio compression could be detrimental in terms of
social welfare (Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston, 2018). The only other piece
of work we are aware of that deals with the eﬀects of compression on systemic risk
speciﬁcally is Veraart (2019). The author studied compression in much the same way
as we do and obtained suﬃcient conditions under which compression is beneﬁcial for
all banks. The author also showed that compression can have negative eﬀects both on
the banks involved in it and on other banks and this can depend on assets external
to the ﬁnancial network. These results can be viewed as special cases of some of the
results obtained in the present paper.
In the present paper we show that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, compression
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is not in general socially beneﬁcial in terms of banks’ equities. There are cases where
compression is socially detrimental or even hurts every bank in the system in a Pareto
sense. We further show that whether or not compression is socially beneﬁcial depends
on the parameters of the ﬁnancial system and on the compression in a complex and
non-monotonic way. The same applies to banks’ incentives to agree to compression.
Their incentives may further be misaligned with the social good (Section 3).
We then derive suﬃcient conditions under which these complications do not
apply, i.e., where compression is always a Pareto improvement with respect to banks’
equities. These conditions are local in the sense that they only depend on properties of
individual banks and banks’ assets in the uncompressed system, but do not require any
global network computation that depends on the particular compression in question.
We ﬁnd that compression is beneﬁcial when banks are well capitalized or when all
banks are involved in the compression to a certain degree. These conditions scale
with the default costs in the system: our results become stronger when defaulting
banks lose a higher share of their incoming payments due to frictions such as legal
costs or early settlement fees (Section 4).
From these “local” conditions, we then turn to the network structure itself. We
ﬁnd that whether or not the involved banks have an incentive to agree to compression
crucially depends on the presence of feedback paths, i.e., paths of liabilities that are not
involved in the compression and that lead from an involved bank to another involved
bank. If feedback paths do not exist and a normality condition is met, compression is
always incentivized. This provides a possible explanation why banks virtually always
agree to compression in practice while our results in Section 3 imply that this is a
complex strategic decision: banks may not be taking the possibility of feedback paths
into account (Section 5).
Finally, we turn to a high-level property of the ﬁnancial network structure, namely
homogeneity of the involved banks. We show that if a collection of asset and liability
measures and the compressed amount of liabilities are equal across all involved banks,
then compression is beneﬁcial for all (involved and non-involved) banks. A study
of an example network suggests a quantiﬁed version: the lower the default costs in
the system, the more homogeneity is required to make compression beneﬁcial for all
banks (Section 6).
With the present paper, we are among the ﬁrst to conduct a principled theoretical
study of the eﬀects of portfolio compression on systemic risk. We consider this paper a
ﬁrst step at the beginning of a larger program of research. Given that compression has
already found its way into regulatory policy, we believe that a thorough understanding
of compression is urgently needed. We discuss possible next steps in this direction in
Section 7.
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2 Preliminaries
We assume that we are given a ﬁnancial network ex-post to a shock. We then
perform network clearing in the compressed ﬁnancial network and in the network had
compression not been done and we compare the two outcomes by their eﬃciency and
incentives. We now formally deﬁne the three elements of this approach: our model of
(post-shock) ﬁnancial systems and clearing payments, our formalization of portfolio
compression, and our measure of utilities, eﬃciency, and incentives in a ﬁnancial
system.
2.1 Basic Notation
Throughout this paper, we employ the following notation. Matrices and vectors
always range over arbitrary ﬁnite sets of indices. That is, we do not implicitly assume
that vectors range over sets of form {1, ... , n}. Ordering of matrices and vectors is
always point-wise. That is, if N and M are sets and p, q ∈ RN×M are matrices, we
write p ≤ q iﬀ pij ≤ qij ∀i ∈ N, j ∈ M . We write [0, q] for the set of p such that
0 ≤ p ≤ q, i.e., 0 ≤ pij ≤ qij ∀i, j. Vectors are treated analogously. If A ⊆ N ×M , we
write pA for the restriction of p to pairs of indices in A, i.e., pA = (pij)(i,j)∈A. Vectors
are treated analogously. We use “∪” to denote concatenation of vectors and matrices,
respectively, with disjoint index sets. Thus, if A,B ⊆ N ×M , A ∩ B = ∅, p ⊆ RA,
q ⊆ RB, we write p ∪ q for the matrix with indices A ∪ B where (p ∪ q)ij = pij if
(i, j) ∈ A and (p ∪ q)ij = qij if (i, j) ∈ B.
2.2 Financial Systems and Clearing Payments
We use the clearing model from Rogers and Veraart (2013). In this sub-section, we
provide a brief description of this model.
Financial System. Let N be a set of banks. We assume that each bank i ∈ N
holds an amount of external assets ei ≥ 0. For any two banks i, j ∈ N , let lij ≥ 0
denote the amount that the writer i owes to the holder j of the contract (i.e., the
liability). We also call this number the notional of the contract, where a notional of
zero indicates the absence of a contract. If lij > 0, we also call j a creditor of i and i
a debtor of j. Assume that lii = 0∀i, i.e., no bank has a contract with itself. We do
not exclude the possibility that two banks are creditors of each other, i.e., lij , lji > 0.
Note that the collection of all notionals l = (lij)i,j∈N can be viewed as the adjacency
matrix of a weighted graph with nodes N and e = (ei)i∈N can be viewed as a vector
of node weights.
Following Rogers and Veraart (2013), we assume that we are further given two
default cost parameters α, β ∈ [0, 1]. If a bank is in default, it is only able to pay
to its creditors a share of α of its external assets and a share of β of its incoming
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payments from other banks. That is, a share of 1−α and 1− β, respectively, is lost.9
If we set α = β = 1 (no default costs), we receive the clearing model in Eisenberg
and Noe (2001).
A tuple X = (N, e, l, α, β) is called a ﬁnancial system.
Assets and Liabilities. Given such a ﬁnancial system X, the total liabilities of a
bank i are
li :=
∑
j∈N
lij
and the relative liability of i to j is
πij :=


lij
li
if li > 0
0 if li = 0.
Note that
∑
j πij = 1 unless li = 0.
The matrix of liabilities deﬁnes how much money every bank is supposed to pay
to its creditors. The amount of money that said bank will actually be able to pay
will be lower in case it defaults. We capture these amounts in a matrix of payments
pij ∈ [0, lij ]. We are ultimately looking for a payment matrix that is clearing in a
sense that will be deﬁned shortly.
Given p, the total assets ai(p) of a bank i at p consist of its external assets and
the incoming payments from other banks:
ai(p) := ei +
∑
j∈N
pji
If a bank’s assets are insuﬃcient to cover its liabilities, it is called in default. A
defaulting bank i has its assets reduced according to the factors α and β. That is, its
assets after default costs are:
a′i(p) := αei + β
∑
j∈N
pji
Clearing Payment Matrix. We call p clearing if it follows the following funda-
mental principles of bankruptcy law:
1. Banks that are not in default pay their liabilities in full.
9Default costs may originate from various sources, corresponding to different combinations of the
α and β parameters. For example, we can model a setting where the external assets are illiquid,
which leads to a price discount when they need to be sold quickly in case of default, by choosing
α < 1. Smaller α values model lower liquidity of the external assets. If the external assets describe
perfectly liquid “cash” holdings, we set α = 1. Similarly, interbank payments may be lossless (β = 1)
or they may be subject to time delays, legal costs, or early settlement costs (β < 1). It is easy to
extend the model to allow for per-bank α and β values or several asset classes with different default
cost levels. Our results easily generalize to these extensions with minor adjustments.
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2. Banks that are in default pay out all their assets to creditors, after default costs
have been subtracted.
3. By the principle of proportionality, the assets of defaulting banks are split up
among creditors in proportion to the respective liability.
We thus call p clearing if it is the ﬁxed point of the following function:
Ψ :[0, l]→ [0, l]
Ψij(p) :=


lij if ai(p) ≥ li
πija
′
i(p) if ai(p) < li
(1)
In other words, p is clearing iﬀ Ψ(p) = p. The following theorem shows that a
clearing matrix of payments always exists and is essentially unique (unique up to a
point-wise decrease in payments).10
Theorem (Rogers and Veraart (2013, Theorem 3.1)). For any ﬁnancial system
X = (N, e, l, α, β) there is a matrix p of payments such that i) p ∈ [0, l], ii) p = Ψ(p),
and iii) if p′ is another matrix with these properties, then p′ ≤ p point-wise.
We call p like in the theorem the maximal clearing payment matrix. While there
could be several clearing p, the point-wise maximal p is a canonical choice. Note
in particular that maximizing p also maximizes the assets of each individual bank.
Therefore, in this paper, we only consider the maximal clearing matrix of payments.
Remark 1 (Algorithms for Computing Clearing Payments). Two well-known algorithms
can be used to compute the maximal clearing payment matrix. The simplest one
is to consider the iteration sequence deﬁned by p0 := l and pn+1 := Ψ(pn). Since Ψ
is monotonic with respect to the point-wise ordering, this sequence converges from
above to the maximal clearing payment matrix.11 However, as soon as there is a
cycle of defaulting banks, the sequence does not converge in ﬁnite time. An improved
algorithm, called the ﬁctitious default algorithm by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and
the greatest clearing vector algorithm by Rogers and Veraart (2013), skips over linear
10Note that this existence result is specific to financial networks where the liabilities between banks
are fixed numbers. This model is appropriate when banks only enter into debt contracts, i.e., loans
from one bank to another, or into financial derivatives that only depend on variables external to
the financial system. In the latter case, liabilities can be assumed to be fixed or the purpose of
clearing. In contrast, clearing payments need not exist (and need not be essentially unique) when
banks can also enter into credit default swaps, i.e., default insurance, on other banks in the network
(Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston, 2019).
11This is a consequence of the following theorem. If L is a complete lattice with maximal element
⊤ and F : L→ L is monotonic and continuous from above, then the iteration sequence defined by
x0 := ⊤ and xn+1 = F (xn) is decreasing and converges to a fixed point x+ of F that dominates
every other fixed point of F . This theorem is a special case of the Kleene and Tarski-Kantorovitch
fixed-point theorems (see Granas and Dugundji (2003)) and has become a standard tool in the theory
of financial networks, for example Rogers and Veraart (2013); Barucca et al. (2016). We provide a
simple proof in Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston (2019, Lemma 3). The statement for clearing
payment matrices follows via L := [0, l] with the point-wise ordering and F := Ψ.
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stretches of the iteration sequence by solving a linear equation system and terminates
with an exact solution after polynomially many steps.
Remark 2 (Individual payments, total payments, and recovery rates). Most pieces of
prior work do not consider the matrix of individual payments pij as the fundamental
object of clearing, but the vector of total payments pi or the vector of recovery rates
ri :=


1 if ai(p) ≥ li
a′i(p)
li
if ai(p) < li.
It is easy to see that the deﬁnition (1) of Ψ implies that pij = πijpi = lijri, so
that these three objects all deﬁne each other and being “clearing” can be deﬁned
in terms of either of them. In this paper, we ﬁnd that operating on the individual
payments is most convenient to establish relationships between the uncompressed
and the compressed network.
2.3 Portfolio Compression
Portfolio compression is the process of netting liabilities between any number of
banks while preserving each bank i’s net position
∑
j lji −
∑
j lij . We only consider
conservative compression (D’Errico and Roukny, 2019) in this paper, i.e., point-wise
reductions in liabilities. Again following D’Errico and Roukny (2019), we thus deﬁne
a compression as any way how a given ﬁnancial system can be compressed subject to
these two constraints, i.e., as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 (Compression). Let X = (N, e, l, α, β) be a ﬁnancial system. A com-
pression for X is a circulation in the weighted graph associated to l in the sense
of network ﬂow theory. That is, a compression is a matrix c ∈ [0, l] such that
ci :=
∑
j cij =
∑
j cji. If c is a compression for X, the ﬁnancial system X compressed
by c is Xc := (N, e, l − c, α, β). We also use a superscript · c for the liabilities, assets,
etc., evaluated in Xc. In particular, we write pc for the maximal clearing payments
in Xc. Let N(c) = {i ∈ N | ci > 0} be the set of banks involved in the compression.
Remark 3 (Cycles and Compressions). Veraart (2019) considered compression by cycles
(i.e., closed directed paths in the liability graph) rather than circulations. A cycle can
be viewed as a special case of a compression: if C is a cycle and 0 ≤ µ ≤ min(i,j)∈C lij ,
then c deﬁned by
cij =


µ if (i, j) ∈ C
0 otherwise
is obviously a compression for X. In this case, ci = µ if i ∈ C and ci = 0 otherwise.
By slight abuse of notation, we write c = (C, µ) for this kind of compression. By the
ﬂow decomposition theorem (see, e.g., Korte and Vygen (2012, Chapter 8)), for any
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compression c there exists a ﬁnite (not generally unique) set C of pairs (C, µ) like
above such that:
cij =
∑
(C,µ)∈C
s.t. (i,j)∈C
µ
Our most important example in the following considerations will be compressions
of form (C,min(i,j)∈C lij), where C is a cycle. However, we will show at the end of
Section 4 that, to correctly capture the systemic eﬀects of more complex compressions,
it is not suﬃcient to apply ﬂow decomposition and then consider individual cycles.
Thus, our deﬁnition of compressions as circulations oﬀers additional generality.
A compression of maximal value
∑
i ci, where the largest possible amount of
notional is eliminated, can be computed eﬃciently via linear programming (D’Errico
and Roukny, 2019) or via combinatorial algorithms (e.g., Korte and Vygen (2012,
Chapter 8)). Like for most ﬂow problems, the naive greedy algorithm, where cycles are
successively compressed until none are left, does not in general lead to a compression
of maximal value.
2.4 Utilities, Efficiency, Welfare
Given a matrix of payments p, deﬁne the balance Bi(p) of bank i as the diﬀerence
between assets and liabilities:
Bi(p) := ai(p)− li
Note that Bi(p) < 0 if and only if i defaults under p. Deﬁne the equity Ei(p) as the
balance if this is non-negative (i.e., if i is not in default):
Ei(p) := max (0, Bi(p)) = max (0, ai(p)− li)
If there is no risk of confusion, we leave out the p argument and simply write ai,
Bi, and Ei for the respective values under the maximal clearing payment matrix. We
likewise write aci , B
c
i , and E
c
i for these values in the compressed ﬁnancial system X
c
under the maximal payment matrix pc.
The equity is the proﬁt that the owners (i.e., the shareholders) of a bank get to
keep after clearing. Just like how a stock price can never be negative, the equity
value of a bank can never be negative, too. This is a consequence of limited liability
of equity holders. By the principle of absolute priority of debt, equity is zero in case
of default.12
12There does not seem to be a standard for the definition of the term “equity”. While, for example,
Barucca et al. (2016) and Veraart (2019) use the term “equity” to refer to what we call the balance,
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) use the term in the same manner as we do. In this paper, it is important
for us to differentiate between the two concepts of equity and balance.
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We assume that banks derive a utility from a ﬁnancial system that is equal to their
equity under the maximal clearing matrix of payments. Recall that a compression is
implemented if and only if each of the involved banks agrees to it, i.e., if it weakly
increases the equity of each involved bank. We can now deﬁne Pareto eﬃciency, social
welfare, and incentives in the usual way.
Deﬁnition 2. The social welfare in a ﬁnancial system X is the total equity
EΣ :=
∑
i∈N
Ei.
If c is a compression for X, then c is called a (weak) Pareto improvement if c weakly
increases the equity of each bank in the system, i.e., if Eci ≥ Ei ∀i ∈ N . The Pareto
improvement is strict if the inequality is strict for at least one i. We call c (weakly)
incentivized if it weakly increases the equity of each bank involved in the compression
(but it may reduce the equity of other banks). That is, we call c incentivized if
Eci ≥ Ei ∀i ∈ N(c). We call c strictly incentivized if the inequality is strict for at
least one i. Obviously, every Pareto improvement is incentivized and weakly increases
social welfare.
2.5 Discussion of Our Formal Model
If α = β = 1 (no default costs), then we know from Eisenberg and Noe (2001)
that EΣ = eΣ = E
c
Σ, where eΣ :=
∑
i ei. Thus, in this case, compression cannot
be welfare-improving and there can in particular be no strict Pareto improvements.
However, strictly incentivized compressions can exist and they can reallocate equity
from banks outside the compression to those inside. Prior work that studied systemic
risk in the model without default costs (Glasserman and Young, 2015; Demange,
2016) considered the aggregate payments (equivalently, the total balance) as a welfare
measure. This was necessary because total equity is a trivial measure if there are no
default costs. For the present paper, where we do assume default costs, it is easy
to see that EΣ < eΣ unless no bank defaults or α = β = 1, so that total equity is
not a trivial measure. We consider total equity a measure of social welfare that is
better motivated and better in line with banks’ incentives than total payments or
total balance.13
Recall that we do not assume that banks can actually make choices about com-
pression after a shock has struck and clearing has already taken place. Banks that
have already defaulted will be subject to severe limits on their capacity to contract.
13For example, it is not clear what immediate value society would derive from payments being
high per se. In contrast, equity has a clear interpretation as the amount of money that “leaves” the
financial system after all obligations have been settled. Note that the interests of society or the
real economy can be represented explicitly in this framework by adding them as synthetic nodes to
the network. These nodes will likely be leaves in the network and thus cannot be involved in any
compression.
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Instead, we take an ex-post perspective. A Pareto improvement is thus a compression
where everyone would agree in retrospect that they should have compressed. An
incentivized compression is one where the involved banks would agree on this.
Recall further that we do not perform an equilibrium analysis in this paper. A
compression is not an action that banks perform as part of some game. Rather, we
assume that a certain compression is provided exogenously by a central ﬁnancial
service provider (that is not a bank) and we are interested in eﬃciency and incentives
for this single given compression. Our results in the present paper may form the basis
for a future study of “stable” networks where no further incentivized compressions
exist. It may further serve as a ﬁrst step towards a study of the mechanism design
problem where banks strategically report the liabilities to compress and the ﬁnancial
service provider chooses the compression according to a known set of rules.
To the best of our knowledge, the following are the only known general results on
the eﬀect of compression on eﬃciency in prior work:
Theorem (Essentially Veraart (2019)). Let c be a compression for X = (N, e, l, α, β).
1. If α = β = 0, then c is a Pareto improvement.
2. The following two conditions are equivalent: i) none of the banks in N(c) default
in X, ii) none of the banks in N(c) default in Xc. If this condition holds, then
E = Ec point-wise, i.e., all banks are indiﬀerent regarding compression.
Proof. Veraart (2019) proved these statements when c is a cycle. It is easy to see
that her arguments generalize to arbitrary compressions.
Beyond these results, we note that compression aﬀects various measures of network
structure and prior work has studied the eﬀect of such measures on systemic risk
quite extensively. By connecting these two eﬀects, we can receive a ﬁrst indication
how compression may aﬀect systemic risk. The respective predictions vary across
diﬀerent models. We provide a discussion in Appendix A.
An immediate implication of part 2 of this theorem is that compression cannot
set all banks involved in it strictly better oﬀ: any incentivized compression leaves
some of the involved banks indiﬀerent. Likewise, no compression can set all involved
banks strictly worse oﬀ.
Corollary 1. If c is a compression for X, then there exist i, j ∈ N(c) such that
Ei ≤ Eci and Ej ≥ Ecj .
Proof. If no i like in the statement exists, then Ei > E
c
i ∀i ∈ N(c). In particular,
Ei > 0 ∀i ∈ N(c) and thus none of the banks in N(c) default in X. By the above
theorem, part 2, this implies E = Ec. Contradiction. Likewise, if Ecj > Ej ∀j ∈ N(c),
then none of those banks default in Xc and again, E = Ec.
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Figure 1 Financial System where compressing a cycle decreases social welfare. Variant
of Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston (2018, Figure 1). Let α = β = 0.5.
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3 Detrimental Effects of Compression
In this section, we illustrate using a series of examples that compression can have
beneﬁcial as well as detrimental eﬀects on eﬃciency, both in terms of social welfare
and in a Pareto sense, and that this eﬀect depends on the parameters of the ﬁnancial
system in a complex and non-monotonic way. Incentives to compress may further be
misaligned with the social good.
3.1 Compression May Reduce Social Welfare
The basis for our examples in this section is a variant of a ﬁnancial system ﬁrst
introduced in our prior work (Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston, 2018); see
Figure 1a. There are ﬁve banks A–E. Liabilities are depicted as blue arrows with
notionals next to them. External assets are depicted inside boxes on top of the banks.
There is a single cycle, A–B–C. We are interested in the eﬀect of compressing that
cycle, i.e., we consider the compression c = (A–B–C, 2). The result of the compression
is depicted in Figure 1b. Let α = β = 0.5. The way we would typically think
about this example is that all banks were initially solvent and may or may not have
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performed compression; then A was hit by a shock.14
Compression reduces social welfare. To see this, observe that in both the com-
pressed and uncompressed case, banks B and C have external assets so high that they
cannot default and bank A will always default. The key to our construction is that
the recovery rate of A, and equivalently the payment pAD, depends on whether or
not compression is performed. Since there is no cycle of defaulting banks, clearing
payments can be computed easily in topological order. In the uncompressed case,
we have a′A = α · 0.5 + β · 2 = 1.25 and thus pAD = pAB = 1/2 · a′A = 0.625. In
eﬀect, aD = 4.125 > 4 = lD and D does not default. In the compressed case, we have
a′cA = α · 0.5 = 0.25 and thus pcAD = a′cA = 0.25 and acD = 3.75 < 4 = lcD. Thus, D
defaults. As the external assets of D are relatively large, the default costs due to α
lead to a signiﬁcant drop in social welfare compared to the uncompressed case. This
dominates social welfare. More in detail, the equities in both cases are:
EA = 0 E
c
A = 0
EB = 0.625 E
c
B = 2
EC = 2 E
c
C = 2
ED = 0.125 E
c
D = 0
EE = 4 E
c
E = 1.75
EΣ = 6.75 E
c
Σ
= 5.75
The total share of value lost due to default costs is EΣ−eΣeΣ =
1.25
8 ≈ 0.15 in the
uncompressed and
Ef
Σ
−eΣ
eΣ
≈ 0.28 in the compressed case. This spread can be made
arbitrarily close to 1− α by increasing eC and lDE by the same amount.15
3.2 Dependence on External Assets and Default Costs
One may wonder how our result depends on the choice of parameters, speciﬁcally
how the diﬀerence in total equity ∆EΣ := E
c
Σ − EΣ depends on the default cost
parameters and the level of the external assets eA of A. We can determine two
boundary cases analytically: if α = β = 0, then Veraart (2019) has shown that
compression constitutes a (weak) Pareto improvement so ∆EΣ ≥ 0. In our case,
∆EΣ = E
c
B = 2 in case α = β = 0. If α = β = 1, we know from Eisenberg
and Noe (2001) that ∆EΣ = eΣ − eΣ = 0. The existence of our counterexample
(where ∆EΣ < 1) now implies that ∆EΣ must be non-monotonic in the default cost
parameters at least for eA = 0.5.
14If eA ≥ 2 and one of the other banks is exposed to shock instead, then compression is always a
Pareto improvement: for B and C, it is clear that it is better to isolate these banks from the others
as long as A can pay. For D and E, compression makes no difference.
15It can in fact be made arbitrarily close to 1 by replacing the bank E by a cycle of intermediation.
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Figure 2 Diﬀerence in total equity ∆EΣ between the compressed and uncompressed
network under variation in eA and α = β in Figure 1. The blue plane is zero.
Resolution: 0.01 steps in both parameters.
Figure 2 depicts the graph of ∆EΣ for all relevant values of α = β and eA
16.
The blue transparent plane is zero. It is easy to see analytically that D does not
default in X iﬀ αeA + β · 2 = α(eA + 2) ≥ 1 and D defaults in Xc iﬀ αeA < 0.5.
The intersection of these two regions is the blue “canyon,” where compression is
socially detrimental. Note how this set has a complex three-dimensional shape that
depends on both parameters. Note in particular that if we ﬁx a value of eA > 1.0,
the set {α | compression is socially detrimental for eA and α = β} is non-contiguous.
Analogously, for α = β ≈ 0.6, this is the case as we vary the eA values.
3.3 Individual Values for Default Cost Parameters
In the discussion so far, we have assumed that α = β. One may wonder to which
extent this is necessary for our result.
For the α parameter, it is easy to construct an equivalent example that does not
depend on the value of α at all. To do this, add a source bank s and replace the
external assets of all banks by an equivalent liability from s. Then give s suﬃciently
high external assets so that it cannot default. There is now no bank that holds any
external assets and can possibly default, so the value of α is irrelevant. The resulting
ﬁnancial system will behave like our original example for α = β. Thus, for any value
of α there exists a ﬁnancial system and a compression that decreases social welfare.
Note that this technique is general and can transform any ﬁnancial system where
α = β into an equivalent one where α is arbitrary.
16Note that only values eA ∈ [0, 2) are relevant since no bank defaults if eA ≥ 2 and thus, ∆EΣ = 0
trivially
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Figure 3 Diﬀerence in total equity between the compressed and uncompressed
network under variations in eA and α ≤ β = 1 in Figure 1. Resolution: 0.01 in both
parameters.
The remaining two boundary cases to explore are thus β = 0 and β = 1. For β = 0,
we will show in Section 4 below that this already implies that compression is a (weak)
Pareto improvement, and is in particular (weakly) socially beneﬁcial. For β = 1,
compression is (weakly) socially detrimental in our example for any value of α and
eA. This is because then EΣ = eΣ − (1− α)∑i∈D ei, where D is the set of defaulting
banks, (Rogers and Veraart, 2013, Lemma 4.8) and, by the above discussion, only the
default of D depends on any payments from others. It follows from the analytical
expressions for the default of D in Section 3.2 that if D defaults in X,then also in
Xc. Thus, ∆EΣ ≤ 0 and ∆EΣ = 0 iﬀ α = 1 or αeA ≥ 0.5. Figure 3 shows the
corresponding plot.
3.4 Detrimental Effects for Involved Banks and Pareto Worsening
Note that the banks A, B, and C that are part of the compressed cycle in our
running example beneﬁt from compression (some weakly, some strongly). Thus, this
compression is incentivized. We will show in Section 5 that this is always the case for
this kind of network topology. For the parameter values discussed above, compression
also reduces social welfare, so that incentives are misaligned with the social good.
This property is not universal. If we identify banks C and E, we receive the
ﬁnancial system in Figure 4. In this ﬁnancial system, bank C suﬀers from compression.
To see this note that C cannot default, so the outcome of clearing is the same as in
Section 3.1, except for that C’s equity is increased by what was E’s equity before.
We thus have EcC = 3.75 < 6 = EC , i.e., compression would harm C and C would
therefore not be willing to agree to it. Thus, c is not incentivized. Notice how C’s
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Figure 4 Financial system where compression hurts the cycle bank C.
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Figure 5 Financial system where compression hurts all banks (B, C, and D strictly).
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veto to compression is at the expense of B, who would beneﬁt from compression.
Keeping the cycle does not cause an immediate cost for C because B does not default
and thus allows C to support A “for free”. This eventually beneﬁts C. We will study
such phenomena in greater detail in Section 6 when we discuss homogeneity.
We can take the idea from the previous example one step further to receive a
ﬁnancial system where the equity of every bank decreases (strictly for some banks),
i.e., compression is a Pareto worsening. To do this, consider Figure 1 again and notice
that C is actually indiﬀerent between compression and non-compression, B gains
1.375 and E loses 2.25 from it. By eliminating E and splitting up the liability from D
to E into two separate liabilities to B and C, we can simultaneously split up the loss
and make compression strictly harmful for both B and C. See Figure 5. We now have:
EA = 0 E
c
A = 0
EB = 3.625 E
c
B = 3.3125
EC = 3 E
c
C = 2.4375
ED = 0.125 E
c
D = 0
EΣ = 6.75 E
c
Σ
= 5.75
Of course, the eﬀect can be made arbitrarily much stronger by increasing eD, lDB,
and lDC like before.
Note that, by Corollary 1, it is not possible that all banks strictly suﬀer from
compression.
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Figure 6 Individual equities and total equity dependent on the compressed amount
ζ in Figure 1. Resolution: 0.01
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3.5 Partial Compression
One can imagine a situation where only part of a feasible compression is executed.
This might be, for example, because in reality, opportunities for compression come
up over time and are executed in an on-line fashion. One might assume that partial
compression has a monotonic eﬀect on social welfare: if compression is beneﬁcial,
performing part of the compression should be less beneﬁcial, but still beneﬁcial
and vice versa. However, this is not the case even when we consider a single cycle.
Figure 6 shows the total equity and individual banks’ equities under the compression
c = (A–B–C, ζ) in our original example from Figure 1a. ζ = 0 corresponds to no
compression and ζ = 2 corresponds to full compression of the cycle. We also allow
negative values of ζ, which we interpret as increasing all liabilities in the cycle by −ζ.
Observe that, as we proceed from 0 to 2 in the graph, the total equity ﬁrst increases,
then experiences a discontinuous drop as D defaults (and thus EE drops sharply)
and then the total equity increases again, but not to its previous level. Observe
further that each of the individual equities is monotonic, only their sum EΣ is not.
Speciﬁcally, the banks A,B, and C involved in the compression monotonically proﬁt
from more compression while the other banks D and E are monotonically hurt by it.
This is a consequence of the network topology in this example, which we will discuss
in greater detail in Section 5.
3.6 Pareto Effects Without Additional Defaults
The eﬀects presented in the previous subsections are driven by the fact that the
default of bank D depends on whether or not compression is done. However, if β < 1,
then compression can also Pareto-decrease equities while the set of defaulting banks
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Figure 7 Financial system where compression hurts all banks (B, C, and D strictly).
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stays the same, by changing the paths that money takes. To see this, let α = β = 0.5
and consider Figure 7. We see immediately that C defaults and that this implies
that all banks except H default. If we compress the only cycle (A–B–C, 1), the same
banks default. Thus, H is the only bank with positive equity and EH = pAH + pFH
and EcH = p
c
AH + p
c
FH . To compute the payments in the uncompressed case, we ﬁrst
resolve the cycle. By p = Ψ(p) and since all banks default, we have:
pAB = 1/2 · 1/2 · pCA = 1/4 · pCA
pBC = 1/2 · pAB
pCA = 1/2 · 1/2 · (0.5 + pBC)
Solving this equation system yields pAH = pAB = 1/31, pBC = 1/62, and pCD =
pCA = 4/31. At each step of the path D–E–F–G–H, a factor of 1 − β = 0.5 is
lost due to default costs. We thus have pFH = (1/2)
4 · 4/31 = 1/8 · 1/31. Overall,
EH = (1 + 1/8) · 1/31. In the compressed network, all the money must take the
less eﬃcient path C–D–E–F, so pcAH = 0 and E
c
H = p
c
FH = (1/2)
5 · 1/2 = 1/64 <
(1+1/8) ·1/31 = EH . Thus, compression leads to a Pareto worsening without any new
defaults. Of course, one can make the eﬀect arbitrarily much stronger by increasing
the length of the longer path.
If we give A positive external assets rather than C, setting eC = 0 and eA = 0.5, we
can observe the opposite eﬀect: compression leads to a Pareto improvement because
it prevents money from ﬂowing via the ineﬃcient cycle and the longer path, and
instead routes it directly to H.
4 Local Sufficient Conditions for a Pareto Improvement
In the previous section, we have seen that compression need not constitute a Pareto
improvement, may in fact be a Pareto worsening, and that incentives for the involved
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banks may be misaligned with the social good. In this section, we present conditions
under which this cannot happen, i.e., where compression is always a Pareto improve-
ment. Our conditions will be local, i.e., they will not require any network calculations
beyond, in some cases, a lower bound for banks’ assets under the maximal clearing
values.
We begin by deﬁning two formal tools that will be useful in the rest of our
analytical examination.
Deﬁnition 3. Let c be a compression for X = (N, e, l, α, β), the change in relative
liability due to c is ∆πij := π
c
ij − πij ∈ [−1, 1). The adjusted compressed payments
are the matrix p′ := pc + c.
Remark 4. The following facts are easy to verify. The proof is omitted.
• If ci = 0, then ∆πij = 0 ∀j. That is, only relative liabilities of nodes involved
in the compression change.
• ∆πij > 0 iﬀ cij < πijci. Likewise, ∆πij ≤ 0 iﬀ cij ≥ πijci. That is, the “inside”
nodes of a compression are exactly those where the compressed amount is at
least in proportion to the relative liabilities.
• ∑j ∆πij = 0, except for when ci = li > 0, in which case ∆πij = −πij ∀j and
thus
∑
j ∆πij = −1.
• If c = (C, µ) is a cycle and µ < li, then ∆πij = −(1− πij) µli−µ < 0 if (i, j) ∈ C
and ∆πij = πij
µ
li−µ
> 0 if (i, j) /∈ C. If µ = li, then ∆πij = −πij ∀j
• p′ ∈ [0, l]. p′ = l iﬀ no bank defaults in Xc.
• Bi(p′) = Bci (pc) = Bci . In particular, Ei(p′) = Eci and if p′ ≥ p, then c is a
Pareto improvement.
The change in relative liabilities allows us to distinguish between banks “inside”
and “outside” the compression in a mathematically meaningful way. Intuitively, if
∆πij ≤ 0, we consider the edge (i, j) “rather inside” c and if ∆πij > 0 we consider
(i, j) “rather outside” c. Note that simply testing whether cij > 0 is not a good
way to do this for general compressions. For example, for any ﬁnancial system and
compression, we could simply increase both lij and cij by a suﬃciently small positive
number. Then we would suddenly have cij > 0 for all (i, j) and N(c) = N even
though the mathematical properties of the compression have not changed.
The last property in Remark 4 means that we can “transfer” the clearing payments
from the compressed ﬁnancial system Xc to the original system X by considering
the adjusted compressed payments instead. The payment matrix p′ is not usually
clearing because i) proportionality is not generally satisﬁed and ii) the c part of p′ is
not subjected to default costs due to β. Instead, we can interpret p′ as payments in
X that have a priority structure: payments in c are privileged before other payments
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and also avoid default costs. The following lemma provides a technical suﬃcient
condition under which this compression is beneﬁcial along all dimensions. The lemma
will be fundamental for all other, more conceptual suﬃcient conditions presented in
this section.
Lemma 1. Let c be a compression for a ﬁnancial system X = (N, e, l, α, β). Let p be
the maximal clearing payment matrix in X and let p ∨ c be the point-wise maximum
of p and c, i.e., (p ∨ c)ij = max(pij , cij). Assume that for all i, j ∈ N where ∆πij > 0
and i defaults under p ∨ c in X, we have:
∆πija
′
i(p ∨ c) + cij ≥ βπcijci
Then p′ ≥ p. In particular, compression by c weakly increases the balance of each
bank and is a Pareto improvement.
The proof of the lemma can be found in Appendix B. Recall that ∆πij = 0 if
i /∈ N(c). Thus, to verify the precondition of the theorem, we only need to look
at banks i that are involved in the compression. The precondition of the lemma is
not completely local because it depends on the maximal clearing payments p in X.
However, it only depends on p: once p is known, a′i(p ∨ c) = αei + β
∑
j max(pji, cji)
can be easily computed. Often, we can bound p from below, which may already
be enough to apply Lemma 1. We demonstrate some of these applications in the
following.
We call c immediately beneﬁcial at (i, j) for X if the preconditions of the lemma for
the pair (i, j) are satisﬁed. Note that this alone does not imply that pcij ≥ pij or that
bank j beneﬁts from compression. That is because compression may be detrimental
to other banks, which may negatively aﬀect i and j.17 — The precondition needs to
hold for all pairs (i, j) for the lemma to have any implications. We will now describe
a few simpler and more interpretable conditions that imply immediate benefits for
some pair. By definition, if for each pair (i, j) where ∆πij > 0 and i defaults (under
p or p ∨ c), one of these conditions hold, then c is a Pareto improvement.
An immediate implication of the theorem is that compression is always a Pareto
improvement if β = 0. This generalizes Veraart (2019, Theorem 3.7), where it was
shown that compression is always a Pareto improvement if α = β = 0. We thus learn
that the condition α = 0 was not actually necessary.
Corollary 2. For any ﬁnancial system X = (N, e, l, α, β = 0), any compression
is immediately beneﬁcial for all pairs. In particular, p′ ≥ p and c is a Pareto
improvement.
Proof. If β = 0, the right-hand side in the precondition of Lemma 1 is 0 and the
left-hand side is always non-negative. Thus, the precondition holds trivially.
17We explore the idea of these feedback effects further in Section 6.
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Compression is immediately beneﬁcial when the recovery rate of the contract
writer is not too low.
Theorem 1. Let X = (N, e, l, α, β) be a ﬁnancial system and assume that
ri ≥ β.
Then any compression is immediately beneﬁcial for any pair (i, j), for j ∈ N .
Proof. Let i, j be such that ∆πij > 0 and i defaults in X under p ∨ c. We have
ri = a
′
i(p)/li ≥ β by assumption and thus a′i(p ∨ c) ≥ a′i(p) ≥ βli. We now receive:
∆πija
′
i(p ∨ c) + cij ≥ β∆πijli + cij
= βπcijci − βcij + cij ≥ βπcijci
as required, where the second line is by the identity cij = π
c
ijci −∆πijli.
The previous theorem is only meaningful when β < α. This is because, if β ≥ α,
it is easy to see that if we have ri ≥ β = max(α, β), then already ri = 1, i.e., i does
not default under p and in particular not under p ∨ c.18 A default cost regime where
β < α is one in which external assets are relatively liquid, but interbank payments are
subject to high costs such as delays or legal uncertainty (see Section 2.2). Under this
regime, the theorem states that the creditors of a defaulting bank will still beneﬁt
from compression as long as said bank is not too deep in default. Note how this is
independent of the compression applied.
Theorem 1 does still not provide a fully local condition because it depends on the
recovery rates. We could derive a fully local condition from the theorem using the
estimate ri ≥ αei/li. However, the following theorem shows that a weaker version of
this condition is still suﬃcient.
Theorem 2. Let c be a compression for X = (N, e, l, α, β) and assume that α > 0
and
li = ci or
ei
li − ci ≥
β
α
.
Then c is immediately beneﬁcial for any pair (i, j) for j ∈ N .
Proof. The condition implies that αei ≥ β(li − ci) and thus a′i(p ∨ c) ≥ a′i(c) =
αei + βci ≥ βli. The statement now follows like in the proof of Theorem 1.
The term eili−ci =
ei
lc
i
is the reciprocal of the loan-to-value ratio
lci
ei
, which is a
common measure used to gauge the riskiness of giving a loan of lci to a would-be
18This holds for any bank under any clearing vector. We provide a proof of this “gap lemma” in
Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston (2019, Lemma 1). There, we consider an extension of the
model from the present paper to other contract types, but the argument is the same.
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debtor that has own capital of value ei. This is used especially in the context of
mortgages.
The precondition of the theorem implies that αei ≥ βlci and thus rci ≥ β. It can
thus be seen as a counterpart to Theorem 1 in Xc. If β ≥ α, then like in Theorem 1,
the precondition implies that i does not default in Xc. It might, however, default in
X.
Our ﬁnal suﬃcient condition enables us to relax the condition that we need to
consider all pairs (i, j) for which ∆πij > 0. Recall from Remark 4 that
∆πij ≤ 0 ⇔ cij ≥ πijci ⇔ cij/lij
ci/li
≥ 1.
That is, compression is immediately beneﬁcial if the relative decrease in the individual
liability lij is at least as big as the relative decrease in the total liabilities li of i. The
following theorem allows us to relax this condition from “at least as big” to “not too
much smaller.”
Theorem 3. Let c be a compression for a ﬁnancial system X = (N, e, l, α, β). Let
η : [0, 1)→ [0,∞)
η(x) =


0 if x = 0
x
1−x =
1
1
x
−1
otherwise.
Assume that
η(cij/lij)
η(ci/li)
≥ β.
Then c is immediately beneﬁcial for the pair (i, j).
Proof. Whenever ∆πij > 0, we must have cij < lij and in particular ci < li, otherwise
πcij = 0 and thus ∆πij ≤ 0. We must further have ci > 0, otherwise ∆πij = 0. Hence,
all fractions above are well-deﬁned. We now have:
η(cij/lij)
η(ci/li)
=
cij
lij−cij
ci
li−ci
=
cij
lij−cij
li−ci
ci
=
cij
πcijci
Thus, cij ≥ βπcijci. This implies the precondition of Lemma 1.
The function η is a continuous, monotonic, non-linear, and convex. We have
η(0) = 0 and limx→∞ η(x) =∞. Figure 8 provides an illustration. It is easy to see
that x ≥ y ⇒ η(x)/η(y) ≥ 1. Thus, the theorem provides a true relaxation over the
condition ∆πij ≥ 0. Note that if cij = 0 < lij , then η(cij/lij) = η(0) = 0 and so the
precondition is only satisﬁed in the trivial case where β = 0. This holds in particular
if c = (C, µ) is a cycle, i ∈ C, and (i, j) /∈ C.
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Figure 8 Function η from Theorem 3
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Figure 9 Financial System with a more complex Pareto-improving compression. Let
β = 0.5. α is irrelevant.
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(c) Partially Compressed
Note how Theorem 3 does not depend on e, but only on c and l, i.e., on the
network structure and the modiﬁcations we make to it.
For an example where the above theorem can be useful, consider Figure 9a and
the compression c = (A–B–C, 1) + (B–C–D, 1). This is clearly not a single cycle
like in the examples before. Figure 9b shows the compressed network. Let β = 0.5.
Whenever (i, j) 6= (C,A) we have ∆πij ≤ 0 because πcij = 0. However, we also have
∆πCA = 1− 2/3 = 1/3 > 0. At the same time,
η(cCA/lCA)
η(cC/lC)
=
η(1/2)
η(2/3)
=
1
2
.
Thus, for β = 0.5, this compression will always be a Pareto improvement for any
choice of the external assets.
We can use this example to illustrate another phenomenon. Let b = (A–B–C, 1).
Note that b ≤ c, i.e., b corresponds to executing only part of the compression c.
Figure 9c shows the result of compressing by b. Calculation shows that equities
correspond to the following table:
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i Ei E
b
i E
c
i
A 0 0.25 0
B 0.5 1.125 2
C 0 0 0
D 0 0 0
* 0.5 1.375 2
Note how partial compression ﬁrst increases the equity of A and then decreases it
again. This implies that even though both b and c are Pareto improvements and b is
a partial compression of c, this does not imply that c is also a Pareto improvement
over b. This provides a case for considering compression by arbitrary circulations, not
just by cycles. If we had only considered successive compression by Pareto-improving
cycles, we would not have been able to reach c even though it is superior to b with
respect to social welfare.
5 Sufficient Conditions for Incentivized Compression
We now turn to non-local conditions on the network structure under which compression
is incentivized or a Pareto improvement. Our main result will be that compression
is incentivized if there are no feedback paths. En-route to this result, we develop a
methodology that will enable us to decompose the eﬀects due to compression into
two separate phases: an immediate eﬀect on only the involved banks and a feedback
eﬀect due to reverberations of the immediate eﬀect in the rest of the network. When
the compression is relatively simple, e.g., just a single cycle, the immediate eﬀect is
easy to estimate while the feedback eﬀect depends on the surrounding network. Our
results from this and the following section will exploit the fact that we can sometimes
know the direction of one of the two eﬀects upfront.
Deﬁnition 4. Let c be a compression in a ﬁnancial system X = (N, e, l, α, β).
Let I = {(i, j) | lij > 0 ∧ cij > 0} and O = {(i, j) | lij > 0 ∧ cij = 0}. Observe that
Ψij(q) = 0 ∀q, (i, j) /∈ I ∪O. We can thus ignore pairs (i, j) /∈ I ∪O, i.e., pairs where
lij = 0. To simplify notation, we leave these pairs out. A feedback path is a path in O
from some bank in N(c) to another or the same bank in N(c). A chord is a feedback
path of length 1, i.e., an edge (i, j) ∈ O such that i, j ∈ N(c). c is called chord-free if
there are no chords. We call c normal for X if cij > 0⇒ ∆πij ≤ 0 for all i, j ∈ N .
The immediate-eﬀect payments p˜ in X due to c are the clearing payments in
Xc when all payments in O have been ﬁxed to their values in X. That is, p˜ is the
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point-wise maximal solution to the equation19
p˜ = Ψc(p˜I ∪ pO). (2)
Such a maximal solution exists by monotonicity of the function Ψc( · ∪ pO). Let
E˜ := Ec(p˜) and denote the other values analogously. Deﬁne the adjusted immediate-
eﬀect payments p˜′ := p˜+ c and observe that E(p˜′) = E˜.
The edges in I are those where any compression takes place. However, as we have
discussed at the beginning of Section 4, we should only consider those liabilities truly
“part of” the compression where ∆πij ≤ 0. In a normal compression, the two notions
are aligned. Note that any cycle c = (C, µ) is normal.
Note that if i /∈ N(c), then p˜ij = pij ∀j. This is because Ψcij(p) only depends on the
components (pki)k∈N and by assumption we have (k, i) ∈ O ∀k, so p˜ij = Ψcij(p˜I ∪ pO)
only depends on pO and by assumption, Ψ
c
ij = Ψij . Thus, the immediate-eﬀect
payments only concern the banks in N(c) and payments within and leaving this set.
The following lemma shows how our decomposition can be useful.
Lemma 2. Let c be a compression for a ﬁnancial system X.
1. If c is normal for X, then p˜′I ≥ pI . If c is normal and chord-free for X, then
E˜i ≥ Ei for all i ∈ N(c).
2. If p˜O ≥ pO, then pc ≥ p˜. In particular, pcO ≥ p˜O ≥ pO and Eci ≥ Ei for all
i /∈ N(c). If further, every bank i ∈ N(c) has a liability in O, then p′ ≥ p˜′ ≥ p
and thus c is a Pareto improvement.
3. If p˜′ ≥ p, then p′ ≥ p˜′ ≥ p and thus c is a Pareto improvement.
The proof can be found in Appendix B.
Part 1 shows that the immediate eﬀects of a (chord-free) compression are always
positive to those banks participating in it. Thus, if a compression is not incentivized,
this must be due to the feedback eﬀect.
Part 2 and 3 are useful because they tell us that, as far as Pareto improvements
(for all banks or the banks not involved in the compression) are concerned, it is
suﬃcient when the immediate eﬀects are beneﬁcial. We will use this fact in Section 6.
Our theorem regarding feedback paths follows from part 1 of the lemma because,
if there are no feedback paths, feedback eﬀects do not matter to the banks involved
in the compression.
Theorem 4. If c is normal for X and there are no feedback paths, then c is incen-
tivized.
19Recall that we denote restriction of indices to a subset by an index and concatenation along
disjoint subsets of indices by a union. Thus, p˜I ∪pO is a matrix with indices in N ×N and (p˜I ∪ pO)ij
is p˜ij if (i, j) ∈ I and pij if (i, j) ∈ O.
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Proof. By Lemma 2 part 1, it is enough to show that E˜i = E
c
i for all i ∈ N(c). This
is for the following reason. Let G be the graph with adjacency matrix l. Let
A := {(i, j) ∈ O | there is a path j → N(c) in G}
B := {(i, j) ∈ O | there is a path N(c)→ i in G} .
Since there are no feedback paths, A, I, and B are pair-wise disjoint and for all q,
ΨA(q) is independent of qI and qB, and ΨI(q) is independent of qB. The same holds
for Ψc. This implies that pcA = p˜A = pA and p
c
I = p˜I . And E
c
i for i ∈ N(c) only
depends on pcA and p
c
I and likewise for E˜i.
When we look back at our example from Section 3.1 through the lens of Theorem 1,
it is now clear that compression will always be incentivized in this example. Note in
particular that this does not depend on the external assets, recovery rates or on which
banks default. It also does not depend on the compressed amount (cf. Section 3.5). We
also learn from this example that this kind of compression is always incentivized, but
need not even increase social welfare, let alone be a Pareto improvement. Section 3.6
provides another example where there are no feedback path and thus compression is
always incentivized, but need not be socially beneﬁcial.
Remark 5. It is easy to see that not all feedback paths will impair the conclusion
of the theorem, but only those where all banks that are part of the feedback path
default in Xc. By bounding the assets of these banks from below, perhaps similarly
to how we did it in Section 4, one may be able to receive a weaker suﬃcient condition
in Theorem 4.
In the real world, it does not seem that banks consider it a complex strategic
decision whether or not they should agree to a compression. Rather, it seems that
proposed compressions are agreed to in the vast majority of cases. The lemma and
the theorem suggest local information or local reasoning as a possible explanation
why this might be the case. Feedback paths lie in a part of the network not directly
related to the compression. If a bank has limited information about the network
structure, it may (incorrectly) assume that feedback paths do not exist. Alternatively,
the bank may simply not reason about feedback eﬀects, but only about immediate
eﬀects. If it then also assumes that the compression is normal (for example, because
it has limited information about the parts of the compression that it is not directly
involved in), it may conclude via Theorem 4 of Lemma 2 part 1 that compression
is always beneﬁcial. Note that the lemma and the theorem do not depend on the
external assets and thus on any shocks, so that this decision can be conﬁdently made
ex-ante.
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6 Homogeneity
In this section, we consider network structure at an even higher level. Going back to
those examples from Section 3 where compression was socially detrimental, we can
observe that there was always one bank that was vastly worse oﬀ than the others.
For example, in Figure 1, bank A was very poorly capitalized while the two other
banks in the cycle were very well capitalized. In this section, we show that such
a high-level structure is in fact necessary for our examples: if there is a suﬃcient
degree of homogeneity among the balance sheets of involved banks, then compression
is always a Pareto improvement.
6.1 Perfect Homogeneity
The following theorem proves our statement analytically for the case of perfect
homogeneity.
Theorem 5. Let c be a compression for a ﬁnancial system X and assume that
the following values are the same across all i ∈ N(c): ei, pOi := ∑j:(j,i)∈O pji,
lIi :=
∑
j:(j,i)∈I lji, liO :=
∑
j:(i,j)∈O lij, liI :=
∑
j:(i,j)∈I lij, and ci. In this case, we
call the pair (X, c) homogeneous. Then c is a Pareto improvement.
The proof of the theorem can be found in Appendix B. Note that, in the previous
theorems, none of the individual values lij or cij need to be equal; they only need
to be equal in aggregate. This is important for compressions that are more complex
than a cycle. There are several simple classes of examples for (X, c) pairs that are
homogeneous in the sense of Theorem 5:
• Let M be the adjacency matrix of a regular directed graph G, let γ ≥ 0, and
let l = γ ·M . Let ei := δ ∀i, where δ ≥ 0 is arbitrary. Let C be any cycle in G,
let µ ≤ γ and let c = (C, µ). Then X and c are homogeneous in the sense of
Theorem 5.
• Consider the set of homogeneous (X, c) pairs where N(c) has no incoming
liabilities from O, i.e., lji = 0 for any i ∈ N(c) and (j, i) ∈ O. It follows
immediately from the deﬁnition that this set forms a polytope. In particular,
convex combinations of two such homogeneous pairs are homogeneous. Note
that Theorem 4 implies that such compressions are always incentivized if they
are normal.
• If (X, c) is homogeneous and Y is any ﬁnancial system, we can consider the
disjoint union of the two and connect N(c) to nodes in Y in any way such that∑
j∈Y lij is the same across i ∈ N(c). If we call the new ﬁnancial system Z,
(Z, c) is homogeneous.
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Figure 10 Simple ﬁnancial system that is homogeneous together with the compression
c = (A–B–C, 1).
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6.2 Towards a Sufficient Degree of Homogeneity
The theorem only makes a statement about (X, c) pairs where the diﬀerent asset and
liability values are exactly the same. However, intuition seems to suggest that it is
not crucial that these values match exactly; there should be some slack. We study
this hypothesis using an example of a particularly simple homogeneous (X, c) pair: a
cycle where each bank has the same outgoing liabilities and the same external assets
(see Figure 10). We then gradually make the pair less homogeneous by changing
the external assets of a single node, say A. Given the role of the β parameter we
revealed in Section 4, we hypothesize that more homogeneity is required for a Pareto
improvement when β is higher. To isolate this eﬀect, we ﬁx α = 0.5 and consider the
eﬀect of compression on the equities under variation of eA and β.
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By Theorem 4, c is always incentivized, so the equities of banks A, B, and C will
always weakly increase.21 Figure 11 depicts the minimum diﬀerence in equity across
the other three banks D, E, and F. This number is above zero (i.e., the curve is above
the blue zero plane in the ﬁgure) iﬀ c is a Pareto improvement.
The ﬁgure reinforces our hypothesis. Consistent with our ﬁndings in Section 4,
compression is a Pareto improvement for a wide range of eA values when β is low.
As we increase β, however, this region continuously becomes more narrow until
it converges to the point 0.5 for β = 1: here, we require exact homogeneity for
compression to be a Pareto improvement.
20Further experiments not documented in the present paper show that the value of α ∈ (0, 1] affects
our finding quantitatively, but not qualitatively. For α = 0, banks are indifferent to compression for
all but very high values of eA because all banks default, so all value is destroyed. A choice of α = β
does not imply a qualitative difference, either. The data is available upon request.
21Note, however, that all banks default in this examples unless eA ≥ 1, in which case A does not
default in Xc. Only for eA ≥≈ 1.56 A does not default in X and compression is detrimental for E.
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Figure 11 Minimum diﬀerence in equity across the nodes D,E,F in Figure 10 when
varying β and eA. We ﬁx α = 0.5. Note that the minimum is not taken in absolute
value. The blue plane is zero. Resolution: 0.01 steps in both parameters.
Our experiment suggests that one may be able to obtain a quantiﬁed version of
Theorem 5 where an “amount of homogeneity” inversely dependent on β may be
enough to guarantee that compression is a Pareto improvement. An analytical result
in this vein would constitute substantial progress towards a deeper understanding of
compression.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied portfolio compression, a post-trade mechanism which
eliminates cycles in the ﬁnancial network. We have studied the incentives for banks
to engage in portfolio compression and its systemic eﬀects in terms of banks’ equity.
We have shown that whether or not compression is socially or individually desirable
depends on the parameters of the ﬁnancial system and the compression in a com-
plex and non-monotonic way and the incentives for participating banks to perform
compression may be misaligned with the social good. We have presented suﬃcient
conditions under which compression is a Pareto improvement. We have shown that
banks always have an incentive to agree to compression unless there are feedback
paths. Finally, we have identiﬁed homogeneity of participating banks’ balance sheets
as an important driver of eﬃciency of compression.
Our results reveal the default costs on interbank payments, encoded by the β
parameter in our model, as a central factor for the ex-post desirability of compression.
This is intuitive: when part of each payment is lost, it makes sense to have less
of them. Our results on homogeneity suggests that portfolio compression may be
particularly eﬀective in a ﬁnancial system where many actors are exposed to the same
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(or similar kinds of) risks, so that if a large shock hits certain assets, then it hits all
banks at once. Haldane (2009) describes how the pre-crisis ﬁnancial system, through
a convergence of investment and risk management strategies, had indeed been put
into this very situation where “ﬁnancial sector balance sheets became homogenised.”
This may be taken as an indication that compression is indeed helpful to protect
from another 2008 crisis; of course, further research is needed before any deﬁnite
conclusions can be drawn.
An important avenue for future work will be to leave the ex-post model considered
in this paper and take on an ex-ante perspective. Assuming a probability distribution
of shocks and assuming that banks maximize their expected equity, which compressions
are eﬃcient and incentivized, respectively, in terms of expected equity? Incorporating
uncertainty about the future in this way will be an important step towards an
evaluation of compression from a practical point of view. This perspective may
provide another explanation for why banks usually agree to compression and it may
reveal another disconnect between the incentives of banks and the interests of society:
perhaps compression is beneﬁcial in expectation, but has strong detrimental eﬀects in
a small part of the probability space.
The insights from an ex-ante study may also help answer the question regarding
regulatory incentives for compression. To date, one of the strongest incentives for
banks to engage in compression is relief of regulatory capital requirements. Are these
capital reliefs justiﬁed relative to the systemic impact of compression? Should we
further incentivize or disincentivize compression? Or might the issue of portfolio
compression point to a fundamental ﬂaw of prescribing capital requirements relative
to a single number, namely risk-weighted assets?
Finally, central clearing and portfolio compression in non-centrally cleared markets
both serve the same goal: to reduce notionals by rewiring the network. Ultimately,
we need to be able to judge which of these approaches is more appropriate to reduce
systemic risk in the future: central clearing, compression, or perhaps leaving the
network as it is while increasing transparency? Answering these questions requires an
understanding of the eﬀect of network modiﬁcations on systemic risk, to which we
hope to have contributed a ﬁrst step.
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A Effect of Compression on Prior Work
Researchers have previously studied the eﬀect of network structure on systemic risk.
We can examine how compression aﬀects network structure at a grand scale and then
apply their results. From this, we receive a ﬁrst indication what eﬀects we might
expect from compression on average. Note that all we can expect from this exercise
is an a tendency: apart from Veraart (2019), no prior piece of work has studied the
eﬀect of compression on a per-network basis.
Glasserman and Young (2015) studied the eﬀect of a random shock to banks’
external assets on the aggregate payments in the Eisenberg and Noe (2001) model
(i.e., our model without default costs) where every bank has an outside liability bi ≥ 0
in addition to its interbank liabilities. The authors provided suﬃcient conditions
under which the extent of ﬁnancial contagion is bounded. These suﬃcient conditions
are based on the following local properties of each bank:
• Its ﬁnancial connectivity βi = li/(li + bi), which measures the share of its
interbank liabilities relative to all its liabilities.
• Its leverage of outside assets λi = ei/Ei(l), where Ei(l) = ei +∑j lji − li is the
book value of equity of i, i.e., the equity of bank i if all its creditors pay in full.
• Its external assets ei.
Observe that compression reduces ﬁnancial connectivity and keeps leverage of outside
assets and external assets the same. Thus, compression makes the suﬃcient conditions
weaker and thus the overall bounds stronger.22 These results therefore suggest an
overall positive eﬀect of compression, which is however very coarse: unless compression
transports a ﬁnancial system from not satisfying the suﬃcient conditions to satisfying
them, we should not expect any implications.
Bardoscia et al. (2017) assessed the stability of a ﬁnancial system based on the
greatest eigenvalue of the leverage matrix Λij = lij/Ej(l). The lower this eigenvalue,
the more stable the system, where 1 is an important threshold value. Since compression
reduces l point-wise and keeps Ei(l) the same, it reduces the leverage matrix point-
wise and thus also reduces its maximal eigenvalue. Thus, compression should make
each individual network more stable in the sense of this paper.
Battiston et al. (2012) studied the spread of ﬁnancial contagion in a model similar
to the SIR (susceptible–infected–resistant) class of models from epidemiology. A level
of ﬁnancial distress of ψi ∈ [0, 1] at bank i causes a level of ﬁnancial distress of Λijψi
at each creditor j, where Λ is the leverage matrix from above. Since compression
reduces Λ point-wise, it reduces contagion in this model. Any SIR-style model where
22Precisely, this statement should be interpreted as follows: consider any of the sufficient conditions
in Glasserman and Young (2015) and fix their parameters. If c is a compression for X and X satisfies
the condition, then so does Xc; there exists an X such that Xc satisfies the condition, but X does
not.
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infection propagates via liabilities will likely share this property.
Elliott, Golub and Jackson (2014) considered a model of cross-holdings of (essen-
tially) equity cross-holdings and isolate two network measures, both of which must
have intermediate levels for contagion to occur: integration, which measures the share
of an organization held by ﬁnancial, compared to external, actors. Diversiﬁcation
measures how spread out the ﬁnancial part of the cross-holdings is. While there seem
to be several options how one could deﬁne compression for a cross-holdership model,
it seems that any sensible deﬁnition would reduce both integration and diversiﬁcation.
The overall eﬀect would therefore be ambiguous.
Demange (2016) studied aggregate payments in the Eisenberg/Noe model like
(Glasserman and Young, 2015), but focused on the partial derivatives of this measure
with respect to changes in a banks’ external assets. This is what she called the threat
index µi of bank i. The threat index depends on the set of defaulting banks. If the
set D ⊆ N of banks default under the maximal clearing matrix of payments, then
µi = 0 if i /∈ D and for the collection µD = (µi)i∈D and πD := (πij)i,j∈D we have:
µD = 1 + πDµD
⇔ µD = (I − πD)−1 1 =
∞∑
k=0
πkD1,
where 1 := (1, ... , 1).23 Like in the related formula for Katz centrality (cf. the
corresponding discussion in Demange (2016)), we thus have for i ∈ D:
µi =
∑
P path
starting at i
∏
(j,k)∈P
πjk
The risk index of a bank i is the sum over the products of π values of paths starting
at i. Compression transforms the π values in a non-linear and non-monotonic way. It
may also move a bank into or out of default. This is why compression may increase
or decrease a bank’s risk index.
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The key technical step in the proof is that the precondition to
the lemma implies the following:
Claim. For any q ∈ [0, l − c] such that q + c ≥ p we have:
Ψc(q) + c ≥ Ψ(q + c) (3)
23For the first line, see Demange (2016, Theorem 1). The second line is by linear algebra and the
Neumann series. The series converges because we restricted our attention to the set of defaulting
banks.
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Proof of the Claim. Consider the inequality for an individual entry (i, j) on both
sides. It is easy to see that
aci (q) = ai(q) = ai(q + c)− ci
a′ci (q) = a
′
i(q) = a
′
i(q + c)− βci
and, of course, lci = li − ci. Thus, bank i defaults under q in Xc iﬀ it defaults under
q+ c in X. In case of non-default, (3) for (i, j) is of course equivalent to lcij + cij ≥ lij
and trivially true with equality. Thus, assume that i defaults in these cases. Then (3)
for (i, j) is equivalent to:
πcija
′
i(q) + cij ≥ πija′i(q + c)
⇔πcija′i(q + c)− πcijβci + cij ≥ πija′i(q + c)
⇔ ∆πija′i(q + c) + cij ≥ βπcijci (4)
The second line is by the above identity and the third line is by simple algebra. We
now distinguish the cases ∆πij ≤ 0 and ∆πij > 0.
If ∆πij ≤ 0, then we can use the identity cij = πcijci −∆πijli to see that (4) is
equivalent to:
∆πij(li − a′i(q + c)) ≤ (1− β)πcijci
Since i defaults under q + c in X, the parenthesis on the left-hand side is ≥ 0. Since
∆πij ≤ 0, the left-hand side is non-positive and the right-hand side is positive, so the
inequality holds trivially.
If ∆πij > 0, we observe that, if q is as speciﬁed in the claim, then q + c ≥ p and
(since q ≥ 0) also q+ c ≥ c. Thus, q+ c ≥ p∨ c and this implies that i) i also defaults
under p ∨ c in X and ii) ∆πija′i(q + c) ≥ ∆πija′i(p ∨ c). Now (4) follows from the
precondition of the lemma.24 (Claim)
With the claim shown, we can prove the statement of the lemma by induction on
the iteration sequence that converges to the clearing payments. More in detail, let:
p0 = l pc,0 = l − c p′n = pc,n + c
pn+1 = Ψ(pn) pc,n+1 = Ψc(pc,n)
We know that pn → p, pc,n → pc, and thus p′n → p′ for n→∞, all from above (see
Section 2.2). We now prove by induction that p′n ≥ pn ∀n. This immediately implies
p′ ≥ p.
24Note that it is in fact equivalent to the precondition of the lemma that (4) hold for all specified q
in the ∆πij > 0 case lemma because
∧ {q + c | q ∈ [0, l − c], q + c ≥ p} = p ∨ c.
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For n = 0, we trivially have p′0 = l = p0. Assuming p′n ≥ pn, we have
p′n+1 = pc,n+1 + c = Ψc(pc,n) + c ≥ Ψ(pc,n + c) = Ψ(p′n) ≥ Ψ(pn) = pn+1.
The ﬁrst inequality is by the above claim. The claim is applicable because pc,n + c =
p′n ≥ pn ≥ p by induction hypothesis. The second inequality is by the induction
hypothesis and monotonicity of Ψ.
Proof of Lemma 2. 2: By assumption and monotonicity of Ψc, we have
Ψc(p˜) = Ψc(p˜I ∪ p˜O) ≥ Ψc(p˜I ∪ pO) = p˜.
By the Knaster-Tarski ﬁxed point theorem (see, e.g., Granas and Dugundji (2003)),
we have
pc =
∨
{q ∈ [0, l − c] | Ψc(q) ≥ q} ,
where “
∨
” denotes the point-wise supremum. By the above, p˜ is a member of the set
on the right-hand side and thus pc ≥ p˜. Now trivially by assumption pcO ≥ p˜O ≥ pO.
If i /∈ N(c), then (j, i) ∈ O whenever lji > 0 for all j. Thus, since pcO ≥ pO, we
have aci (p
c) ≥ ai(p). At the same time, since i /∈ N(c), lci = li. This implies Eci ≥ Ei.
For the second sentence, we show that under the preconditions also p˜′ ≥ p′. Then
the statement follows by part 3. Let (i, j) ∈ I. If there is a k such that (i, k) ∈ O,
then we have r˜ilik = p˜ik ≥ pik = r˜ilik and thus r˜i ≥ ri and
p˜′ij = r˜i(lij − cij) + cij = r˜ilij + (1− r˜i)cij ≥ rilij = pij .
3: The statement implies the precondition to the ﬁrst sentence of part 2 since
p˜′O = p˜O and p
′
O = pO. Therefore, p
′ = pc+ c ≥ p˜+ c = p˜′. And p˜′ ≥ p by assumption.
1: Similarly to the proof of Lemma 1, the result is driven by the following
statement, which only holds if c is chord-free:
Claim. If c is normal for X and qI ∈ [0, (l − c)I ] be arbitrary, then:
ΨcI(qI ∪ pO) + c ≥ ΨI((qI + cI) ∪ pO) (5)
Proof of the Claim. Let (i, j) ∈ I and deﬁne for convenience q′I := qI + cI . We
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distinguish two cases based on the default of i. Note that
aci (qI ∪ pO) = ei +
∑
k:(k,i)∈I
qI,k,i +
∑
k:(k,i)∈O
pO,k,i
= ei +
∑
k:(k,i)∈I
(qI,k,i + cki) +
∑
k:(k,i)∈O
pO,k,i − ci = ai(q′I ∪ pO)− ci
a′ci (qI ∪ pO) = a′i(q′I ∪ pO)− βci
lci = li − ci.
Thus, i defaults (i.e., assets are below liabilities) in Xc under qI ∪ pO iﬀ it defaults in
X under q′I ∪ pO. In case of non-default, we have
Ψcij(qI ∪ pO) + c = lcij + c = lij = Ψij(q′I ∪ pO),
and in particular (5) holds for (i, j). In case of default, we have
Ψcij(qI ∪ pO) + c = πcija′ci (qI ∪ pO) + cij = πcija′i(q′I ∪ pO)− πcijβci + cij
Ψij(q
′
I ∪ pO) = πija′i(q′I ∪ pO)
Taking the diﬀerence, we have ΨcI(qI ∪ pO) + c ≥ ΨI(q′I ∪ pO) iﬀ
∆πija
′
i(q
′
I ∪ pO) + cij ≥ βπcijci.
Via the elementary identity cij = π
c
ijci −∆πijli, this is equivalent to
∆πij
(
li − a′i(q′I ∪ pO)
) ≤ (1− β)πcijci.
On the left-hand side, since c is normal, the ﬁrst factor is ∆πij ≤ 0, and since i
defaults, the second factor is ≥ 0. Thus, the left-hand side is non-positive. Since the
right-hand side is always non-negative, the inequality holds.
With the claim proven, we can show our original statement p˜′I ≥ pI . Deﬁne two
sequences of vectors
p˜0I := lI − cI p0I := lI
p˜n+1I := Ψ
c
I(p˜
n
I ∪ pO) pn+1I := ΨI(pnI ∪ pO).
By deﬁnition, p˜I is the maximal ﬁxed point of the map qI ∈ [0, (l − c)I ] 7→
ΨcI(qI ∪ pO). Also, pI is the maximal ﬁxed point of the map qI ∈ [0, lI ] 7→ ΨI(qI ∪ pO)
because p is the maximal ﬁxed point of Ψ.25 Thus, by the well-known extension of
25This follows via the Tarski-Knaster fixed point theorem if we consider Ψ as a function of two
variables Ψ(qI , qO). See Lemma 3 in Appendix C.
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the Tarski-Knaster ﬁxed point theorem (see Remark 1), we have that p˜nI → p˜I and
pnI → pI from above for n→∞.
Note that p˜0I = p
0
I and via the claim, p˜
n
I + cI ≥ pnI ⇒ p˜n+1I + cI ≥ pn+1I . Thus,
by induction, p˜nI + cI ≥ pnI and by taking the limit, p˜′I = p˜I + cI = limn (p˜nI + cI) ≥
limn p
n
I = pI .
Towards the second part of the statement, if c is chord-free and i ∈ N(c), then
for all j ∈ N we either have (i, j) ∈ I and thus p˜′ij ≥ pij or ci = cij = 0 and thus
p˜′ij = p˜ij = pij . Therefore, ai(p˜
′) ≥ ai(p) and thus Bci (p˜) = Bi(p˜′) ≥ Bi(p). In
particular, E˜i ≥ Ei.
Proof of Theorem 5. Consider the immediate-eﬀect payments p˜ and consider the
recovery rates r˜i =
p˜i∗
lc
i
. We show that r˜i ≥ ri ∀i ∈ N(c). This implies the statement
via Lemma 2 because then
p˜′ij = r˜i(lij − cij) + cij = r˜ilij + (1− r˜i)cij ≥ r˜ilij = pij ∀i ∈ N(c), j ∈ N.
The recovery rates r˜i =: ρ˜ and ri =: ρ are the same across all i ∈ N(c). To see
this, consider the sequences
p˜0 := (l − c)I ∪ pO p0 := lI ∪ pO
p˜n+1 := Ψc(p˜nI ∪ pO) pn+1 := Ψ(pnI ∪ pO).
We know that p˜n → p˜ and pn → p monotonically decreasing for n → ∞ (see the
proof of Lemma 2). We show by induction that ρ˜n := r˜ni :=
p˜ni∗
lc
i
and ρn := rni :=
pni∗
li
are equal, respectively, across i ∈ N(c). This implies that also r˜i and ri must be
equal, respectively, across i ∈ N(c), via continuity from above. For n = 0, the two
statements are trivial because r˜0i = r
0
i = 1. Given the statement for n, we have:
aci (p˜
n
I , pO) = ei + pOi +
∑
j:(j,i)∈I
p˜nji = ei + pOi + ρ˜
n (lIi − ci)
a′ci (p˜
n
I , pO) = αei + βpOi + β
∑
j:(j,i)∈I
p˜nji = αei + βpOi + βρ˜
n (lIi − ci)
lci = liO + liI − ci.
By assumption, all of these values are the same across i ∈ N(c) and thus,
r˜n+1i =


1 if aci (p˜
n
I , pO) ≥ lci
a′ci (p˜
n
I
,pO)
lc
i
if aci (p˜
n
I , pO) < l
c
i
are the same across i ∈ N(c). An analogous argument holds for the rni .
The above-described symmetry implies that either all or no bank in N(c) default
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and this is independent of compression. More in detail:
• If, equivalently across i ∈ N(c), li ≤ ai(p0I , pO) = ei + pOi + lIi, then p1 = p0
and thus pn = p0 ∀n, p = p0, and ρ = 1. Further, lci = li− ci ≤ ai(p0I , pO)− ci =
aci (p˜
0
I , pO) and thus p˜ = p˜
0 and ρ˜ = 1.
• If li > ei + pOi + lIi, then ρ ≤ ρ1 < 1 and ρ˜ ≤ ρ˜1 < 1 by the same argument.
If ρ˜ = ρ = 1, our statement is of course trivially true. If ρ˜, ρ < 1, we have by symmetry
and the clearing identity (1) (let i ∈ N(c) be arbitrary):
ρ =
αei + βpOi + βρlIi
li
ρ˜ =
αei + βpOi + βρ˜ (lIi − ci)
li − ci
Solving for ρ and ρ˜, respectively, and simplifying yields:
ρ =
αei + βpOi
li − βlIi
ρ˜ =
αei + βpOi
li − βlIi − (1− β)ci
And this obviously implies ρ˜ ≥ ρ. Note that both fractions are well-deﬁned since,
if li − βlIi − (1 − β)ci = 0, then in particular li − ci ≤ lIi and thus, by the above
discussion, i would not default. Likewise for li − βlIi.
C Fixed Points of Monotonic Functions
Lemma 3. Let K,L be complete lattices and let F : K × L→ K × L be monotonic.
Let (x+, y+) be the (unique) maximal ﬁxed point of F . Then x+ is the maximal ﬁxed
point of the function x 7→ F1(x, y+).
Note that the converse of the lemma does not hold. For example, letK = L = [0, 1]
and F (x, y) = (y, x). Then 0 is the unique (and therefore maximal) ﬁxed point of
F1( · , 0) and of F2(0, · ), but (0, 0) is not the maximal ﬁxed point of F .
Proof. Let x∗ be the maximal ﬁxed point of x 7→ F1(x, y+). We will show that
x∗ = x+. As x+ is a ﬁxed point of F1( · , y+) by choice of (x+, y+), we have x+ ≤ x∗.
It remains to show “≥”.
We have (x∗, y+) ≤ F (x∗, y+). To see this, consider the two components of F
separately. We have x∗ = F1(x
∗, y+) by choice of x∗. For the second component, note
that y+ = F2(x
+, y+) ≤ F2(x∗, y+), where the equality is by choice of (x+, y+) and
the inequality is because x+ ≤ x∗. Now, by Tarski’s ﬁxed point theorem, we have
(x+, y+) =
∨
{(x, y) | (x, y) ≤ F (x, y)} ,
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where “
∨
” denotes the supremum. By the above, (x∗, y+) is a member of the set on
the right-hand side and thus (x+, y+) ≥ (x∗, y+), i.e., x+ ≥ x∗.
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